



lB 18. 1675 Tw (614-72 Malsen miti Cantab: Soc: iv: Joh: ti ut

Fred Sum 128. of Text us to Billy " Remember" them. Desire bode recomboul required to man Ryrands etc. But Legent on Ost Persentinion Thoughts, to work on our offections 12 quie view poased for quies + quille in prayers + Rollow Plan (Somi auti-papielo (pringaling etc.)) p 23. Julgel so well, not often suprized by event Equality & wind - been convert beyond columers & nature topper Inde Actigably Preading Brid Mutil : apt + plain Arust berefit Brenewloud, asysterially in that, which I concer is much more consul them undistand. I were the design of the Royal Seerily, No calley a lessary of the great so is the fine Prudent Laterna in dissimulation Abhonch a lie + would be connective de onined From sever sty prevenued informing, when proceeded from there & gold unwell Mei- Steen , That he was not better undertail he been as his inistantes We give represt radius it weld, here to proceedy (indeal ', ' mant fight 2001 Barelink 4 to with Faren for dissources persons a wayr. AB educated by grand Puthe 1/1, 202 Protest a furt hatral of this hand rebellion

Res p 20 Minah 21 Proper in Sputh Tautrich 27 Grating 36 Avistor, Var + Kelin, 37 Not Dear: De Leals, Tuse, Epitt, De Net Dear Sener Tally ? 45 De Beuefre Severa, Alto, Autorite, Athay 55 Tilleton 55 Awar 62 Metawyongs 80 82100 +258 .. 88 102 Severe x 2 104 Tully INS Subeca MI 116 125 E-ab 164 ş.... 6 179 Mr. Swith on Supeltin 217 186 Mr. Piuloe 269 270-1



TILleron pafaa 12 - 12 chapter withen our in her life tom (56 20) remainder out of her prop - Deapper Deapper Deligna, Color there touded areas I with buildied in Aurilie 1 direct appelantes p 5. areas seena 66 bala, with + pur p 8 In Callible cataly prerogatine of 067 P-Grad Any etc. p 13 the question the alastage, The work responsable to referentine for it AIS IN Smanlah The smanned Man course workers + buts like sena + reason > 1/2 rose hit de rapable st religer, appeleider expecting Putric out Cutimany actions capable of rewal or punishionest an obiled Mored p71 Ready 6 hour + Mike (microsoppi) ((h VI, admirable contribut & notion Airys) 217. BB & a Mening (under Subarisma) hontordeal with in 234









ÖFTHE Principles and Duties OF Natural Religion: TWO BOOKS.

By the Right Reverend Father in GOD,

Dr. JOHN WILKINS,

Late Lord Bishop of CHESTER.

To which is added, A Sermon preached at his Funeral, by William Lloyd, D. D. then Dean of Bangor, afterwards Lord Bishop of Worcester.

The Minth Edition.

LONDON:

Printed for J. WALTHOE, J. KNAPTON, R. KNAPLOCK,
G. CONYERS, R. WILKIN, D. MIDWINTER, B. LINTOT,
A. BETTESWORTH, B. SPRINT, J. BONWICK, R. ROBINSON,
B. MOTTE, A. WARD, T. LONGMAN, S. BIRT,
T. WARD and E. WICKSTEED. M DCCXXXIV.

- 100110 0.21 1 4 & ch LIBRARY



PREFACE.



HE enfuing Treatife is fufficiently recommended to the World by the Name of the Author,

and needs nothing elfe to make way for its Entertainment. I shall only therefore give a short Account of these *Remains* of that Learned and Excellent *Perfon*, and of the particular Design and Intention of them.

He was pleafed by his Last Will to commit his Papers to my Care; and out of his great Friendship, and undeferved good Opinion of me,to leave it wholly to my Dif-A 3 pofal, posal, whether any, or what part of them, should be made publick. This Treatise, Iknew, he always defigned for that purpose; and if God had been pleafed to have granted him but a little longer Life, he would have published it himfelf : And therefore, though a confiderable Part of it wanted his last Hand, yet neither could I be so injurious, to deprive the World of it, because it was less persect than he intended it; nor durst I be so bold, to attempt to finish a Piece defigned and carried on fo, far by fo great a Master.

The first *Twelve Chapters* were written out for the Prefs in his Life-time. The *Remainder* hath been gather'd and made up out of his *Papers*, as well as the *Materials* left for that purpose, and the Skill of the *Compiler* would allow : So that it cannot be expected, that the *Work* should be of equal Strength

The PREFACE.

Strength and Beauty in all the Parts of it. However, fuch as it is, I hope it may prove of confiderable use and benefit to the World, and not altogether unworthy of its *Author*.

The Design of it is Three-fold.

First, To eftablish the great Principles of Religion, the Being of God, and a Future State; by shewing how firm and solid a Foundation they have in the Nature and Reason of Mankind : A Work never more necessary than in this degenerate Age, which hath been so miserably over-run with Scepticism and Infidelity.

Secondly, To convince Men of the natural and indifpenfable Obligation of Moral Duties; those 1 mean, which are comprehended by our Saviour under the Two General Heads of the Love of God and iv

and of our Neighbour. For all the great Duties of Piety and Justice are written upon our Hearts, and every Man feels a fecret Obligation to them in his own Confcience, which checks and reftrains him from doing contrary to them, and gives him Peace and Satisfaction in the Difcharge of his Duty; or in cafe he offend against it, fills him with Guilt and Terror.

And certainly it is a Thing of very confiderable ufe, rightly to underftand the natural Obligation of moral Duties, and how neceffarily they flow from the Confideration of God and of our felves. For it is a great Miftake, to think that the Obligation of them doth folely depend upon the Revelation of God's Will made to us in the Holy Scriptures. It is plain that Mankind was always under a Law, even before Gcd had made any external

The PREFACE.

V

external and extraordinary Revelation; elfe, how fhall God judge the World? How fhall they to whom the Word of God never came, be acquitted or condemned at the Great Day? For where there is no Law, there can neither be Obedience nor Tran[greffion.

It is indeed an unfpeakable Advantage which we, who are Christians, do enjoy, both in respect of the more clear and certain Knowledgeofour Duty in all the Branches of it, and likewise in regard of the powerful Motives and Affistance which our bleffed Saviour in his Gostel offers to us, to enable and encourage us to the difcharge of our Duty. But yet it is nevertheless very useful for us to confider the primary and natural Obligation to Piety and Virtue, which we commonly call the Law of Nature; this being every whit as much the Law of God, as

VJ

as the Revelation of his Will in his Word ; and confequently, nothing contained in the Word of God, or in any pretended Revelation from Him, can be interpreted to diffolve the Obligation of moral Duties plainly required by the Law of Nature. And if this one Thing were but well confider'd, it would be an effectual Antidote against the pernicious Doctrines of the Antinomians, and of all other Libertine-Enthusiasts whatfoever: Nothing being more incredible, than that Divine Revelation should contradict the clear and unquestionable Dictates of Natural Light; nor any thing more vain, than to fancy that the Grace of God does release Men from the Laws of Nature.


This the Author of the following Discourses was very fenfible of, and wifely faw of what Confequence it was to eftablish the Princi-

The PREFACE.

Principles and Duties of Religion upon their true and natural Foundation; which is fo far from being a Prejudice to Divine Revelation, that it prepares the way for it, and gives it greater Advantage and Authority over the Minds of Men.

Thirdly, To perfuade Men to the Practice of Religion, and the Virtues of a good Life, by shewing how natural and direct an Influence they have, not only upon our future Blessedness in another World, but even upon the Happiness and Prosperity of this present Life. And furely nothing is more likely to prevail with wife and confiderate Men to become Religious, than to be thoroughly convinced, that Religion and Happineß, our Duty and our Interest, are really but one and the fame thing confidered under feveral Notions.

J. TILLOTSON.



BOOKL

Of the Reasonableness of the Principles and Duties of Natural Religion.

CHAP. I.

Concerning the several kinds of Evidence and Affent, Pag. 1

CHAP. II.

Two Schemes of Principles, relating to Practical things, whether Natural or Moral; proposed in the Method used by Mathematicians, of Postulata, Definitions and Axioms, p. 11

CHAP. III. Some Propositions necessary to be premised for the removing of several Prejudices in debates about Religion, p. 19

C H A P. IV. Concerning the Existence of a Deity; and the Arguments for it. I. Arg. From the Universal Consent and Agreement of Mankind: And the Objections against it answer'd, P. 34 C H A P.

CHAP.V. II. Arg. From the Original of the World, p. 55

CHAP. VI.

III. Arg. From the admirable Contrivance of Natural Things, p. 69. CHAP. VII.

IV. Arg. From Providence, and the Government of the World, p. 75 C H A P. VIII.

Concerning the Excellencies and Perfections of the Divine Nature: And first, Of those which are commonly called Incommunicable; namely, Simplicity, Unity, Immensity,

Immutability, Infinitenefs,

C Eternity, P. 88

CHAP IX.

Of the Communicable Perfections of God: And first of those which relate to the Divine Understanding, viz. Knowledge, Wisdom, particular Providence, p. 109 C H A P. X. Of the Perfections relating to the Divine

Will ; Goodness, Justice, Faithfulness,

p. 119

CHAP. XI.

Of the Perfections belonging to the Power and Faculties of Acting, viz. Power, Dominion, Distribution of future Rewards and Punishments, p. 126

CHAP.

CHAP. XII. Concerning the Duties of Religion naturally flowing from the Consideration of the Divine Nature and Perfections: And first, Of Adoration and Worship, p. 155 CHAP. XIII. Of Faith or Affiance, p. 166 CHAP. XIV. Of Love, p. 175 CHAP. XV. Of Reverence and Fear, p. 189 CHAP. XVI. Of Active Obedience to the Laws of God, p. 198 C H A P. XVII.

Of Paffive Obedience; or Patience and Submission to the Will of God, p. 209

BOOK II.

Of the Wisdom of Practifing the Duties of Natural Religion.

C.H.A.P. I.

SHewing in general, how Religion conduces to our Happines, p. 249 CHAP. II.

How it conduces to our present Happiness in this World: And first to the Happiness of

of the Outward-man, 1. In respect of Health, p. 274

CHAP. III. In respect of Liberty, Safety, and Quiet, p. 282

CHAP.IV. In respect of our Estates and Posses, Riches, p 287

CHAP. V. In respect of Pleasure; or the chearful Enjoyment of outward Blessings, p. 299 CHAP. VI.

In respect of Honour and Reputation,

p. 306

CHAP. VII. How Religion conduces to the Happinefs of the Inward-man : As it tends to the perfecting and regulating our Faculties; and to the Peace and Tranquillity of our Minds, P. 323 CHAP. VIII.

How Religion conduces to our Happiness in the next World, P. 337 C. H. A. P. IX.

The Conclusion of the whole; Shewing the Excellency of the Christian Religion, and the Advantages of it, both as to the Knowledge and Practice of our Duty, above the mere Light of Nature, p. 342

THE



FIRST BOOK:

SHEWING

The Reasonableness of the Principles and Duties of Natural Religion.

Concerning the feveral Kinds of Evidence and Assent.



Intend, by God's Affiftance, in this Firft Book, to treat concerning the Reafonableness and the Credibility of the Principles of *Natural Religion*, in opposition

to that Humour of Scepticism and Infidelity, which hath of late so much abounded in the World, not only amongst sensitive for the sensitive the vulgar Sort, but even amongst those who pretend to a more than ordinary Measure of Wit and Learning.

In my Entrance upon this Work, I am fenfible of what ill Confequence it may be, to lay the Strefs of a weighty Caufe upon weak or obscure Arguments, which instead of convincing Men, will rather harden and confirm them in their Errors.

2

And therefore I cannot but think myfelf obliged in the management of this Argument, to use my utmost caution and endeavour, that it be done with so much strength and perspicuity, as may be sufficient to convince any Man, who hath but an ordinary Capacity, and an honest Mind; which are no other Qualifications than what are required to the Institution of Men, in all kind of Arts and Sciences whatsoever.

In order to this, I judge it expedient to premise fomething concerning the several kinds and degrees of Evidence and Assent, and to lay down some common Principles, which may serve as a Foundation to the following Discourse.

The feveral ways whereby Men come to the knowledge or belief of any thing without immediate *Revelation*, are either by fuch *Evidence of Things* as is more

Simple

Chap. 1. of Natural Religion.

Simple, relating to the Senfes, mainte

SOutward. Inward.

(Understanding, arising either from the 5 Nature of the Things in themselves. Testimony of others concerning 'em. Mixed, relating both to the Senses and Understanding.

10 - 11 a - 11

I. By Senses, I mean those Faculties whereby we are enabled to difcern and know fuch particular Objects as are present. These are either und 14 ar auciai ob endto eatand .

1. Outward; By which we can apprehend external Objects, as when we see, or hear, or touchany Thing prefented to us.

2. Inward; By which we can difcern inter. nal Objects, and are confcious to ourfelves, or sensible both of the Impressions that are made upon our outward Senses, and of the inward Motions of our Minds; namely, our Apprehensions, Inclinations, and the Power of determining ourfelves, as to our own Actions ; and by which we can at any time be affured of what we think, or what we defire or purpose.

II. By Understanding, I mean that Faculty whereby we are enabled to apprehend the Objects of Knowledge, Generals as well as Particulars, Absent Things as well as Pre-Sent; and to judge of their Truth or Falshood, Good or Evil.

B 2

That

That kind of *Evidence* may be faid to arife from the *Nature of Things*, when there is fuch a Congruity or Incongruity betwixt the *Terms* of a *Proposition*, or the *Deductions* of one Proposition from another, as doth either fatisfy the Mind, or elfe leave it in doubt and hefitation about them.

4

That kind of *Evidence* is faid to arife from *Teflimony*, when we depend upon the Credit and Relation of others for the Truth or Falfhood of any Thing. There being feveral Things which we cannot otherwife know, but as others do inform us of them. As namely *Matters of FaEt*, together with the Account of *Perfons* and *Places* at a Diffance. Which kind of Evidence will be more or lefs clear, according to the Authority and Credit of the Witnefs.

Besides these, there is a mixed kind of Evidence relating both to the Senses and Understanding, depending upon our own Observation and repeated Trials of the Issues and Events of Actions or Things, called Experience.

These are the several kinds of Evidence whereby we attain to the Knowledge or Belief of Things.

The Kinds of Assent proceeding from them, are reducible to these Two Heads.

I. Know-

I. Knowledge or Certainty, which may be distinguished into three Kinds, which I crave leave to call by the Names of

Physical. Mathematical.

(Moral.

II. Opinion or Probability.

I. That kind of Affent which doth arife from fuch plain and clear Evidence as doth not admit of any reasonable Cause of doubting, is called Knowledge or Certainty.

1. I call that Physical Certainty, which doth depend upon the Evidence of Sense, which is the first and highest Kind of Evidence of which human Nature is capable.

Nothing can be more manifest and plain to me, than that I now fee fomewhat which hath the Appearance of fuch a Colour or Figure, than that I have in my Mind fuch a Thought, Defire, or Purpose, and do feel within myfelf a certain Power of determining my own Actions, which is called Liberty.

To fay that we cannot tell whether we have Liberty; because we do not understand the manner of Volition, is all one as to fay, that we cannot tell whether we see or hear; because we do not understand the manner of Sensation.

He that would go about to confute me in any of these Apprehensions, ought to bring a Medium that is better known, and to derive his

his Argument from fomewhat that is more evident and certain than thefe Things are, unlefs he can think to overthrow and confute that which is more plain and certain, by that which is lefs plain and certain ; which is all one as to go about to out-weigh a heavy Body by fomewhat that is lighter, or to attempt the proving of Ten to be more than Eleven ; than which nothing can be more abfurd.

6

2. I call that Mathematical Certainty, which doth more eminently belong to Mathematical Things, not intending hereby to exclude such other Matters as are capable of the like Certainty; namely, all fuch fimple abstracted Beings, as in their own Natures do lie so open, and are so obvious to the Underftanding, that every Man's Judgment (though never so much prejudiced) must necessarily affent to them. 'Tis not poslible for any Man in his Wits (though never fo much addicted to Paradoxes) to believe otherwife, but that the Whole is greater than the Part ; That Contradictions cannot be both true; That three and three make fix ; That four is more than three.

There is fuch a kind of Connexion betwixt the Terms of fome Propositions, and fome Deductions are fonce effary as must unavoidably enforce our Affent : There being an evident Neceflity that fome Things must be fo, or not fo, according as they are affirmed or denied to be, and that fupposing our Faculties Chap. 1. of Natural Religion.

culties to be true, they cannot possibly be otherwise, without implying a Contradiction. 7

3. I call that Moral Certainty, which hath for its Object fuch Beings as are lefs simple, and do more depend upon mixed Circumstances. Which though they are not capable of the fame kind of Evidence with the former, so as to necessitate every Man's Affent, though his Judgment be never fo much prejudiced against them; yet may they be foplain, that every Man whose Judgment is free from prejudice will consent unto them. And though there be no natural Neceffity, that fuch things must be so, and that they cannot possibly be otherwise, without implying a Contradiction ; yet may they be fo certain as not to admit of any reasonable Doubt concerning them.

Under each of these Heads there are several Propositions, which may be stilled Selfevident and first Principles.

Self-evident, Because they are of themfelves so plain, as not to be capable of proof from any Thing that is clearer or more known.

First Principles, Because they cannot be proved à priori; That which is first can have nothing before it.

Only they may receive fome kind of Illuftration by Instances and Circumstances, and by fuch universal Effects as do proceed from 1 them;

them; and from the monstrous Absurdities that will follow upon the denial of them.

8

Such Deductions as do necessarily flow from these Principles, have the same kind of Certainty, whether *Physical*, Mathematical, or Moral, with the Principles themselves from which they are deduced.

The two first of these, namely, *Physical* and *Mathematical* Certainty may be stilled *Infallible*; and *Moral* Certainty may properly be stilled *Indubitable*.

By Infallible Certainty, I do not mean abfolute Infallibility, because that is an Incommunicable Attribute. And it were no less than a blasphemous Arrogance, for any Man to pretend to such a perfect unerring Judgment on which the Divine Power itself could not impose. But I mean a Conditional Infallibility, that which supposes our Faculties to be true, and that we do not neglect the exerting of them. And upon such a Supposition there is a necessity that some things must be so as we apprehend them, and that they cannot possible be otherwise.

By Indubitable Certainty, I mean that which doth not admit of any reasonable Cause of doubting, which is the only certainty of which most Things are capable; and this may properly be ascribed both to that kind of Evidence arising from the Nature of Things, and likewise to that which doth arise from Testimony, or from Experience.

I am,

Chap. 1. of Natural Religion.

I am, from the Nature of the Things themfelves, Morally certain, and cannot make any doubt of it, but that a Mind free from paffion and prejudice, is more fit to pafs a true Judgment, than fuch a one as is biaffed by Affections and Interests. That there are fuch Things as Virtue and Vice. That Mankind is naturally designed for a sociable life. That it is most agreeable to Reason and the common Interests of those in Society, that they should be true to their Compacts, that they should not hurt an innocent Person, &c.

And as for the Evidence from *Testimony* which depends upon the Credit and Authority of the Witness, these may be so qualified as to their *ability* and *fidelity*, that a Man must be a fantastical incredulous Fool to make any doubt of them. And by this it is that I am sufficiently assured, That there was such a Person as Queen *Elizabeth*; That there is such a Place as *Spain*.

And fo for the Evidence of *Experience*, I am by that to a great degree affured of the fucceffion of Night and Day, Winter and Summer; and have no fuch reafon to doubt, whether the Houfe wherein now I am, fhall this next Minute fall upon me, or the Earth open and fwallow it up, as to be in continual fear of fuch Accidents.

II. That kind of Affent, which doth arife from fuch Evidence as is lefs plain and clear,

9

is called *Opinion* and *Probability*. When though the Proofs for a Thing may preponderate any Thing to be faid againft it; yet they are not fo weighty and perfpicuous as to exclude all reafonable doubt and fear of the contrary.

And this doth arife from a more imperfect and obscure representation and conception of Things, either by our Senses or Understandings, by Testimony or by Experience.

When the Evidence on each fide doth equiponderate, this doth not properly beget any Affent, but rather a *Hesitation*, or Suspension of Affent.



CHAP.

CHAP.II.

Two Schemes of Principles relating to Practical Things, whether Natural or Moral, proposed in the Method used by Mathematicians of Postulata, Definitions and Axioms.

Having premised these Things in gene-vid. Dr. ral concerning several kinds of Evi-H. More. dences and Assents; I shall in the next Place offer some particular Schemes of Principles relating to practical Things, whether Natural or Moral, in the same Way and Method as is used in the Mathematicks, consisting of Postulata, Definitions and Axioms.

A Scheme of Natural Principles.

Every thing is endowed with fuch a natu-Poftularal Principle, whereby it is necessarily incli-tum. ned to promote its own preservation and wellbeing.

That which hath in it a fitness to promote Defin. 1. this End, is called Good. And on the contrary, that which is apt to hinder it, is called Evil. Amongst which there are several degrees, according as things have more or less fitness, to promote or hinder this End.

The

Defin, 2.

12

The lessening or escaping of Evil is to be reckoned under the Notion of Good.

The leffening or loss of Good is to be reckoned under the Notion of Evil.

Axiom. I.

2.

3.

4.

That which is good is to be chosen and prosecuted, that which is Evil to be avoided.

The greater Good is to be preferred before the Less, and the lesser Evil to be endured rather than the Greater.

Such kinds of Things or Events, whether Good or Evil, as will certainly come to pass, may fall under computation, and be estimated as to their several degrees, as well as things present. Because when such a space of time is elapsed, that which is now future, will be-come present. Which is the Ground of Men's dealing for Reversions.

And thus likewise is it for such Things as may probably come to pass; Though this probability should be somewhat remote, it is counted a valuable Thing, and may be estimated at a certain Rate, for a Man to be one amongst four or five equal Competitors for a Place, to be the fourth or fifth Expectant of an Inheritance; tho' in such Cases there be the odds of Three or Four to One, yet the Price that is fet upon this, may be so proportioned, as either to reduce it to an equality, or make it a very advantageous Bargain.

of Natural Religion.

13

5.

A prefent Good may reafonably be parted with, upon a probable expectation of a future Good which is more excellent. Which is the Cafe of Merchants, who have large Estates in their own possession, which they may fafely keep by them; and yet chuse to venture them upon a thousand Hazards, out of an apprehension that there is a greater Probability of their gaining, than of their lofing by such Adventures.

Chap. 2.

And this would be much more reafonable, if befides the probability of gaining by thefe Adventures, there were the like probability of their being utterly undone and ruined, if they fhould neglect or refuse to venture.

The greater the Advantage is, the more reafonable must it be to adventure for it. If it be reafonable for a Man to run the venture of Twenty Pounds for the gain of a Hundred Pounds, much more for a Thousand.

The Reafon why Men are moved to believe a probability of gain by adventuring their Stocks into fuch foreign Countries, as they have never feen, and of which they have made no Trial, is from the Testimony of other credible Perfons, who profess to have known those Places, and the Advantages of Traffick thither by their own Experience. And this is generally accounted a sufficient Argument to perfuade others unto the like Trials.

The Reafon which moved Men to adventure for the first Discovery of unknown Countries, is, because they had fair probabilities to perfuade them, that there were such Piaces, which would probably afford very gainful Traffick.

And upon the fame Ground, if any confiderable number of Men, fuch whom we efteem the most wife and the most honest, should affure us, that they did firmly believe (though they did not know it by experience) that there was fuch an undifcovered Country, to which if Men would make any Ventures, their Gains would be a thousand Times more than could be expected by any other way of Traffick ; and that upon this perfuasion, they themselves did resolve to venture their Estates, and should withal offer such Arguments for the reasonableness of what they affert, as to any Men, whofe Judgments were unprejudiced, would render it much more probable than the Contrary : In this Cafe, he that would act rationally, according to fuch Rules and Principles as all Mankind do obferve in the government of their Actions, must be perfuaded to do the like, unless he would be counted foolifh, and one that did affect Singularity.

6.

A prefent Evil is to be endured for the avoiding of a probable future Evil, which is far greater. Which is the Reafon of Mens undergoing the mifchiefs and hardships of War;

Chap. 2. of Natural Religion.

War; the charges and vexations of Law-Suits; the trouble of Fasting and Physick. A Man will endure the Pain of Hunger and Thirst, and refuse such Meats and Drinks as are most grateful to his Appetite, if he be perfuaded that they will endanger his Health; especially if he believe that they are poisoned. He will chuse to take nauseous offensive Physick, upon a probable expectation that he may thereby prevent or cure a dangerous Sickness.

The greater the Evil is, the more reason is there to venture the loss of a less Good, or the suffering of a less Evil, for the escaping of it.

A Scheme of Moral Principles.

There are feveral kinds of Creatures in the Poftula-World, and feveral degrees of dignity amongft tum. them; fome being more excellent than others, Animate more than Inanimate; Senfitives more than Vegetives; and Men more than Brutes. It is a greater preheminence to have life, than to be without it; to have life and fense, than to have life only; to have life, fense and reason, than to have only life and sense.

That which doth conflitute any Thing in Defin. 1. its Being, and diftinguish it from all other Things, is called the *Form* or *Essence* of fuch a Thing.

That

7.

16

Defin. 2. That State or Condition by which the nature of any thing is advanced to the utmost Perfection of which it is capable according to its rank and kind, is called the chief end or happiness of such a Thing.

The Nature of Plants doth confift in having a Vegetative Soul, by which they receive nourishment and growth, and are enabled to multiply their kind.

The utmost Perfection, which this kind of Being is capable of, is to grow up to a state of Maturity, to continue unto its natural Period, and to propagate its kind.

The Nature of Brutes (besides what is common to them with Plants) doth confift in having fuch Faculties, whereby they are capable of apprehending external Objects, and of receiving Pain or Pleafure from them.

The Perfection proper to these doth confift in sensitive Pleasures, or the enjoying of fuch Things as are grateful to their Appetites and Senfes.

The Nature of Man (besides what is common to him with Plants and Brutes) doth confift in that faculty of Reafon, whereby he is made capable of Religion, of apprehending a Deity, and of expecting a future State of Rewards and Punishments. Which are Capacities common to all Mankind, notwithftanding the utmost endeavours that Can be used for the suppressing of them; and which no other Creature in this visible World, except Man, doth partake of. The

Chap. 2. of Natural Religion.

The *happinefs* of Man doth confift in the perfecting of this Faculty ; that is, in fuch a ftate or condition as is most agreeable to reafon, and as may entitle him to the divine Favour, and afford him the best affurance of a bleffed Eftate after this Life.

That which every Man doth, and must propose unto himself, is the being in as good a Condition as he is capable of, or as is reasonable for him to expect: And the defire of this is not properly a *Duty* or a *Moral Virtue*, about which Men have a liberty of acting; but 'tis a *Natural Principle*, like the defeent of heavy Bodies, it flows necessfarily from the very Frame of our Natures; Men must do so, nor can they do otherwise.

The customary Actions of Men, confider-Defin. 3.³ ed as voluntary, and as capable of Reward or Punishment, are stilled Moral.

AsThat, which hath a fitness to promote the Defin. 4. welfare of Man, confider'd as a *sensitive* Being, is filed Natural Good; so That which hath a fitness to promote the welfare of Man, as a rational, voluntary and free Agent, is filed Moral Good: and the contrary to it, Moral Evil.

That, which is morally good, is to be defined Axiom 1. and profecuted ; That, which is evil, is to be avoided.

The greater Congruity or Incongruity there Axiom 2. is in any thing to the Reafon of Mankind, and the greater tendency it hath to promote or hinder the Perfection of Man's Nature, fo

much

L.

much greater degrees hath it of moral Good or Evil. To which we ought to proportion our Inclination or Aversion.

There is in fome things fuch a natural Decency and Fitnefs, as doth render them moft agreeable to our Reafon, and will be fufficient to recommend them to our Practice; abftracting from all confiderations of reward : As in loving those who are kind to us, and from whom we receive benefit : In compensating Good with Good, and not with Evil.

It is most fuitable both to the Reason and Interest of Mankind, that every one should submit themselves to him, upon whom they depend for their Well-being, by doing such things as may render them acceptable to him.

It is a defirable thing for a Man to have the affiftance of others in his need and diffrefs. And 'tis not reafonable for him to expect this from others, unlefs he himfelf be willing to fhew it to others.

Axiom 3.

The rational Nature and the Perfection belonging to it being more noble than the Senfitive: Therefore Moral Good is to be preferred before Natural; and that which is Morally Evil is more to be hated and avoided, than that which is Natural.

Axiom 4. A present natural Good may be parted with upon a probable Expectation of a future Moral Good.

Axiom 5. A present natural Evil is to be endured for the probable avoiding of a future moral Evil. C H A P.



19

Í.

CHAP. III.

Some Propositions necessary to be premised for the removing of several Prejudices in debates about Religion.

B Esides what hath been already suggested concerning the first Foundations to be laid, in order to a Discourse about Natural Religion, I shall in the next place offer to Consideration these Seven following Propositions, as being very proper to prevent or obviate the Cavils of sceptical captious Men.

1. Such things as in themselves are equally true and certain, may not yet be capable of the same kind or degree of Evidence as to us. As for Instance, That there was such a Man as King Henry the Eighth ; that there are fuch Places as America, or China. I fay, these things may in themselves be equally true and certain with those other Matters, That we now see, and are awake ; That the three Angles in a Triangle are equal to two right ones. Though for the First of these we have only the Teftimony of others, and human Tradition; whereas for the other we have sensitive Proof, and mathematical Demonstration. And the reason is, because all С 2 Truths

Truths are in themselves equal, according to that ordinary Maxim, Veritas non recipit magis & minus. And therefore nothing can be more irrational than for a Man to doubt of, or deny the Truth of any thing, becaufe it cannot be made out by fuch kind of Proofs of which the Nature of fuch a thing is not capable. A Man may as well deny there is any fuch thing as Light or Colour, because he cannot hear it; or Sound, because he cannot fee it, as to deny the truth of other things because they cannot be made out by sensitive or demonstrative Proofs. The kinds of Probation for feveral things being as much difproportioned, as the objects of the feveral Senfes are to one another.

2. Things of several kinds may admit and Ariftot. Eth.lib. 1. require several forts of proofs, all which may cap. 3. be good in their kind. The Philosopher hath Metaph Metaph. lib. 1. cap. long ago told us, that according to the divers Nature of things, so must the Evidences for ult. them be; and that it is an Argument of an undifciplin'd Wit, not to acknowledge this. He that is rational and judicious will expect no other kind of Arguments in any cafethan the subject-matter will bear. How incongruous would it be for a Mathematician to perfuade with Eloquence, to use all imaginable Infinuations and Entreaties, that he might prevail with his hearers to believe that three and three make fix? It would be altogether as vain and improper in matters belonging to an Orator

Chap. 3. of Natural Religion.

21

Orator to pretend to strict Demonstration. All things are not capable of the fame kind of Evidence. Though the Conclusions in Mathematicks, by reason of the abstracted nature of those Sciences, may be demonstrated by the clearest and most unquestionable way of Probation to our Reason; yet it is not rational to expect the like Proof, in fuch other matters as are not of the like nature. This he himfelf applies to Moral things, which being not of fuch simple abstracted Natures, but depending upon mixed circumstances, are not therefore capable of fuch kind of demonstrative Proofs. 'Tis a Saying of Jambli-Protrept. cus, That Demonstrations are not to be ex-in Sympected in matters concerning God and divine bol. 25. things. Nor is this any greater prejudice to the certainty of fuch things, than it is that God is invisible. And thus likewise it is, for the fame reason, with many particular Conclusions in Natural Philosophy. And as for matters of Fact, concerning Times, Places, Perfons, Actions, which depend upon Story and the relation of others, these things are not capable of being proved by fuch fcientifical Principles as the others are. Now no fober Man can deny but that feveral things in Moral and in Natural Philosophy are in themfelves as abfolutely and as certainly true, and as firmly believed by us, as any Mathematical Principle or Conclusion can be. From whence I infer this, That it is not, ought not C 3 to

to be, any prejudice to the Truth or Certainty of any thing, that it is not to be made out by fuch kind of Proofs, of which the nature of that thing is not capable, provided it be capable of fatisfactory Proofs of another kind.

3.

3. When a thing is capable of good proof in any kind, Menought to rest fatisfy'd in the best evidence for it, which that kind of things will bear, and beyond which better could not be expected, supposing it were true. They ought not to expect either sensible proof, or Demonstration for such Matters as are not capable of fuch Proofs, fuppofing them to be true: Because otherwise nothing must be affented to and believed, but that which hath the higheft Evidence: All other things being to be looked upon as uncertain and doubtful, and wholly excluded from all poffibility of being known. And at this rate, Men must believe nothing at all in Story; becaufe fuch things cannot be demonstrated ; and 'tis poffible that the reft of Mankind might have combined together to impose upon them by these Relations. And how abhorrent fuch Sceptical Principles must needs be to common Reason, I need not say. Those who will pretend fuch kind of grounds for their disbelief of any thing, will never be able to perfuade others, that the true Caufe why they do not give their assent, is; because they have no reason for it; but because they have no

22

Chap. 3. of Natural Religion. no mind to it. Nolle in causa est, non posse prætenditur.

And on the other fide, when we have for the proof of any thing, fome of the higheft kinds of Evidence; in this cafe it is not the fuggeftion of a mere poffibility that the thing may be otherwife, that ought to be any fufficient caufe of doubting.

To which I fhall only add, that we may be unqueftionably fure of many things as to their *exiftence*; and yet we may not be able to explain the nature of them. No Man in his wits can make any doubt, whether there be fuch things as Motion, and Senfation, and Continuity of Bodies : And yet thefe things are commonly efteemed inexplicable. So that our not being able to fee to the bottom of things, and to give a diftinct account of the *Nature* and *Manner* of them, can be no fufficient caufe to doubt of their *being*.

4. The Mind of Man may and must give a firm affent to some things, without any kind of hesitation or doubt of the contrary; where yet the Evidences for such things are not so infallible, but that there is a possibility, that the things may be otherwise. (i.e.) There may be an indubitable Certainty, where there is not an infallible Certainty. And that kind of Certainty, which doth not admit of any Doubt, may ferve us as well, to all intents and purposes, as that which is infallible : A Man may make no doubt, whether he himself were C4 bap23

4.

24

baptized, whether fuch persons were his Parents, of which yet he can have no other Evidence than Tradition, and the Testimony of others. Who is there fo wildly Sceptical as to question, whether the Sun shall rife in the East, and not in the North or West, or whether it shall rife at all, because the contrary is not impossible, and doth not imply any Contradiction ? Suppose that in digging of the Earth, amongst some ancient Ruins, a Man fhould find a round flat piece of Metal, in the exact shape of an old Medal, with the Image and Inscription of one of the Roman Emperors. Or suppose he should dig up a large Stone, of the shape of an ancient Tombstone, with a distinct Inscription upon it, of the Name and Quality of some Person said to be buried under it; Can any rational Man doubt, whether one of these were not a piece of Coin, and the other a Grave-stone? Or should a Man be bound to suspend his affent and belief of this, barely upon this ground, because 'tis possible that these might have been the natural shapes of that particular Metal and Stone, and that those which seem to be Letters or Figures engraven or embossed upon it, may be nothing else but fome cafual dents or cavities, which by the various motions and temper of the matter did happen to them, amongst those many millions of other Figures which they were capable of ? Who would not think fuch a Man

to

Chap. 3. of Natural Religion.

to be strangely wild, and irrational, who could frame to himfelf any real Scruples from fuch Confiderations as thefe? Why, 'tis the fame kind of absurd dotage that Scepticks in Religion are guilty of, in suspending their affent merely upon this Ground, becaufe some Arguments for it do not fo infallibly conclude, but that there is a Poffibility things may be otherwife. He that will raife to himfelf, and cherish in his mind, any real doubts, according to the mere possibility of things, shall not be able to determine himself to the belief or practice of any thing. He must not stay within Doors, for fear the House fhould fall upon him, for that is possible: Nor must he go out, lest the next Man that meets him fhould kill him, for that alfo is poffible. And fo must it be for his doing or forbearing any other Action. Nay, I add farther, that Man is fure to be deceived in very many things, who will doubt of every thing, where 'tis possible he may be deceived.

I appeal to the common Judgment of Mankind, whether the Human Nature be not fo framed, as to acquiefce in fuch a *Moral Certainty*, as the Nature of Things is capable of; and if it were otherwife, whether that Reafon which belongs to us, would not prove a Burthen and a Torment to us, rather than a Privilege, by keeping us in a continual Sufpence, and thereby rendring our Conditions perpetually reftlefs and unquiet? Would not

not fuch Men be generally accounted out of their Wits, who could pleafe themfelves, by entertaining actual hopes of any thing, merely upon account of the poffibility of it; or torment themfelves with actual Fears of all fuch Evils as are poffible? Is there any thing imaginable more wild and extravagant amongft those in Bedlam, than this would be? Why, Doubt is a kind of Fear, and is commonly filed formido oppositi; and 'tis the fame kind of Madness for a Man to doubt of any thing, as to hope for, or fear it, upon a mere Poffibility.

s. 'Tis fufficient that matters of Faith and Religion be propounded in fuch a Way, as to render them highly credible, fo as an honeft and teachable Man may willingly and fafely affent to them, and according to the rules of Prudence be justified in so doing. Nor is it either necessary or convenient, that they should be established by such cogent Evidence, as to neceffitate Affent : Because this would not leave any place for the virtue of Believing, or the freedom of our Obedience; nor any ground for Reward and Punishment. It would not be thank-worthy for a Man to believe that which of neceffity he must believe, and cannot otherwise chuse.

Rewards and Punishments do properly belong to *free* Actions, fuch as are under a Man's power either to do or forbear; not to fuch as are *necessary*. There is no more reafon

5.

Chap. 3. of Natural Religion.

fon to reward a Man for believing that four is more than three, than for being hungry or fleepy; becaufe thefe things do not proceed from *Choice*, but from *natural Neceffity*. A Man must do fo, nor can he do otherwife.

27

I do not fay, that the Principles of Religion are merely probable, I have before afferted them to be morally certain. And that to a Man who is careful to preferve his Mind free from prejudice, and to confider, they will appear unquestionable, and the deductions from them demonstrable : But now because that which is necessary to beget this certainty in the Mind, namely, impartial Consideration, is in a Man's power, therefore the Belief or Disbelief of these things is a proper Subject for Rewards and Punisbments.

There would be little reafon for the Scripture fo much to magnify the Grace of *Faith*, as being fo great aVirtue, and fo acceptable to God, if every one were neceffitated to it, whether he would or no. And therefore God is pleafed to propose these Matters of Belief to us in fuch a Way, as that we might give some Testimony of our teachable Dispositions, and of our Obedience by our affent to them. Ut fermo Evangelii tanquam lapis effet Lydius, Grot. de ad quem ingenia fanabilia explorarentur, as lib. 2. the learned Grotius speaks concerning the Doctrine of the Gospel, whereby God was pleased as with a Touchstone to prove and try what kind of tempers Men are of, whether

ther they are so ingenuous as to accept of sufficient Evidence, in the Confirmation of a holy Doctrine. And the Scripture doth in feveral places make use of the word Faith, according to this Notion of it, as it confifts in a readiness of Mind to close with, and give assent unto things upon fuch Evidence as is in itself sufficient. To which purpose is that expression of our Saviour to Thomas, Blessed are they that have not seen, and yet have believed, Joh. xx. 29. Signifying it to be a more excellent, commendable, and bleffed thing for a Man to yield his affent, upon fuch Evidence as is in itself sufficient, without infifting upon more : It denotes good Inclinations in Men towards Religion, and that they have worthy Thoughts of the Divine Power and Goodness; when they are willing to submit unto fuch Arguments in the Confirmation of a holy Doctrine, as to unprejudiced Perfons are in themselves sufficient to induce Belief. It was this Disposition that was commended

II.

Acts xvij. in the Bereans, for which they are stilled er furésten, more ingenious, teachable, and candid, more noble than others, Because they received the word with all readiness of Mind: (i.e.) Were ready and willing to affent to the Gospel, upon such Evidence as was in itself fufficient to convince reasonable and unprejudiced Men.

And on the other side, it was the want of this Disposition which is condemned, Mat. xiij. 58.

28

Chap. 3. of Natural Religion.

xiij. 58. where 'tis faid that our Saviour did not many mighty works in his own Country; because of their unbelief: (i.e.) That prejudice, which there was upon them, by their knowledge of his mean Parentage and Birth, and their ignorance of his divine Commission and high Calling, did indispose them for an equal judgment of things, and render them unteachable. And having tried this, by doing some mighty Works amongst them, he would not do many, because of their incapacity of receiving benefit by them.

Wicked Men are in the Scripture-phrafe Eph.ij. 2, ftiled δ_{10} $\dot{\alpha}\pi_{E1}\Im$ $\dot{\alpha}_{as}$, filii infuafibilitatis, un-5, 6. col. iij. 6. perfuadable Men, fuch as no reafon can con-2 Thef. iij. vince. And elfewhere they are ftiled $\ddot{\alpha}\pi_{70}\pi_{01}$,². which we tranflate unreafonable Men. But the word may fignify abfurd, contumacious Perfons, who are not to be fixed by any Principles, whom no Topicks can work upon, being directly oppofite to this Virtue of Faith, as appears by the next Claufe, For all Men have not Faith.

Supposing Mankind to be endowed (as all other things are) with a natural Principle, whereby they are strongly inclined to seek their own preservation and happines; and supposing them to be *rational* and *free* Creatures, able to *judge* of, and to chuse the Means conducing to this end; nothing can be more reasonable in this case, than that such Creatures should be under the Obligation Of the Principles, &c.

tion of accepting fuch Evidence, as in itfelf is fufficient for their Conviction.

Lib. I.

6.

6. When there is no fuch evident certainty, as to take away all kind of doubting; in such Cases, a Judgment that is equal and impartial must incline to the greater Probabilities. That is no just Balance, wherein the heaviest fide will not preponderate. In all the ordinary affairs of Life, Men use to guide their Actions by this Rule, namely, to incline to that which is most probable and likely, when they cannot attain to any clear unqueftionable certainty. And that Man would be generally counted a Fool, who should do otherwise. Now let it be supposed, that some cf the great Principles in Religion, should not seem to some Men altogether so evident as to be wholly unquestionable; yet ought their affent still to incline to the greater probability.

When it is faid to be a Duty for Men to believe any thing, or to acquiefce in fuch kind of Evidence as is fufficient for the Proof of it; the meaning is not, as if there were any moral Obligation upon the Understanding, which is proper only unto the Will; but the meaning is, that Men should be careful to preferve their Minds free from any wilful prejudice and partiality, that they should seriously attend to, and confider the Evidence proposed to them, so as to take a just Essimate of it. For though it be true, that the Judgments

Chap. 3. of Natural Religion.

Judgments of Men must, by a natural Necesfity, preponderate on that fide where the greatest Évidence lies; supposing the Mind to be equally disposed, and the Balance to be just; yet must it withal be granted to be a particular Virtue and Felicity, to keep the Mind to fuch an equal frame of judging. There are fome Men, who have fufficient Abilities to difcern betwixt the true difference of things; but what through their vicious Affe-Etions and voluntary Prejudices, making them unwilling that some things should be true; what through their Inadvertency or Neglect to confider and compare things together, they are not to be convinced by plain Arguments; not through any Infufficiency in the Evidence, but by reason of some defect or corruption in the Faculty that should judge of it. Now the neglect of keeping our Minds in such an equal frame, the not applying of our Thoughts to confider of fuch matters of moment, as do highly concern a Man to be rightly inform'd in, must needs be a Vice. And though none of the Philosophers (that I know of) do reckon this kind of Faith (as it may be filed) this teachableness and equality of Mind in confidering and judging of matters of importance, amongst other intellectual Virtues; yet to me it feems, that it may justly challenge a Place amongst them; and that for this reason, because the two Extremes of it, by way of Excess and Defect, I mean the assenting I

32

affenting unto fuch things upon infufficient Evidence, which is called *Credulity*, and the not affenting unto them upon fufficient Evidence, which is called *Incredulity* or Unbelief, are both of them Vices. Now where the *Excefs* and *Defett* do makeVices, or fuch things as ought not to be, there the *Mediocrity* muft denote fomething that ought to be, and confequently muft be a Virtue, and have in it the obligation of Duty.

7. If in any Matter offered to Confidera-7. tion, the Probabilities on both fides be supposed to be equal : (In this cafe, though an impartial Judgment cannot be obliged to incline to one fide rather than to the other, because our Assent to things must, by a Necessity of Nature, be proportioned to our Evidence for them; and where neither fide doth preponderate, the Balance should hang even) Tet even in this case, Men may be obliged to order their Actions in favour of that side, which appears to be most safe and advantagious for their own Interest. Suppose a Man travelling upon the Road to meet with two doubtful Ways, concerning neither of which he can have any the least probability to induce him to believe that one is more like to be the true Way to his Journey's end, than the other ; only he is upon good grounds affured, that in one of these Ways he shall meet with much Trouble, Difficulty, and Danger, which the other is altogether free from : In this I

cafe,


Chap. 3. of Natural Religion.

cafe, though a Man be not bound to believe that one of them is a truer way than the other, yet is he obliged in prudence to take the fafeft.

Nay, I add farther, if the Probabilities on the one hand fhould fomewhat preponderate the other, yet if there be no confiderable hazard on that fide which hath the least probability, and a very great apparent danger in a miftake about the other ; in this case, Prudence will oblige a Man to do that which may make most for his own fastey.

These are those preparatory Principles which I thought fit to premise, as a necessary foundation for any debate with captious Men about the first grounds of Religion. And they are each of them (I think) of such perspicuity, as to need little more than the bare *Proposal* of them, and the *Explication* of their Terms, to evince the truth of them.

CHAP.



CHAP. IV.

Concerning the Existence of a Deity, Arguments for it. The I. Argument, From the universal Consent and Agreement of Mankind; and the Objections answered.

These Things being premised, I betake myself to that which was at first proposed as the chief design of this Book, namely, to prove the Reasonableness and the Credibility of the Principles of Natural Religion.

By *Religion*, I mean that general Habit of Reverence towards the Divine Nature, whereby we are enabled and inclined to worfhip and ferve God after fuch a manner as we conceive most agreeable to his Will, fo as to procure his Favour and Bleffing.

I call that Natural Religion, which Men might know, and fhould be obliged unto, by the mere Principles of Reason, improved by Confideration and Experience, without the help of Revelation.

This doth comprehend under it, these three principal Things.

1. A Belief and an Acknowledgment of the Divine Nature and Existence.

2. Due

Chap. 4. of Natural Religion.

2. Due Apprehensions of his Excellencies and Perfections.

3. Suitable Affections and Demeanour towardshim.

Concerning each of which I shall treat in order.

1. There must be a firm Belief of the Divine Nature and Existence. Primus est Deorum cultus, Deus credere, faith Seneca. Answerable to that of the Apostle, He that Heb.xi. comes to God must believe that he is. Now that this is a Point highly credible, and such as every sober rational Man who will not offer violence to his own Faculties, must submit unto, I shall endeavour to evince by the plainest Reason.

In treating concerning this Subject, which both in former and later times hath been fo largely difcuffed by feveral Authors, I fhall not pretend to the Invention of any new Arguments, but content myfelf with the Management of fome of those old ones, which to me feem most plain and convincing. Namely, from

1. The universal Consent of Nations, in all Places and Times.

2. The Original of the World.

3. That excellent Contrivance which there is in all natural Things.

4. The Works of Providence in the Government of the World.

D 2

t. From

1. From the univerfal Confent of Nations in all Places and Times, which muft needs render any thing highly credible to all fuch as will but allow the Human Nature to be rational, and to be naturally endowed with a Capacity of diffinguifhing betwixt Truth and Falfhood.

* Aristot. Top.

36

It is laid down by the * *Philosopher* as the proper way of Reasoning from *Authority*, That what seems true to *some* wise Men, may upon that account be effeem'd *somewhat* probable; what is believed by *most* wise Men, hath a *further* degree of probability; what *most men*, both wise and unwise, do affent unto, is yet *more* probable: But what *all men* have generally confented to, hath for it the highest degree of Evidence of this kind, that any thing is capable of: And it must be monstrous Arrogance and Folly for any single Perfons to prefer their own Judgments before the general Suffrage of Mankind.

Var. Hift. It is observed by *Ælian*, that the Notions lib.2. c.31. concerning the Existence and Nature of God, and of a Future State, were more firmly be-

and of a Future State, were more firmly believed, and didufually make deeper Impression upon the *illiterate Vulgar*, who were guided by the more fimple dictates of Nature, than upon feveral of the *Philosophers*, who by their art and fubtilty were able to invent disguises, and to dispute themselves into Doubts and Uncertainties concerning such things as might bring disquiet to their Minds.

That

Chap. 4. of Natural Religion.

That all Nations of Men now do, and have formerly owned this Principle, may appear both from present Experience, and the History of other Times and Places. And here I might cite abundance of the best Authors that are extant, concerning the truth of this in all other Ages and Nations. But for brevity's fake I shall mention only Two, Tully and Seneca. Quæ gens est, aut quod genus Nat. Deor. hominum, quod non habeat sine Doctrina, an-lib. 1. 32. ticipationem quandam Deorum, quam appel-lat webnur Epicurus. 'What kind of Men ' are there any where, who have not of ' themfelves this prenotion of a Deity? And in another place : Nulla gens est, neque tam De Legib. immansueta neque tam fera, quæ non, etiamsilib. 1. ignoret qualem habere Deum deceat, tamen habendum sciat. ' Amongst all Mankind ' there is no Nation fo wild and barbarous, ' who, though they may miftake in their due · Apprehensions of the Nature of God, do ' not yet acknowledge his Being.' And elfewhere: Nulla est gens tam fera, nemo om- Tusc. Qu. nium tam immanis, cujus mentem non im-lib. 1. buerit Deorum timor. ' There is no Nation ' fo immenfely barbarous and favage, as not • to believe the Existence of a Deity, and by ' fome kind of Services to express their Adoration of him.' So Seneca, Nulla gens uf-Epist. 118. quam est, adeo extra leges moresque proje-Eta, ut non aliquos Deos credat. 'There is " no where any Nation fo utterly loft to all D 3 f things

37:

things of Law and Morality, as not to believe the Existence of God.

He that fhall traverse over all this habitable Earth, with all those remote Corners of it, referved for the Discovery of these later Ages, may find some Nations without Cities, Schools, Houses, Garments, Coin, but none without their God. They may, and do vastly differ in their Manners, Institutions, Customs: But yet all of them agree in having fome Deity to worship.

And besides this Universality as to Nations and Places, it hath been so likewise as to Times. Religion was observed in the beginning of the World, before there were Civil Laws amongst Men, I mean any other than the mere Wills of their Princes and Governors.

The Works of *Mofes* are by general confent acknowledged to be the moft ancient Writings in the World. And though the defign of them be to prefcribe Doctrines and Rules for Religion, yet there is nothing offered in them by way of Proof or Perfuafion concerning the *Existence of God*; but it is a thing taken for granted, as being univerfally acknowledged and believed. Nor do we read that any of the other ancient Law-givers or Founders of Commonwealths, who thought fit to prefcribe Rules for the *Worfhip* of God, have endeavoured to perfuade the People concerning his *Being*; which yet had been moft neceffary,

Chap. 4. of Natural Religion.

neceffary, if any doubt or queftion had then been made of it; as being the very foundation of Religion, and a disposition fo requifite to qualify Men for Society and Government.

And as it hath been thus in former times, fo it is now amongft the Nations more lately difcovered, and not known to former Ages. 'Tis excellently faid by *Tully*, *Opinionum* De Nat.' *commenta delet dies*, *Naturæ judicia confirmat*: That Time wears out the Fictions of Opinion, and doth by degrees difcover and unmask the fallacy of ungrounded Perfuafions, but confirms the Dictates and Sentiments of Nature; and 'tis a good fign that those Notions are well eftablished which can endure the Teft of all Ages.

There are two Things may be objected against this Argument.

1. That there is no fuch universal Consent as is pretended.

2. If there were, this would fignify but little, becaufe it may as well be urged for *Polytheifm* and *Idolatry*.

1. That there is no fuch univerfal Confent as is pretended, becaufe there are fome Nations in the World fo wild and favage, as not to acknowledge any Deity; which by feveral Hiftorians is reported of the *Cannibals* in *America*, and the Inhabitants of *Sol-*D 4 *dania*

.

dania in Africk, who are fo fottifh and grofly ignorant, that they differ very little from Brutes, having fcarce any thing amongft them of Civil Policy, and nothing at all of Religion, or any publick Affemblies for Worthip: Befides fuch particular Perfons, pretending to Learning and Philosophy, as in feveral Ages have openly afferted, and professed felded maintained Atheistical Principles, as Diagoras, Theodorus, Pherecides, and others are faid to have done.

To this it may be faid, that fuppofing these Reports to be true, there may almost in all kinds be fome few Instances, besides and against the general course of Things, which yet can no more be urged as Prejudices against the common and most usual Order belonging to them, than Prodigies may to prove, that there is no Regularity in the Laws of Nature. Is there any Equity or the leaft Colour of Reason in this; for a Man to take an Eflay of the Nature of any Species of things from fuch particular Inftances, as in their Kinds are monstrous? Because Beasts may fometimes be brought forth with five Legs, and it may be two Heads, is it reason therefore to conclude, that no other Shape is natural to their Kind ? Specimen naturæ cujuslibet, à natura optima sumendum est (faith Tully) The Effay of any kind is rather to be taken from the best and most usual, than from the worft and most depraved part

Chap. 4. of Natural Religion.

part of it. Will it therefore follow, that Honey is not naturally fweet to our tafte, becaufe a fick Palate doth not judge it to be fo? Such diffolute perfons as are altogether immerfed in Senfuality, whereby they have befotted their Judgments, cannot be looked upon as the most competent Instances of what belongs to Human Nature.

Where there is either a Defect of Reafon, or a groß Neglect in exciting a Man's natural Faculties, or improving his Reafon, by a due Confideration of fuch Confequences as do most naturally refult from it: In fuch cases, it cannot otherwise be expected, but that he must come short of that Knowledge which he is naturally capable of, and should have, were it not for their Defects.

Some Men are born blind, or have loft their Sight, will it hence follow, that there is no fuch thing in Nature as Light or Colour? Others are Lunaticks or Ideots, fhould any Man from hence infer, that there is no fuch thing as Reafon? No Man may raife any doubt from fuch Inftances as thefe, but he that will make it a ferious Queftion, who are the mad Men, whether those in *Bedlam*, or those out of it? Whether Ideots are not the wifeft of Men, and all other the verieft Fools, according as they are at the widest distance from them? Can that Man be thought to need any farther Confutation or Pursuit, who is forced to fly to fuch a Retreat?

45

As for those Instances of particular Perfons, whom Stories deliver down to us, as being professed Atheists, it may be faid, 1. Tis plain, that some of these were

counted Atheists and Despisers of Religion, because they did endeavour to confute the Fopperies of the Heathen Worship, and deny the Sun and Moon, and the feveral Idols that were adored in their Countries to be true Gods: The loofe and vicious Poets, having fo far debauch'd the Understandings of the Vulgar, in those darker Ages, as to make them believe vile and filthy Things of their Gods, unfuitable to all Principles of Sobriety and common Reafon: Upon this, feveral Men, who were more Judicious and Virtuous than others, thought themselves obliged to reclaim the People from fuch mischievous Fopperies : In order to which, besides the most ferious Arguments which they made use of, they did likewise by Jeers and Scoffs endeavour to render these vicious Deities contemptible, and to deride them out of the World. And for this were they by the foolish superstitious Multitude counted Atheists, which was the Cafe of Anaxagoras, Socrates, and others.

2. Let it be fupposed that some Men have declared a Disbelief of the Divine Nature in general; yet as there have been always some *Monsters* amongst Men, in respect of their *Bodies*, so may there be likewise in respect of

Chap: 4. of Natural Religion.

of their Minds: And this no prejudice to the Standing-Laws of Nature. And befides it ought to be confidered, that the fame Stories which mention fuch Perfons as profeft Atheifts, do likewife give an Account of diverfe fignal Judgments, whereby they were witneffed against from Heaven.

3. But I add farther, There never yet was any fuch Perfon, who had any full and abiding conviction upon his Mind, against the Existence of God. Mentiuntur qui dicunt se non sentire esse Deum, nam etsi tibi affirment interdiu, noctu tamen & sibi dubitant. " They lie who fay that they believe there is " no God (faith Seneca) though they may " profess this fomewhat confidently in the " Day-time, when they are in Company, " yet in the Night and alone they have doubt-" ful Thoughts about it." 'Tis their Wish, but not their Opinion. The Interest of their Guilt doth make them defire it. But they are never able with all their endeavours wholly to extinguish their natural Notions about it. Witness those continual Fears and Terrors, whereunto fuch kind of Men are above all other most obnoxious.

The fecond Objection was, That if the Confent of Nations be a fufficient Evidence to prove the Existence of God, it may as well prove Polytheism and Idolatry, for which the like confent may be pleaded.

To this two Things may be answered : 1. Tho?

43

r. Tho' the Unity of the Godhead, and the Unfitness of worshipping him by Idols, be discoverable by the Light of Nature; yet these things are not so immediate, and so obvious to every one's Understanding as the Being of God is, but will require some deeper Confideration, and fome skill in the Rules of reasoning. Now it could not be reasonably expected, that either the generality, or any confiderable number of the Vulgar, should attain to such a degree of Knowledge, as their own natural Reason, duly exercifed and improved, might have furnished them with : Partly by reason of the Prejudice of Education, which must needs incline them to acquiesce in what is delivered down to them, as the belief or practice of their Forefathers; and confequently hinder them from an impartial Enquiry into the Nature of things : But chiefly for want of Jufficient leisure to apply themselves to the business of Contemplation, by reason of their being immersed in the Affairs of the World, either Pleasures, Ambition, Riches, or else being wholly taken up with Cares, about providing the Necessaries of Life for themselves and their Families ; which must needs much divert them from the ferious Confideration of things, and hinder them from the improvement of their natural Light to all the due Consequences of it. I

2. The

44

of Natural Religion.

45

2. The most confidering and the *wisest* Men in all Ages and Nations, have constantly differed from the *Vulgar* in their Thoughts about these things, believing but one supreme Deity, the Father of all other subordinate Powers.

Chap. 4.

-Hominum fator atque Deorum. Whom they called Jupiter or Jove, with plain reference to the Hebrew Name Jeho-And to this one God did they afcribe vah. feveral Names, according to those feveral Virtues they fupposed to be in him, or Benefits they expected from him. Bacchus and Neptune, Nature, Fortune, Fate: Omnia quidem Dei nomina sunt, variè utentis sua potestate, saith Seneca. So likewise Pythagoras, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, &c. And De Benefic. they advise Men to worship this God, not solib.4. c. 7much by Images or by Sacrifices, as by inward Goodness, by endeavouring to be like him; as I shall shew more largely afterwards. Now though the Opinion of the Vulgar, with the Confent of the Wise, may be of great Authority, yet being separated from or especially opposed unto, their Opinion, who are best able to judge, it must needs fignify but little.

If the Queftion should here be proposed, How comes it to pass, that Mankind should thus confent and agree in the notion of a Deity, and to what Ground or Cause may it be ascribed ?

To

To this I fhall fuggeft fomething by way of anfwer, both *negatively* and *politively*.

46

1. Negatively, From what hath been faid it may appear, that this belief doth not proceed from any particular Infirmity, or occafional Prejudice in the Judgment, becaufe it hath been fo conftant and univerfal amongft Mankind: And befides, there is not the least probability for those things which are affigned as the grounds of this Prejudice, namely, Fear, Policy, Stipulation.

1. Not *Fear*, or a certain jealoufy of the worft that may happen. For though it muft be granted natural to the Minds of Men, to be poffeffed with an awe towards fuch things as are able to hurt them; yet 'tis much more probable, that the fear of a fupreme Being, is rather the Confequence and Effect of fuch a Belief, than the *Caufe* of it. For this reafon, becaufe the Notion of a Deity doth comprehend under it infinite *Goodnefs* and *Mercy*, as well as *Power* and *Juffice*; and there is no reafon why *Fear* fhould difpofe a Man to fancy a Being that is infinitely *Good* and *Merciful*.

2. Not *Policy* or the device of Statist, to keep Men's Confciences in awe, and oblige them to subjection. I. Because the greatest Princes and Politicians themselves, have in all Ages been as much under this conviction of a Deity, and the lashes of Conscience, as any other Persons whatsoever; which could

not

Chap. 4. of Natural Religion.

not be, had they known this bufiness of Religion to have been a Device or State-Engine, whereby their Subjects were to be imposed upon. 2. Because this Belief is amongst the more rude and favage Nations, such as in all other Regards are ignorant and wild, and utterly destitute of all common Policy.

3. Not Stipulation or mutual Agreement, for the fame Reafon: Becaufe 'tis amongft those barbarous and favage People, who decline all kind of Commerce with others. Nor is it imaginable, how such kind of Perfons should agree together to promote any Opinion, who are widely separated from one another, by Seas, and Mountains, and Defarts; and yet not at so great a distance in their Habitations, as in their Customs and Manners.

From all which it may appear, That this Opinion or Belief which is fo general amongft Men, doth not arife from any prejudice or partiality upon their Minds; but rather the doubting or questioning of these Things, which belongs but to few. There is reason enough to believe, that this may be founded in prejudice. Nor is it difficult to determine whence their prejudice doth arise, namely, from the vicious Inclinations of Men, which will corrupt and bias their Judgments. When once Men are immersed in fensual Things, and are become Slaves to their

48

The Wif-

gious.

their Passions and Lusts, then are they most disposed to doubt of the Existence of God. Whereas on the contrary, the more just and honeft any Man is, the more willing and careful he is to walk up to the dictates of his natural Light, by fo much the more firmly are fuch Persons convinced of this Truth. 'Tis the Confcience of Guilt which makes it the Interest of some that there should be no God. And confequently being defirous to have it fo, this makes them studious how to find out some doubt and obscurity about it.

2. Affirmatively, It is a known Rule, That the Caufe must be as universal as the Effect is. If this belief have been one and conflant in all Places and Times, then must the Cause of it be so likewise. And what is there imaginable that hath a fairer pretence to this, than the very Nature of our Minds, which are of fuch a frame as in the ordinary exercife of their Faculties, will eafily find out the necessity of a supreme Being? And it seems very congruous to Reason, that he who is the great Creator of the World, should fet some fuch Mark of himself upon those Creatures that are capable of worshipping him, whereby they might be led to the Author of their Being, to whom their Worship is to be directed ; as is observed in a late Discourse, dom of te- wherein there are many other Things to this Purpose.

Such

Such kind of Notions as are general to Mankind, and not confin'd to any particular Sect or Nation, or Time, are usually stiled nouvaj "erroua, Common Notions, roger asep-Marinol, Seminal Principles; and Lex nata, by the Roman Orator, an innate Law, in opposition to Lex scripta, and in the Apofile's Phrase, the Law written in our hearts. Which kind of Notions, though they are of themselves above all other matters most plain and perspicuous, yet because learned Men do fomewhat differ in their Apprehensions concerning the first rife and original of them, I shall therefore take this occasion to suggest briefly, that which to me feems the most eafy and natural Way for the explaining of this, namely, by comparing the inward Senfation of our Minds and Understandings, with that of our outward Senfes.

It hath been generally agreed upon, and we find it by fufficient Experience, that the Acts of our Mind are reducible to these three Kinds.

I. Perception of fuch fingle Objects as are proposed to them, which is called fimple Apprehension.

2. Putting together fuch fingle Objects, in order to our comparing of the Agreement or Difagreement betwixt them, by which we make Propositions, which is called Judging.

E

3. The

3. The difcerning of that Connexion or Dependance which there is betwixt feveral Propositions, whereby we are enabled to infer one Proposition from another, which is called *Ratiocination*, or Difcourse.

50

Now as there is an universal Agreement in the Sensation of outward Objects; The *Eye* and the *Ear* of all sensitive Creatures, having the same kind of perception of vizible and audible things: Those things which appear Green, Blue, or Red to one, having the same appearance to all others. So must it be with the Understandings of Men likewise, which do agree in the same kind of Perception or simple Apprehension of intelligible Objects.

And as in making of Propositions, or compounding our Apprehensions about fensible things, we determine that the Green in this Object is like the Green in that other, and unlike the Yellow or Blue in a third; that it is more or lefs, or equal to fomething elfe, with which we compare it: So likewife is it for compounding other simple Notions belonging to the Understanding, by which we judge one thing to be like or unlike, agreeable or disagreeable, equal, or more or lefs in respect to something elfe compared with it.

Now those kind of Apprehensions wherein all Men do agree, these are called *natural Notions*. And of this kind are all those Opinions which have in them such a suitablenes

10

to the Minds of Men, as to be generally owned and acknowledged for true, by all fuch as apply their Thoughts to the Confideration of them.

As for fuch Doctrines as depend merely upon Inftitution, and the Inftruction of others, Men do frequently differ both from themfelves, and from one another about them ; because that which can plant, can supplant.

If mere Inftitution be able to fix fuch Opinions, it may be able to unfettle them again. Whereas no kind of Inftitution will be fufficient to irradicate these natural Notions out of the Minds of Men.

But now, though the Understanding have naturally this power belonging to it, of Apprehending, and Comparing, and Judging of things ; yet it is not to be expected, either from Infants, or from dull sottish People, or from such as are destitute of all the Advantages of Education, that they should improve this natural Ability, to all the due Confequences of it. But in order to this, 'tis neceffary that Men should first be out of their Nonage before they can attain to an actual use of this Principle. And withal, that they fhould be ready to exert and exercise their Faculties to observe and confider the Nature of Things, to make use of that help which is to be had, by the Instruction and Experience of those with whom they converse. Nor can this be any just Exception against the Ez

the naturalness of fuch Notions, that they are promoted by the Experience and Instruction of others; Because Mankind is naturally designed for a Sociable Life, and to be helpful to one another by Mutual Conversation. And without this Advantage of Discourse and Conversation, whereby they communicate their Thoughts and Opinions to one another, it could not otherwise be, but that Men must needs be strangely ignorant, and have many wild and gross Apprehensions of such things as are in themselves very plain and obvious, and do appear so to others.

For the better understanding of this, let us suppose a Person bred up in some deep Cavern of the Earth, without any Instruction from others, concerning the State of Things in this upper Surface of the World: Suppose this Person, after he is arrived to a mature Age, to be fetched up from this solitary Abode, to behold this habitable World, the Fields, and Towns, and Seas, and Ri-vers, the various revolutions of Seafons, together with the beautiful Hoft of Heaven, the Sun, and Moon, and Stars: It could not otherwife be, but that fuch a Perfon must at first view have many wild Imaginations of Things. He might conceive those useful and beautiful contrivances of Houses and Towns, to spring up and grow out of the Earth, as well as Trees;

53

Trees; or elfe that Trees were made and built by Men, as well as Houfes. But fuppofing him to be a Man, he must be endowed with fuch a Natural Faculty, as upon farther confideration and experience, will quickly fatisfy him, That one of these was *Natural*, and the other Artificial; and that the Buildings were framed to that Elegance and Convenience by the Art and Skill of Men.

It would not at first feem credible to him, that a large Tree should proceed from a small Seed or Kernel: That an Egg should produce a Bird. And as for Man himself, he would not be able to have any conception of his true Original, how it could be possible, that a Young Infant should be bred in his Mother's Womb, where it should continue for so many Months inclosed in a bag of Water, without breathing; yet upon Experience these things would appear to him unquestionable, and of Natural Evidence.

From what hath been faid, it will follow, that fuch things are evident by Natural Light, which Men of a mature Age, in the ordinary use of their Faculties, with the common help of mutual Society, may know and be sufficiently affured of, without the help of any special Revelation. And when it is faid that the Notion of God is natural to the Soul, the meaning of it is, That there is such a Faculty in the Soul E_3 of

of Man, whereby, upon the use of Reason, he can form within himself a settled notion of such a first and supreme Being, as is endowed with all possible perfection. Which is all I shall say as to this first Argument. I shall be briefer in the rest.

54



CHAP.

CHAP. V.

KCHEPICESING STREET

55

II. Arg. From the Original of the World.

Nothing can be more evident, than that this visible Frame, which we call the World, was either from all *Eternity*, or else that it had a *Beginning*: And if it had a Beginning, this must be either from *Chance* or from some *wise Agent*. Now if from clear Principles of Reason, it can be rendred more credible, that the World had a Beginning, and that from some wise Agent: This may be another Argument to this purpose.

I cannot here omit the mention of a late Dr. Tillot-Difcourfe, wherein this Subject hath been 10 fon's 1ft fully treated of, that I fhall need to fay the lefs of it, having little that is material to add to what is there delivered.

In the difcuffing of this, I fhall purpofely omit the mention of those Arguments which relate to Infinity, as being not so easily intelligible, and therefore more apt to puzzle and amuse, than to convince. Let it be supposed, that each of the two Theories, whether about the Eternity of the World, or its having a Beginning, are not impossible, and that neither of them does imply a Contra-E 4 56

Of the Principles, &c. Lib. I.

diction. And farther, that neither of them can be infallibly demonstrated by the mere Principles of Reason. In this Case the Question must be, which of them is most credible.

He that would rationally fix his Opinion and Belief about this matter, hath but these two kinds of Proof to enquire after.

1. Testimony, or the Tradition of the most ancient Times.

2. Reason, or such Probabilities as do arise from the Nature of the thing.

For the First of these Opinions, concerning the Eternity of the World, there is very little to be faid from either of these.

De Cælo,

1. As to Testimony; Aristotle, who was lib.1.c.10. a great Patron of this Opinion, and held that the World was a necessary Emanation from God, as Light is from the Sun; doth of himfelf acknowledge, that the Philosophers before him, were of Opinion that the World had a Beginning; which acknowledgment of his, is no fmall prejudice to the Authority of his Opinion, as I shall shew afterwards. And then,

2. As to Reason, It is a mere precarious Hypothesis, having no sufficient Argument, that I know of, to render it probable.

But now for the other Opinion, namely, the Beginning of the World, there are as fair and convincing Proofs for it, of feveral kinds, as the Nature of the Thing is well capable of. I. From

I. From Tradition : If the World were made and had a Beginning, it is but reafonable to expect, that fo memorable a thing as this, fhould be recorded in fome of the moft ancient Hiftories ; And that fome extrordinary Means fhould be used to perpetuate the Memory of it, and to convey it down from one Generation to another by Universal Tradition : And if it shall appear, that all the Evidence of this kind is for this Opinion, This must needs render it highly credible.

Now the *Hiftory* of *Mofes* hath been generally acknowledged to be the moft ancient Book in the World, and always efteemed of great Authority, even amongft those Heathens who do not believe it to be divinely infpired : And there is no Man of Learning, but must allow to it (at least) the ordinary credit of other ancient Histories; especially, if he confider what ground there is for the Credibility of it, from the Theology of the darker Times, which is made up of some imperfect Traditions and Allusions, relating to those particular Stories which are more difficulty fet down in the Writings of *Moses*.

Now Moses doth give fuch a plain, brief, unaffected account of the Creation of the World, and of the most remarkable Passages of the first Ages, particularly of the Plantation of the World by the dispersion of Noah's Family, so agreeable to the most ancient Remains of Heathen Writers, as must needs very very much recommend it to the belief of every impartial Man.

Though the Jews were but a small Nation, and confin'd to a narrow compass in the World; yet the first rife of Letters and Languages is truly to be afcribed to them. It is attested by several of the best and most ancient Heathen Writers, that the Hebrew Alphabet, or (which is all one) the Phænician, is that, from which both the Greek and the Latin, and confequently the generality of the reft now known, are derived; fo Herodotus, Plutarch, Pliny, Curtius, Lucan, &c. From whence it may be probably inferred, that the account given by the first Language, is the most ancient, and therefore the most likely to be a true Account of the first Original of things.

The usual Course observed by all Nations to preferve the Memory of things most remarkable, which might otherwife in a tract of time be forgotten, especially amongst fuch as are not acquainted with Letters, hath been by some practical Institution, as by appointing some Festival for the Commemoration of fuch things. And thus likewife hath it been in the present Case: The Sabbath (as Moses expresive tells us) was instituted for this very purpose to keep up the Memory of the Creation. And though perhaps it may be difficult to prove, that this Day hath upon this Account been observed by any other Nation, I but

but the Jews; yet the division of Time by Weeks, hath been universally observed in the World, not only amongst the *Civilizid*, but likewise amongst the most *Barbarous* Nations. And there being no Foundation in Nature for this kind of distribution of Days, it must therefore depend upon some ancient general Tradition, the Original whereof, together with the particular reason of it, is prefervid in the most ancient of all other Histories, viz. that of Moses.

59

As for the derivation of this from the feven Planets, whofe Names have been anciently affigned to them; this being well confidered, will appear to be fo far from invalidating what I now affert, that it will rather contribute to the probability of it.

It is commonly believed that the affignation of the Names of the Planets, to the Days of the Week, was by the Chaldaans, who were much devoted to Aftrological Devices, and had an opinion that every Hour of the Day was governed by a particular Planet, reckoning them according to their usual order, Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, Sol, Venus, Mercury, Luna; That Planet which was afcribed to the first Hour, giving Name to the whole Day; fupposing Saturn to belong to the first Hour of Saturday, then the second Hour will belong to Jupiter, the third to Mars, &c. and according to this order, the fifteenth Hour will belong likewise to Saturn, and

and fo will the twenty-fecond, the twentythird to *Jupiter*, the twenty-fourth to *Mars*; and fo the first Hour of the next Day must belong to *Sol*, which must accordingly give the Denomination to that Day; and fo for the other Days of the Week.

60

Now if it may appear, that in this very Account, which all forts of learned Men do agree in, there is fuch a special regard to the Jewish Sabbath, or Seventh-Day, as cannot be pretended for any other; this will still render it more credible, that the Tradition of the Sabbath did precede these Astrological Names: If we suppose these Astrologers to reckon from the first Day of the Creation, and to begin with the most noble Planet the Sun; then the Seventh Day will be Satur. day, or the Jewish Sabbath : Or (which is more probable) if we suppose them to begin their Computation, from the first Day after the Creation was finished, and from the highcst Planet, of flowest Motion, and so more proper to fignify a Day of Reft; according to this way of Computation, there is a peculiar Privilege belongs to the Jewish Sabbath, which cannot be faid of any of the other Days.

The Testimony of greatest Antiquity, next to the Books of Moses, must be fought for amongst those ancient Nations, the Egyptians, Chaldaans, Phanicians, from whom the Grecians derived their Learning, and amongst

amongst whom the first and most famous Philosophers of Greece were wont to travel, for the improving of their Knowledge; it being probable that some Memorials might be preferved amongst those ancient Nations, concerning the first beginning of Things ; and that they were acquainted with what was the Universai Tradition of the first Ages. Upon which account, those Grecian Philosophers before Aristotle, such as Thales, Anaxagoras, Pythagoras, &c. who by their Travel were conversant amongst these Nations, must by this advantage be more competent Judges than he was, concerning the general Belief and Opinion of former Times, and what Grounds they had for it.

Now it is well known to have been a general Tradition amongft these Nations, that the World was made, and had a Beginning. And though there be some prodigious Accounts amongst them, which may seem inconfistent with the Writings of *Moses*, as namely, that of the *Chaldaans*, who reckon Forty-three thousand Years from the begining of the World to the Time of *Alexander*: yet this way of Computation is acknowledged by *Diodorus Siculus* and *Plutarch*, to be meant of *Lunary* Years, or Months; which being reduced to *Solary* Years, will fall out to be much about the time affigned by *Moses* for the Creation.

But

But befides thefe Teftimonies of the Ancient Nations, and the first Grecian Philosophers who conversed amongst them; This hath been likewise believed and professed by the most eminent Writers fince, Socrates, and Plato, and Tully, and Seneca, and the generality of the rest, whether Philosophers or Poets, of greatest Repute for their Learning, who have afferted, That God was the Maker of the World.

There are several Passages to this purpose amongst those ancient Greek Poets, Linus, Hesiod, Orpheus, Epicharmus, Aristophanes, which relate to the Creation of the World; and Ovid particularly, who setched his Matter from the Grecian Writers, doth give such a plain Description of it, as if he had been acquainted with the Book of Moses; in those known Verses:

Metam. / lib. r.

62

Ante Mare & Terras, & quod tegit omnia cœlum, &c.

Nor hath it been thus only amongft the more civiliz'd Nations; but the barbarous *Indians* likewife have owned this Tradition, and profeffed the Belief of it. Now it is not eafy to imagine, how any fuch Tradition could arife fo *early*, and fpread fo *univerfally*, if there were not a real Ground for it. As for the Arguments from *Reafon*, I

would offer these things to Confideration : '1. If

63

I. If the World had been either without a Beginning, or elfe very old, much older than the time affigned for it in the Hiftory of Moses; 'tis not likely, but there should be fome kind of Memorials of those former Ages, or fome real Evidence that there had been such, Quis dubitet, quin Mundus re-Saturnal. cens ac novus sit, cum Historia Græca, bis lib. 1. mille annorum historiam vix contineat? faith Macrobius. The World cannot be very old, because the Grecian History doth scarce extend to two Thousand Years. This was that which convinced Lucretius, that the World could not be Eternal, becaufe there were fuch obscure Footsteps or Reliques in any credible Story, either amongst the Grecians or Romans, concerning any Persons that lived, or any confiderable Action that was done, much before the Trojan Wars.

The first rife and progress of Arts and Sciences in the World, may likewise afford another fair probability to this purpose. Seneca afferts, that there was not above a Thousand Years fince the beginning of Arts and Sciences, to the time wherein he lived. There is fcarce any one of them so ancient, but that the Original and first Inventors of them are recorded in Story. Nor is there any Nation in the World, now accounted Civil, but within the Memory of Books, were utterly rude and barbarous. Now it is not imaginable that so fagacious, so busy a Creature as Mankind

kind is, could all of them have lived an infinity of Ages, deftitute of those Arts, so advantageous for the comfort and benefit of Human Life, without some successful Attempts for the supplying of their Wants by them.

If it be faid, that it is *poffible* there might have happen'd many general Inundations, by which former Inventions might be loft and forgotten, and fuch a kind of Simplicity introduced into the World, as is proper to the first and ruder Ages of it. To this I havefhewed before, that a mere possibility to the contrary, can by no means hinder a Thing from being highly credible. To which I shall prefently add fomething farther.

3. If the World had been eternal, how comes it to pass that it is not every-where inhabited and cultivated? How is it, that very probably a confiderable Part of it is yet unknown? It is not yet two hundred Years fince, that one half of that which is now known lay undiscover'd. Whereas if we judge of its Beginning by the present Plantations and Fulnefs of it, according to those Proportions wherein Men and Families are now multiplied, allowing for such kind of Devastations, by War, Famine, Pestilence, Inundations, as are recorded in credible Story to have hapned in former Times; I fay according to this, it will appear highly credible, that the Begining of the World was much about the Time mentioned by Moses for the Creation of it; whereas

64

whereas, had it been eternal, it muft long ere this have been over-flock'd, and become too narrow for the Inhabitants, though we fhould fuppofe the addition but of one Man every Year. Nay, though we fuppofe but the addition of one Man for every thousand Years, yet long before this time there fhould have been a far greater Number than there could be Sands in the Earth, though the whole Globe were made up of nothing elfe.

If it be faid, that there may have been great Checks given to the Increase of Mankind by Wars, Famines, Pestilences, and Inundations.

To this it may be replied, that either these extraordinary Devastations of Mankind, must fall out regularly, so as not to be too much or too little; and in this Case, they must be ordered by some Wise Agent, which is God; or else they must be purely Casual: And then it is by no means credible, but that the World must long ere this have been wholly wasted, and left desolate of Inhabitants, or else frequently too much replenished.

But the most plausible shift against the force of this Argument, is fetch'd from the instance of *Noah*'s Flood, by which the whole World was destroyed, excepting one Family. The like whereto may frequently have hapned before, when perhaps one only Family did escape, and those such ignorant Persons, as could give no true account of what was before. F

But neither will this shift ferve the turn; because no Man can give any rational Account, how 'tis possible that fuch a general Flood fhould come, by any natural means. And if it be *supernatural*; That grants the Thing I am proving, namely fuch a Supreme Being as can alter the course of Nature. But let it be supposed natural; How comes it to pafs that fo much as one Family doth efcape? Such kind of Deluges, as must prevent the over-stocking of the World, must be neceffary once every ten or twenty thousand Years. And there must have happen'd many Millions of them from all Eternity. And who shall take care for the adjudging of them to their proper Seafon? or for preventing the total destruction of Mankind? Though we fhould grant this possible Casualty, yet he who can believe that to be a probable Cafualty which hath never come to pass in an eternal Duration, must not pretend to be an Enemy to Credulity.

By what hath been faid it may appear, that there is a very great advantage in the Proofs for this Opinion, concerning the *Beginning* of the *World*, above the other for the Eternity of it.

Now for the *Difficulties* on each fide: Those relating to the Eternity of the World, have been already discussed, in the Proofs I have lately infisted upon. And as for the Opinion, concerning the Creation of it, the chief

66

67

chief Difficulty which Aristotle doth mention, is from that Principle of his, Ex nibilo nihil fit, which is generally acknowledged to be true concerning natural Generations, but must not necessarily be extended to supernatural Productions. It is one of the natural Notions belonging to the Supreme Being, to conceive of him that he is Omnipotent. And it is very reasonable for us to believe, that our finite Understandings cannot comprehend the utmost extent of Omnipotence. And though the making of something out of nothing doth argue an inconceivable Power, yet there is no contradiction in it. And if fuch things must be denied which our Reason cannot comprehend, we must then deny that any thing can be Self-existent; which yet is and must be supposed, on both fides; It being altogether as difficult for us to conceive, how any thing should be of it self, as how any thing should be made of nothing. So that this difficulty is not fufficient to overthrow this Opinion, and withal it doth extend equally to both fides.

So then if it do appear, that betwixt these two Opinions the least and fewest Difficulties do lie on that side which hath the plainest and strongest Proofs:

There is no question to be made, which way every impartial Man will determine his Opinion,

I do

I do not pretend that these Arguments are Demonstrations, of which the Nature of this thing is not capable: But they are such strong Probabilities, as ought to prevail with all those, who are not able to produce greater Probabilities to the contrary.

68

As for that other Opinion, concerning Epicurus his Atoms, it is fo extravagant and irrational, and hath been fo abundantly confuted by others, that I cannot think it expedient to fpend any time in the difcuffing of it.



CHAP.



69

CHAP. VI.

III. Arg. From the admirable Contrivance of Natural Things.

3. FROM that excellent Contrivance which there is in all natural Things: Both with respect to that Elegance and Beauty which they have in themselves separately considered, and that regular Order and Subferviency wherein they stand towards one another; together with the exact sitness and propriety, for the several purposes for which they are designed. From all which it may be inferred, that these are the Productions of fome Wise Agent.

fome Wife Agent. The most fagacious Man is not able to find out any blot or error in this great Volume of the World, as if any thing in it had been an imperfect Essay at the first, such as afterwards stood in need of mending: But all things continue as they were from the beginning of the Creation.

Tully doth frequently infift upon this, as De divithe most natural result from that beauty and natione, regularity to be observed in the Universe. Esse prastantem aliquam, aternamq; naturam & eam suspiciendam ador and amq; hominum generi, pulchritudo mundi ordoq; rerum cæ-F 3 lession

lestium cogit confiteri. " The great Elegance " and order of things in the World, is abun-" dantly enough to evince the Necessity of " fuch an eternal and excellent Being, to " whom we owe Adoration. And in another place, quid potest esse tam apertum, tam-

70

De Natur. que perspicuum, cum cœlum suspeximus, cœ-Deor. lib. lestiaque contemplati sumus, quàm aliquod esse Numen præstantissimæ mentis, quo hæc regantur, "What can be more obvious " than to infer a supreme Deity, from that " order and government we may behold a-" mongft the heavenly Bodies?

The several vicifitudes of Night and Day, Winter and Summer, the production of Minerals, the growth of Plants, the generation of Animals according to their feveral Species ; with the Law of Natural Instinct, whereby every thing is inclined and enabled for its own prefervation: The gathering of the Inhabitants of the Earth into Nations, under distinct Policies and Governments; those Advantages which each of them have of mutual Commerce, for fupplying the Wants of each other, are fo many diffinct Arguments to the fame purpose.

I cannot here omit the Observations which have been made in these latter Times, fince we have had the Use and Improvement of the Microscope, concerning that great difference which by the help of that doth appear betwixt natural and artificial Things. Whatever

ever is Natural doth by that appear adorned with all imaginable Elegance and Beauty. There are fuch inimitable Gildings and Embroideries in the smallest Seeds of Plants, but especially in the parts of Animals, in the Head or Eye of a fmall Fly: Such accurate Order and Symetry in the Frame of the most minute Creatures, a Louse, or a Mite; as no Man were able to conceive without feeing of them. Whereas the most curious Works of Art, the sharpest finest Needle, doth appear as a blunt rough Bar of Iron coming from the Furnace or the Forge. The most accurate Engravings or Embossiments, seem fuch rude bungling deformed Works, as if they had been done with a Mattock or a Trowel. So vast a difference is there betwixt the Skill of Nature, and the rudeness and imperfection of Art.

And for fuch kind of Bodies, as we are able to judge of by our naked Eyes, that excellent contrivance which there is in the feveral parts of them; their being fo commodioufly adapted to their proper ufes, may be another Argument to this purpofe. As particularly those in Humane Bodies, upon confideration of which, Galen himself, no great Friend to Religion, could not but acknowledge a Deity. In his Book de Formatione Factus, he takes notice, that there are in a Humane Body above 600 feveral Muscles, and there are at least ten several Intentions, of F 4

due Qualifications, to be observed in each of these; proper figure, just magnitude, right disposition of its several ends, upper and lower · Polition of the whole, the infertion of its proper Nerves, Veins, and Arteries, which are each of them to be duly placed; fo that about the Muscles alone, no less than 6000 several ends or aims are to be attended to. The Bones are reckon'd to be 284; the diffinct Scopes or Intention in each of these, are above Forty, in all about 100000. And thus is it in some proportion with all the other parts, the Skin, Ligaments, Vessels, Glandules, Humours; but more especially with the several Members of the Body, which do in regard of the great variety and multitude of those feveral intentions required to them, very much exceed the Homogeneous Parts. And the failing in any one of these, would cause an irregularity in the Body, and in many of them, fuch as would be very notorious. the provide of pices

And thus likewife is it in proportion with all other kinds of Beings; Minerals, Vegetables; but efpecially with fuch as are Sensitive, Infects, Fishes, Birds, Beasts; and in these yet more especially, for those Organs and Faculties that concern Sensation: But most of all, for that kind of Frame which relates to our Understanding Power, whereby we are able to correct the Errors of our Senses and Imaginations, to call before us things pass and future, and to behold things that are invisible to Sense. Now

Now to imagine, that all these things, according to their several kinds, could be brought into this regular Frame and Order, to which such an infinite number of Intentions are required, without the Contrivance of some wife Agent, must needs be irrational in the highest degree.

And then, as for the Frame of Human Nature itself. If a Man doth but confider how he is endowed with fuch a Natural Principle, whereby he is neceffarily inclined to feek his own well-being and Happiness: And likewife with one Faculty, whereby he is enabled to judge of the Nature of Things, as to their fitnefs or unfitness for this end : And another Faculty, whereby he is enabled to chuse and, profecute fuch things as may promote this end, and to reject and avoid fuch thir.gs as may hinder it: And that nothing properly is his Duty, but what is really his Interest. This may be another Argument to convince him, that the Author of his Being must be infinitely Wife and Powerful.

The wifeft Man is not able to imagine how things fhould be better than now they are, fupposing them to be contrived by the wifeft Agent; and where we meet with all the Indications and Evidences of fuch things as the Thing is capable of, fupposing it to be true; it must needs be very irrational to make any doubt of it.

Now

Now I appeal unto any confidering Man, unto what Caufe all this Exactnefs and Regularity can be reafonably afcribed, Whether to blind *Chance*, or to blind *Neceffity*, or to the **C**onduct of fome wife intelligent Being.

Though we fhould fuppofe both *Matter* and *Motion* to be Eternal, yet is it not in the leaft credible, that infenfible Mattercould be the Author of all thofe excellent Contrivances which we behold in thefe natural Things. If any one fhall furmife, that thefe Effects may proceed from the *Anima Mundi*; I would ask fuch a one, Is this *Anima Mundi* an Intelligent Being, or is it void of all Perception and Reafon? If it have no kind of fenfe or knowledge, then 'tis altogether needlefs to affert any fuch Principle, becaufe Matter and Motion may ferve for this purpofe as well. If it be an Intelligent, Wife, Eternal Being, This is GOD, under another Name.

As for *Fate* or *Necessity*, this must needs be as blind and as unfit to produce wise Effects, as *Chance* itself.

From whence it will follow, That it must be a Wise Being that is the Cause of these Wise Effects.

By what hath been faid upon this Subject, it may appear, That these visible things of the Rom.i. World are fufficient to leave a Man without 20. Acts xiv. 17. Brad fuch as do plainly declare his great Pow-Pfal. xix. er and Glory.

CHAP.

74

I

CHAP. VII.

SCOMERCE STREET

75

2

IV. Arg. From Providence, and the Government of the World.

4. **F**^ROM the Works of *Providence* in the Government of the World ; and that continual Experience which we have of fome wife and powerful Being, who doth preside over, and govern all things; not only by his general Concourfe in preferving all kinds of things in their Beings, and regulating them in their Operations : But chiefly in his wife and just Government over Mankind, and Human Affairs, which may appear by fuch Effects as are Extraordinary. 1. For the more common Effects of it;

namely, that general Success which in the ordinary Course of things doth accompany honeft and virtuous Actions : And the Punishment and Vengeance that doth one time or other in this World usually befal such as are wicked. BothVirtue andVice being generally, and for the most part, sufficiently distinguished by Rewards and Punishments in this Life.

There are indeed fome Inftances to the contrary, concerning the Miferies of Good Men, and the Profperity of the Wicked: But thefe

these have been by several of the wifest Heathen, *Plato*, *Plutarch*, *Tully*, *Seneca*, &c. fufficiently vindicated, by the clearest Principles of Reason, from being any Prejudice to the wise Government of Providence.

76

It is not either Neceffary or Convenient, that Happiness and Prosperity in this Life, which is the usual Reward of Virtue, should have either such a *Physical* or *Mathematical Certainty*, as could not possibly fail. Because,

I. It would not be confiftent with our dependent Conditions, that Worldly Profperity fhould be fo infallibly under the Power of our own Endeavours, as that God himfelf might not fometimes interpofe for our Difappointment. If I may have leave to fuppofe what I am now proving, namely, a Wife and Omnipotent Providence. It muft needs appear highly reafonable, that it fhould be left to his Infinite Wifdom and Power, to make what referved Cafes he pleafes, from the ordinary Courfe of Things. From whence it will follow, that thefe unequal Difpenfations can be no fufficient Ground for the Disbelief of Providence.

2. It would very much prejudice another great Principle of Religion, which is of mighty Influence for the regulating of Men's Lives and Actions in this World, namely, the Belief and Expectation of a Future State of Rewards and Punifhments.

3. If

3. If Temporal Profperity did infallibly attend all good Actions, This would be a Diminution to Virtue itself; Men would do good by a kind of natural Necessity; which would abate just fo much from the Virtue of their Actions, as it does from the Liberty of them. It is fufficient, that Moral Actions should have Moral Motives. And that Virtue doth generally, and for the most part, make Men profperous and happy in this World. We know by Experience, that all Mankind do in their most weighty Affairs, think it sufficient to depend upon such Caufes as do commonly, and for the most part, prove effectual to the ends for which they are defigned. So that this very thing, which is usually look'd upon as the greatest Objection against Providence, is really and truly an Argument for it.

2. For Extraor dinary Effects of it. If we give any credit to the universal History of all Ages and Nations, it will by that appear,

1. That there have many times happened fuch special signal Providences for the *punish*ing of obstinate Sinners, and for the *Delive*rance of such as were Religious, in answer to their Prayers, whereby the supreme Governor of the World hath so visibly pointed out his Will and Meaning, and so plainly manifested his Power, that every impartial Man must be forced to say, doubtles there is a God that judges in the Earth.

2. That

2. That fometimes Miracles have been wrought, which could not be affected without the help of some Superior Power: And fometimes there have been plain Prophecies and Predictions concerning fuch future things, as in their various Circumstances were contingent, of which the Annals of all Ages and Nations, as well Heathen as Christian, do give very particular and large Accounts. And though we may fafely grant, that some of the Stories to this purpose, delivered either from the more ancient or later Times, were fabulous and vain; yet for a Man to deny that ever fuch things happened in the World, but that they were all mere Forgeries and Defigns to cheat Posterity, this were to fubvert the Credit of all History; which is fo immodest a thing, as any sober Man would be afham'd of.

These Arguments are more largely difcuffed by others, who have writ upon this Subject: But there is one Particular which to me seems very confiderable to this purpose, tho' but little notice of it be taken by others: And that is, The State of the *fewish* Nation, who for these 1700 Years have been driven out of their own Country, having now no particular Place of abode belonging to them as a Nation; but are scattered and difperfed over all the habitable World, hated and despised wherever they are permitted to dwell; very frequently perfecuted, impoverished,

79

rifhed, banifhed, murthered in vaft Multitudes; and notwithftanding all this, they are not yet fo mixed and blended with other Nations, as to be loft amongft them; but are ftill kept up as a diftinct People; there being no Inftance like this in any Story. As if they were intended for a ftanding Memorial and Example to the World, of the Divine Power and Vengeance. To me it feems, amongft Rational Arguments, one of the plaineft, not only for the proof of a Deity, and a juft Providence in purfuing that Nation with fuch exemplary Vengeance; but likewife for the Authority of Scripture, and the Truth of the Chriftian Religion.

I might here add another Argument to the fame purpose, from Natural Conscience, which is God's Deputy, and doth internally witness for him, as other Creatures do externally. 'Tis plain, that all Mankind are in fome measure endowed with this; and one may as well affert, that Hope and Fear are not natural to Men, as that Confcience is not. To this purpose I might farther argue, from those natural Notions of our Minds concerning Good and Evil, the Bounds of which are fixed in the Nature of Things, and do not depend either upon Custom or Positive Law. Those things which have in them a fitness to promote our chief End, being styled Good, and implying in the very Definition of them, Comeline (s and Reward, those things which

which have in them a natural aptitude to hinder our Chief End, being stiled Evil; and implying in the definitions of them Turpitude and Punishment. From whence it will follow, that there must be some Superior Power, who, by framing things with fuch respects towards one another, may be faid to have declared this Law of Nature, and to have taken care to enforce the observance of it; both these belonging to the nature of a Law. But I may perhaps have occasion to fpeak more particularly to this afterwards.

These Things put together, are so ftrong an Evidence, and fo fufficient to convince the Existence of a Deity, that that Man must be very wilful who doth not fubmit and acquiesce in it. And for this Reason is it (faith L. Racon's a Noble Author) that God never yet wrought Effays. any Miracle to convince an Atheist; because to a Man that is capable of being convinced, his ordinary works are fufficient to this purpose. And I should think it much more easy and rational (faith the fame Author) to believe all the Fables in the Poets, the Legend, the Talmud, and the Alcoran, than that this Universal Frame should be without a Creator and Governor.

> And now it may not be improper to look back, and take a review of what kind of Evidence hath been produced in this Matter. As for any immediate Proof from our outward Senses, this cannot be pretended to, for the

80

81

the demonstration of fuch a Being, as is fap posed to be a pure Spirit and invisible; but for the *mediate* Proofs from the effects of a Wise Omnipotent Agent, we can look no where about us, but every Object doth afford evidence of it. There is no conclusion in Philosophy (not immediately apparent to the Sense) that is capable of so full and unqueflionable an Evidence from plain Effects, as this.

As for that kind of Inward Senfation, whereby we can difeern the Impressions of our own Minds, They that have any Senfe of a Law written in their Hearts, or any Natural Notions about Good and Evil, must, by these effects, be convinced of a supreme Being. And as for that kind of Evidence which belongs to our Understandings, if the univerfal Confent of Mankind be of any Authority: If this visible World, replenished with such admirable variety of Creatures, preferved and governed in fuch an excellent Order, be any evidence of Infinite Power and Wifdom : If besides what we our felves have known by our own Experience, any Credit be to be given to universal History, attesting to many Signal Providences that have happen'd in the World; besides the feyeral Miracles and Prophecies that have been taken notice of in feveral Ages and Nations : I fay, if any; or all of these things be of any force; they must nceds tender the Thing I am proving to be ctes

credible in the higheft degree, and even altogether unqueftionable.

Infomuch, that if a Deity be fuppofed, it is not imaginable by what other kind of Evidence we fhould be affured of it, than what we are now furnished withal. And it was before laid down as a Principle, That when a thing is capable of good proof in any kind, Men ought to rest satisfy'd in the best Evidence for it which that kind of thing will bear, and beyond which better could not be expected, supposing it were true.

If any should imagine, that the frequent Miracles might be a more powerful Means to convince Men of this Principle; To this it may be faid,

1. That this is not *fitting*: The proper Work of Miracles being for the confirmation of fuch Doctrines as are not knowable by natural Light, not for fuch things of which Men may be fufficiently convinced by Reafon.

2. 'Tis not fo certain, that this would be effectual. Those frequent Miracles in the Passage of Ifrael out of Egypt; The Dividing the Red-Sea; The Waters out of the Rock; The Cloud and Pillar of Fire; The Mannah; The Quails; The Destruction of Korah; &c. did not prevail with the generality of the Ifraelites. Those constant Miracles under the Mosaical Dispensation; The Waters of Jealousy; The extraordinary Plen-

ty

83

ty of the Sixth Year; The Urim and Thummim; the fpecial Protection of the Coafts of Ifrael every Third Year, when all the Males were to go up to *Jerufalem* to worfhip; which Cuftorn of theirs muft needs be known to their Enemies who lived round about them: None of all these did prove effectual for the Conviction of obstinate Men. Those occasional Miracles wrought by our Saviour, though they were so many, and so great, as were never before wrought by any one, yet did they not prevail with many of the Jews:

If it be faid, That none of these Proofs do fo infallibly conclude, but that there doth still remain a Possibility that the thing may be otherwife. To this I have shewed before, That there may be an indubitable Certainty, where there is not an infallible Certainty: And that a mere possibility to the contrary, is not a sufficient Cause of doubting. To which I now add, That if it should be fupposed, that a Man could not be fure of the Being of God, yet 'tis most evident that he could not be sure to the contrary : For this plain Reason, Because no Man can be sure of a Pure Negative, namely, that fuch a thing is not; unless he will either pretend to have a certain knowledge of all Things that are or may be; than which nothing can be more monstrously and ridiculously arrogant for elfer the fire that the Being of what he Gł denies

denies doth imply a Contradiction, for which there is not the least colour in this case; The true Notion of God confisting in this, That he is a Being of all possible Perfection.

If it be fuppoled, that notwithftanding all that hath been faid, there may yet be fome Probabilities to the contrary. To this it may be anfwered, that unlefs thefe Probabilities were greater and ftronger than those on the other fide, no Man who acts rationally will incline to them. And if there be any fuch, why are they not produc'd? Where are they to be found?

If Men shall yet pretend, That tho' they cannot answer these Arguments, yet they do really find fome doubt in their own Minds. I would ask fuch, Have you ferioufly and impartially confidered what is alledged in this Cafe? It should be no prejudice to any Proposition in Philosophy or Mathematicks, that an ignorant Man, who never apply'd his Thoughts to fuch Things, doth pretend to doubt of it. If you do in some measure understand, and have confidered these Arguments: I would then ask, Have you not as much Reason for this, as you your felves would think fufficient for the proof of any thing you were not unwilling to believe? Do you not knowingly and wilfully entertain Prejudices against fuch things? Have you been true to fo much Light as you have received? Or, have you not rather with-held it in

84

in Unrighteousness? If so, 'tis plain that you have difhonest Minds, that you measure byan Unjust Balance, and therefore cannot be competent Judges of Truth or Falshood.

If it be supposed yet farther, that the Probabilities on each fide should be equal, or that those on the other fide should somewhat preponderate; yet if there be no confiderable hazard on that fide which hath the leaft probability, and a very great and most apparent danger in a Mistake about the other; in this cafe every rational and prudent Mn is bound to order his Actions in favour of that Way which appears to be most fafe and advantageous for his own Interest, as I have fhewed before.

So that in fuch Cafes as may feem unto us not altogether free from some kind of doubt, and which we could not fo far clear up to ourfelves, as to make 'em appear wholly unquestionable; I say, in such Cases, Men that would act prudently, should enquire, Where lies the danger of Miftaking?

Why, on the one fide, All the inconvenience of Believing this (if it be not fo) will be, that we are hereby occasioned to tie our felves up to fome needless Restraints during this fhort time of our Lives, wherein notwithstanding there is, as to the present, much Peace, Quiet and Safety: And, as for the future, our Errors shall die with us, there being none to call us to an account for our Mistake. But

But now, on the other fide, what if there fhould be a Deity fo holy, and just, and powerful, as is supposed? If this should prove to be a real Truth (and no Man can be fure to the contrary) what Vengeance and Indignation may fuch vile Miscreants and Traitors expect, who have made it their Business to banish Him out of the World, who is the great Creator and Governor of it; to undermine his Being; to eradicate all Notions of Him out of the Minds of Men ; to provoke his Creatures and Vaffals to a contempt of Him, a flighting of his Fear and Worship, as being but fuch imaginary Chimera's as are fit only to keep Fools in awe? Certainly, as this is the highest Provocation that any Man can be guilty of, fo shall it be punished with the foreft Vengeance.

There are two Things that Atheistical Men purpose to themselves, by their Prophane loose Principles: namely, to avoid the imputation of Credulity, and the Fears and Perplexities of Mind, to which Religion makes Men obnoxious: But their Principles are not more irrational, than their Design is foolist; for of all Mankind these Prophane Persons are,

1. The most *Credulous*, who can believe themselves to be wifer than all the World; who can believe the Eternity of the World; or its Production by a casual Concourse of Atoms, without any kind of Argument for

it,

it, against the many Reasons that are urged to the contrary. Who, if they should demean themselves about Matters of the World, as they do about Religion, would be counted ridiculous, senseless Persons, and altogether unfit for Human Conversation.

2. The most *Timorous*. *Tully* hath ob-Natura ferved, that no kind of Men are more afraid ^{Deor.} lib. 1. c. of God, than fuch as pretend not to believe 86. his Being: These are the Men who above all others are most liable to be affected with Dread and Trembling, at Thunder and Lightning; at Solitude and Darkness, and more especially then, when it doth most concern them to be freed from such Disquiets: namely, in the time of Sickness, and the approaches of Death.

From whence it will follow, that upon all Accounts Atheism may justly be accounted Folly; both as it is directly contrary to the Principles of Reason, and the Rules of Wisdom.

I have now done with the first Thing required to a state of Religion: namely, A Belief and Acknowledgment of the Divine Nature and Existence.

G 4

CHAP.

CHAP. VIII.

83

con's Ef-

12yso

Concerning the Excellencies and Perfections. of the Divine Nature : And first, of those which are commonly called Incommunicable, namely, Simplicity, Unity, Immutability, Infinitencs, Simmensity, Eternity.

Proceed to the Second Thing proposed as a principal Part of Natural Religion : namely, Due Apprehensions of the Divine Excellency and Perfections. Without which the mere belief of his Being, will contribute but little to a true state of Religion. A Man may have such unworthy Notions of a Deity, that it would in some respects be as good, nay, much better, to be without a God, than Lord Ba- to have fuch a one, as he may frame. " It " would be better (faith a great Author) to " have no Opinion of God, than fuch a one as is unworthy of him; the one is but " mere Unbelief, the other is Contumely." 'Tis a common Saying, cited out of Plutarch's Book of Superstition, where he professeth it much more defirable to him, that Posterity should fay, that there never was any fuch Man as Plutarch, rather than that he was a fierce, unconstant, revengeful Man, one who upon the least omiffion of any finall Circumftance,

ftance towards him, by Men otherways virtuous and worthy, would tear out their Hearts, deftroy their Families and Children, blaft their Fields, fpoil their Cattle with Lightning and Thunder. This would be fuch a Reprefentation as would make the notion and remembrance of him hateful; and it were better to be forgotten, than to be remembred with Infamy. Now there are fome Opinions which do thus reproach the Deity, and render him under fuch a Notion, that if the *Giants* had prevailed in their Attempt againft Heaven, that place had not been worfe fupply'd. This therefore ought to be moft carefully avoided.

Whereas the Divine Nature is fuppofed to be the first and supreme Good; therefore the *Idea* of all absolute Perfection must be effential to the Notion of him. And tho' it be very difficult for us to raife our Minds to any due apprehensions of this; yet we must endeavour in our Thoughts of him, so far as our Finite Understandings are capable, to remove and separate from him whatever is in any kind evil and unworthy, and to assolute unto him the utmost degree of all Goodness and Perfection.

The most general Notion that Men have of God, is, that he is the first Cause, and a Being of all possible Perfection.

Some

Some of his principal Excellencies difcoverable by the Light of Nature, may be reduc'd to these Heads; namely, such as are,

Incommunicable; Absolute Simplicity. Essential Unity. Immutability. Infiniteness, both in respect of Place and Time. S Immensity. Eternity. Communicable ; belonging either to the Divine Understanding. Knowledge. Wisdom. Particular Providence. Will, namely, his Soodness. Justice. Faithfulness. Faculties of Acting, his Power. Dominion over us in this Life. Distributing of Future Rewards and Punishments.

Each of these Attributes are upon this account of very great consequence to be believed and considered, because they are the Foun-

Foundations of those Duties of Religion which we owe to him. According as a Man apprehends God to be, so must his Esteem be of him, and his Demeanour towards him.

And whereas these great and necessary Points, of so much influence to Religion, have been usually treated of by others either too largely, by the inferting of several things less pertinent; or too obscurely, by offering such Proofs concerning them as are less intelligible, or intermixing the Discourses about them with such Niceties as are neither very easy to be folved, nor material for Men to know: I shall therefore in this place endeavour to avoid both these Inconveniencies, by treating concerning each of them with all imaginable brevity and plainness: Obferving this Method.

First, I shall endeavour to explain and describe what is meant by each Attribute; and then prove, that these Attributes, so explained, must belong to the Natural Notion of God. Which I shall make out, both by the confent of the wisest Heathens, express'd by their declar'd Opinions, and by their general Practice suitable thereunto: And from the Nature of the things themselves; their Congruity to the Principles of Reason, and the Absurdities that will follow upon the denial of them.

Those

91

Those are called *Incommunicable* Attributes, which are proper to God alone, and not communicated to any Creature.

62

The *First* of these I have proposed to treat of, is his *Absolute Simplicity*. By which I mean his Freedom from all kind of composition or mixture, either of Principles or of Parts: And that this doth belong to the Natural Notion of the Deity, may be evident,

1. From Testimony of the Heathen Philosophers, who do generally acknowledge him to be the FirstCause, and the most Simple Being, and do frequently stile him mens pura, & funcera segregata ab omni concretione mortali, &c. And not only Scripture, but the very Heathen likewise do express this Attribute by the Similitude of Light, amongst all visible things the most pure and simple.

2. From Natural Reason, by which it will appear, that God cannot be compounded of any Principles; because the Principles and Ingredients, which concur to the making of any thing, must be antecedent to that thing. And if the Divine Nature were compounded, it would follow that there must be something in Nature before him. Which is inconsistent with his being the first Cause.

And here I shall take occasion to speak fomewhat concerning the *Spirituality* of the Divine Nature, as having some Affinity with this, though it be none of the *incommunicable* Attributes.

I know

I know it hath been faid, with Confidence enough, that the Notion of a Spirit, or Immaterial Substance, doth imply a Contradiction; and that their is an utter Imposlibility of any other Being besides Matter. But tho' this hath been faid, yet was it never proved, nor can it be, till either a Man be able to evince, that the Notion of the word Substance, according to the most general use of it (which gives Signification to Words) doth neceffarily imply Corporeity, than which nothing can be more falle; or unless a Man shall pretend to the certain Knowledge and Comprehension of all things that are or may be, than which nothing can be more Vain.

What the Positive Notion of a Spirit is, is not so necessary to enquire after, or determine. 'Tis fufficient, that we conceive of it by way of Negation : namely, that it is a Powerful Intelligent Being that is not Matter, without Figure or Parts, not capable of Rarefaction or Condensation, not visible to our Bodily Eyes, and therefore not to be reprefented by any kind of fenfible Image: Not subject to those necessary Laws of Matter, which cannot move unless it be moved, and cannot but move when impelled by another. I fay, it may be fufficient in our apprehending the Spirituality of God, to remove all Corporeity and Figure in our Conceptions of him.

93.

Now

94

Now that this Attribute doth belong to the Divine Nature, may be made evident both by *Testimony* and by *Reason*.

It hath been generally owned by the wifeft and most learned Heathens: Pythago-DeiraDei, ras is often cited for this; by whom (faith cap. 11. LaEtantius) God was wont to be stilled In-corporalis Mens, an Incorporeal Mind; and by Plato frequently a'στάμαιτος, without a Body; by other. Grecian Philosophers viss upo μοποιος, the Mind that made the World: Plutarch stilles him cap. 50v eildos; a separated Form, not mixed with Matter, without any thing in him that is passible.

Tuscul.Qu. The Latin Philosophers do frequently lib. 1. give him the Attribute of mens divina, mens pura & sincera, mens soluta, & libera, segregata ab omni concretione mortali.

2. By Reason. That Spirituality is a Perfection, and therefore to be afcribed unto God; or rather, that Corporeity is an Imperfection, and therefore to be removed from him, may appear from hence: Because the supposing of him to be Matter is inconfistent with divers of his other most Effential Perfections: As,

1. His Immensity. If we do suppose these two reasonable *Postulata*: 1. That there are some other things in the World besides God: And, 2. That two Bodies cannot be both at the same Time in the same Place. From whence it will follow, that whatever any other

other Body or Matter is, from thence God must be excluded; and so many Chasms or Breaches must there be in the Divine Nature.

2. His Knowledge and Wifdom. It being not imaginable, how mere Matter fhould be able to comprehend, much lefs to contrive all that Variety of things in the World, paft, prefent, and to come.

3. His Liberty and Freedom, and confequently with his Goodness. That Action not being properly good, which is not done freely and out of choice. Now the Laws of Matter are necessary; there can be no aunzuov, or arbitrary Principle, in mere Matter. And it is worth Observation, how this very Argument puzzled Epicurus and his Followers, as is represented by Lucretius. If all material things move by neceffary Laws, and the parts of Matter be naturally so dispos'd, that they do not move unless they be moved, and cannot but move when press'd upon by other parts that are in motion; whence comes that Liberty which we may by an inward Senfation perceive to be within us?

Unde est hæc inquam satis avolsa voluntas?

To which he gives fo wild and irrational an Answer, from the motion of declining Atoms,

as

96

as doth fufficiently manifest him to be baffled by this Objection.

The fecond Incommunicable Attribute to be treated of, is the *effential Unity* of the Divine Nature. By which I mean, his being One and no more. And that this Perfection doth belong to the natural Notion of God, may be made evident both by Teftimony and by Reafon.

1. By *Testimony*. I have shewed before; how that notwithstanding that *Polytheism* which did so generally abound amongst the *Heathen*, yet the wifer and more confiderate Persons amongst them, have in all Ages acknowledged *One Supreme Deity*. The Egyptians of old, tho' of all others the most infamous for their multiplicity of Gods, yet did affert *One* Maker and chief Governor of the World, under whom they did suppose feveral Subordinate *Deities*, who as his *Deputies* did preside over several parts of the Universe.

The first occasion of these lesser Deities; was probably from a defire that Men had, to express their Gratitude to, and to honour the Memories of, such Heroical Persons, as in those first and ruder Ages of the World, had either by their Inventions or their Prowess, been highly Beneficial to Mankind, or to their own Countries; who thereupon were for such publick Services, thought sit to be advanced

advanced to the higheft Honour after their Deaths, and admitted in a fubordinate way, to fome fhare of Government, efpecially in taking care of the Welfare of their Countries. And to this doth the *Apoftle* feem to allude, I Cor. viij. 4, 6. where he faith, We know there is no other God but one; for though there be that are called Gods, both in Heaven and in Earth (as there be Gods many, and Lords many:) But to us there is but one God, the Father, of whom are all things, and we in him. 97

There are many Attestations amongst the Heathen Writers concerning this Attribute, the Unity of the Godhead. It is observed, that Orpheus was the first among them that wrote concerning the Genealogy of the Gods, where he reduces them to the Number of 360. But he was afterwards so sensible of this impious Folly, that he writes a particular Discourse to his Son Museus, and his other Friends, wherein he doth folemnly recant these wild absurd Fables, professing to them, that he thought himfelf obliged to rectify these Errors and Abuses, which his former Poem might have occasioned. And here he doth in the first place admonish them, that there is but one God, of himfelf, and none besides him; eis 821 auro Runs by whom all other things are made, and upon whom they depend. And then he goes on to shew, that God is invisible, and yet fees H and

and knows all things; that as he is merciful, fo is he juft, being the Author of those Judgments which befal wicked Men; with several other things to this purpose: And though *Homer* doth too often follow Orpheus in these Fictions, concerning a Multitude of Deities, yet when he is most serious, he supposes but one, eis noiegnos esco. So Sophocles.

$--\epsilon$ is $\frac{2}{6}$ siv Θ eos,

os reavon teruxe i yasan yanedr. There is but one God, who made the Heaven and the Earth.

So Pythagoras, and feveral others after him, ftile God by the Name of Monas or Unity.

It is commonly faid, that Socrates was put to death for his endeavouring to undeceive his Countrymen in that Vanity they were addicted to, of worfhipping a Multitude of Deities; and that this made the Writers after him, more fhy in fpeaking their thoughts about this matter: But though Plato do in fome places (for fear of incurring the fame Danger) feem to favour this popular Error, by defending Polytheism, yet he acknowledges thefe fubordinate Deities to be begotten; and he lays it down in another place as a Principle, that whatever is begotten is corruptible, and therefore incapable of being pro-

properly a God. And (if the 13th Epistle be truly his) there is a remarkable Passage in it to this purpose, where he gives this Note, That in those Epistolary Discourses, where he designs to be more serious, he doth mention the Name of God in the fingular Number; but when he is not fo, then he mentions Gods in the plural.

99

Hierocles in his Comment upon Pythagoras's Golden Verfes, doth ftile him Oe's Ocor, God of Gods, the only Maker of all Things.

Arrian, in his Dissertations of Epictetus, doth affure us, that in his time (which was about 120 Years after Christ) it was an usual Form in the Prayers of the Heathen, to fay, where exensor, Lord have mercy upon us; whereby they did acknowledge the Unity of that God whom they did invoke in their Prayers. Which Clause is thought to be from that Usage taken into the Liturgies of the Christians. So far then as the Consent of the wifest and best Men, in former Times, is of any Authority, so far is this Attribute rendered highly credible.

I shall only add that remarkable Paffage in Maximus Tyrius : " Though Men differ Differte t; ČC much in their Opinions about other mat-55 ters, yet in this they all agree, That there " is one God, the King, and Father of all; " under whom there are subordinate Deitics; " his Offspring, who are admitted to fome " Share of Government with him. In this is the

Ha

" the Grecian confents with the Barbarian, the Inhabitants of the Continent with the

" Islanders, the Wise with the Unwise.

2. But befides the Teftimonies to this purpofe, it may likewife be made evident by *Rea*fon, That a *Plurality of Gods* is not only unneceffary, and highly improbable; but that it is fuch a Supposition as doth imply in it many *Inconfiftencies*, and therefore is imposfible.

1. 'Tis unnecessary, and therefore highly improbable. Those have been always efteemed good Rules, Frustra fit per plura, &c. Entia non sunt multiplicanda sine necessary It is most suitable to that common Analogy to be observed amongst natural things, even in lesser Matters, that there is nothing amongst them superfluous or redundant; and therefore much more ought it to be so in the greatest and highest Matters of all. Now nothing can be more evident, than that one infinite Being may be sufficient to all Purposes whatsoever; for if it had any Limits, it were not infinite; and nothing can be more absurd, than to suppose more Gods than are necessary.

2. 'Tis not possible, that there should be two such infinite Beings; because either they must have several Perfections, or the same: Neither of which is consistent with the most obvious Notion of God, That he is a Being of all possible Perfections.

To

100

To suppose two Gods, with several Perfections, some belonging to one, and some to another, will plainly prove, that neither of them can be God, because neither of them have all possible Perfections.

To suppose two Gods of the fame and equal Perfections, would likewise prove, that neither of them can be God (*i. e.*) not absolutely perfect, because it is not so great a Privilege, to have the same equal Perfections with another, and in a kind of Partners, as to be alone, and superior above all others.

And to suppose one of them, whether of *feveral* or the *fame kinds* or Perfections with the other, but only in an *inferior* Degree, may sufficiently evince that one of them is not properly God, because not *fupreme*.

3. The third Attribute to be discussed, is the Divine Immutability. By which I mean a Freedom from all kind of Change or Inconstancy, both as to his Nature and his Purposes.

And that this *Attribute* is likewife very fuitable to those natural Notions which Men have of God, may appear,

1. By Testimony. Plato having proposed In Phad. the Question, whether God be mutable and inconstant, answers expressly; 'Tis most necessary that he should be always the same and alike. His Words are most emphatical, ide' ποπ idaµm idaµms a'λλοίασιν ideµúav evdizera, that he is never in any wise capable of any kind of Change what soever.

And

lib. 2.

102

De Repub. And in another place, he mentions these two things, as being the grand Principles of Religion. 1. That God is the caufe of all good, and in no wife of any evil. 2. That he is constant and immutable, and cannot deceive by making various Reprefentations. of himself.

So Seneca, speaking of the Necessity of ascribing this Attribute to the Divine Nature as to his Purpofes or Counfels, hath this Paf-DeBenefic. lage ; Statuerunt que non matarunt, nec unlib. 6. quam primi consilii Deos panitet. God is always conftant to his own Decrees, and doth never repent of his Purposes. And in another place, Necesse est ei eadem placere, Nat. Quest. cui nisi optima placere non possunt; nec ob hoc I. Fraf. minus liber ac potens est, ipse enim est Necessitas sua 'Tis necessary that he should be always pleased with the same things, who can be pleased with nothing but what is best: Nor canthis be any Prejudice to his Liberty or his Power, since he is his own Necessity; i. c. nothing from without, but his own natural Perfection lays this Neceffity upon him.

2. By Reafon. There is an excellent Argument to this purpofe, in that place beforecited out of Plata, which according to his manner, he delivers in a more copious way of expression : But the Substance of it is this; All Change must be either involuntary, and upon Neceffity; or voluntary, and upon Choice. Now God being the moft

most *powerful* Being, cannot by any thing be necessitated to an *involuntary* Change. And for any *voluntary* Change, whereas it must be either for the *better* or the *worse*, it is not imaginable that any *wise* Being should be willing to change for the *worse*; nor is it possible that any *perfect* Being should change for the *better*. And therefore it is necessive that the Divine Nature should be immutable.

We efteem Changeableness in Men either an Imperfection, or a Fault. Their Natural Changes, as to their Persons, are from Weaknefs and Vanity; their Moral Changes, as to their Inclinations and Purposes, are from Ignorance and Inconstancy. And therefore there is very good Reafon why we fhould remove this from God, as being That which would darken all his other Perfections. The greater the Divine Perfections are, the greater Imperfection would Mutability be. Befides, that it would take away the Foundation of all Religion, Love and Fear, and Affiance, and Worship : In which Men would be very much discouraged, if they could not certainly rely upon God, but were in doubt that his Nature might alter, and that hereafter he might be quite otherwife from what we now apprehend him to be.

4. Infiniteness is another Attribute most natural to the Notion of God. By which is meant, his not being bounded by Place, or H 4 Space, 104

De Natu-

ra Deor.

Of the Principles, &c. Lib. I.

Space, or by Duration, but being Immense and Eternal.

1. This Attribute of God's Immensity doth fignify his not being fo confined by any Bounds of Space, but that he doth ipread himfelf to all Places that we can see or can imagine, and infinitely beyond : So as we cannot fay, he is here, and not there, thus far he reaches, and not farther. Some have thought, that it is not absolutely necessary to believe such a kind of Omnipresence of the Divine Substance, as to be actually present in every place. But this is most necessary to be believed, That God is every where in respect of his Power and Providence, whereby he doth influence and govern all things (which is hardly poffible to conceive without his actual Presence in all places) and in respect of his Knowledge, whereby he doth fee, hear, and take notice of every thing, though never fo fecret; and that he can pierce through all these created things, with greater Facility than the Light doth through the Air. And that this doth belong to the natural Notion of God, may appear.

1. By the general Confent of the Heathen, testified by their praying to him at any Place or Time; which shews that they were perfuaded that he was always and every-where present, at least by his Knowledge and his Power. Tully cites Pythagoras affirming, Deum esse animum per naturam rerum omnium

nium intentum & commeantem, That God is a Spirit or Mind, which doth pafs through all things. And in another place, he cites it as Thales his Saying, which he commends, Homines existimare oportere, Deos omnia De Legib. cernere, Deorum omnia esse plena, That Men ought to think, that God beholds every thing, and fills every place. Plato affirms, that De Legib. God doth see and takes notice of all our Actions, Words and Thoughts. So Virgil, --- Eclog. 3. Jovis omnia plena. And in another place,

——— Deum namque ire per omnes Georg. Terrasque, tractusque maris, cœlumque lib. 4. profundum.

So Seneca speaking of God, saith, Ubique Epist. 95. & omnibus præsto est. He is every-where, and always at hand. And in another place, Quocunque te flexeris, ibi illum videbis Benefic. occurrentem tibi; nihil ab illo vacat, Opus suum ipse implet. We can turn our selves no whither, but we shall meet him; no place is without him, he fills his own Work.

2. By the Principles of Reason. If it were otherwife, and the Divine Nature should be limited, this would contradict his universal Providence, and render all Worship of him vain and useles. Why should a Man either fear him, or ferve him, if he could neither hear our Prayers, nor take notice of our Wants, nor receive our Acknowledgments.

2. For

2. For the Attribute of Eternity, whereby is fignify'd God's being of infinite Duraration, without Beginning or End; that this likewife doth belong to the Natural Notion of God, may be evident,

r. By the general confent of the Heathen Philosophers. And though there have been Disputes among them, about some of his other Attributes, yet in this all of them have agreed. They do indeed describe the Genealogies of their Heroes and fubordinate Gods; but for the supreme Deity, he is constantly acknowledged to be without beginning of Time, or end of Days. Epicurus himfelf, who had the loweft and meaneft Opinion of God, and robb'd him of as many of his other Perfections as by the utmost straining of his Wit he was able to do, yet is forc'd to leave Nat. Deor. him this Attribute. So Tully relates of him, fpeaking to those of that Sect, Ubi igitur ve-

lib. 1.

106

strum beatum & Aternum, quibus duobus verbis significatis Deum? Where is that Bleffed and Eternal Being of yours, which are the two usual Words whereby you describe the Nature of God? And Lucretius, who made it his Defign to reprefent to the World the Doctrine of that Philosopher, doth from him give this Account of the Divine Nature,

Omnis enim per se Divum natura necesse est Immortali ævo summa cum pace fruatur.

It is effential to the Notion of God, that he should be happy and immortal. The Poets themfelves, who amongst all others had the wildest Thoughts of God, yet do continually give him the Title of 'A Doiraros, and feldom mention his Name without it : And the Oath most usual amongst them was in this Form, Deos testor immortales, I appeal to the Immortal Gods. Aristotle doth in se- De Calo, veral places make Eternity to be effential to lib. 2. the Notion of God. And Tully afferts it impossible to conceive of God without this Perfection; Nos Deum nist sempiternum intelligere qui possumus? How is it possible for us to conceive of God, but as being Eternal? There never yet was any Man, that had any conception of God, who did not efteem him to be Everlasting. To speak of a God that should be corruptible and mortal, is fo monstrous an Absurdity, that a Man could not, though he fhould purpofely ftudy for it, devise any thing more wild and extra- Against Colotes. vagant, faith Plutarch.

2. There is very good reafon, why this Attribute fhould not by the moft Sceptical Atheistical Men be effected impossible, because they themselves are willing to grant it to the World, or at least to Matter. And if we suppose God to be the first Cause or Mover, it will thence necessarily follow, that he must always be, and could not have a Beginning; because if he ever were only in possibility,


bility, he could not from thence pafs into actual Being, without some precedent Cause and Mover, which is inconfistent with his Being the *first Cause*. And if nothing could cause his Being, then nothing can take it away, and consequently he must be Everlasting.

108

It would be a great Abatement to all the other Divine Perfections, if they were finite and perifhing. Befides, that it would be altogether inconfiftent with fome of them, namely, his Self existence, and necessary Existence. And withal, it must needs take off from the obligation to Duty of the Creatures part, if they were uncertain of the continuance of his Being, by whom Rewards and Punishments were to be distributed in the World.



CHAP.



CHAP. IX.

Of the Communicable Perfections of God : And first, of those which relate to the Divine Understanding, viz. Knowledge, Wisdom, particular Providence.

Besides those incommunicable Attributes already insisted upon, there are others stiled communicable, because they are in some lower degree, and by way of participation, communicated to other inferior Beings. And concerning these, there is a Necessity that we should make an Estimate of them, by fuch Rules and Measures as our Natures are capable of. And because the chief Perfections that we can apprehend in any reasonable Essence, must refer to one of these three Things, the Understanding, the Will, the Faculties of Working; for this reason, these Divine Perfections may be reduced to these Three Heads. And whatever is the most excellent of rational Beings, must excel in each of these (i.e.) There is no kind or degree of Perfection that our Imaginations are able to conceive, but these Excellencies of the Divine Nature must run out still beyond ir, so as not

110

Of the Principles, &c. Lib. I.

not to be determined by any real or imaginary Bounds.

I purpose to treat particularly concerning each of them, beginning with those Perfections that belong to the Divine Understanding, namely, his Knowledge, Wisdom, and particular Providence.

1. By the *Knowledge* of God, I mean that Perfection or Faculty whereby he underftands and confiders things abfolutely, and as they are in their own Natures, their *Pow*ers, *Properties*, *Differences*, together with all the Circumftances belonging to them. And 'tis neceffary to the Notion of God, that this fhould be afcribed to him, in the utmost Perfection of it, infinitely beyond what the most knowing and the most learned Men can pretend unto.

1. His *Knowledge* is most deep and intimate, reaching to the very *Essence* of things; ours is but flight and superficial.

2. His is clear and diffinct; ours but confused and dark.

3. His infallible; ours doubtful and liable to Miftakes.

4. His eafy, and without Labour and Difficulty, always prefent and actual; ours gotten by *fore Travail*, and eafily loft again by the Defects of *Memory* or *Age*.

5. His universal, extending to all Objects; oursshort and narrow, reaching only to some Eccl.i.15. few Things, That which is wanting cannot be numbred. He

He hath a perfect Comprehension of all things, that have been, that are, or shall be, according to all the various Relations, Dependencies, Circumstances, belonging to each of them : So that this Attribute of his must be infinite and unbounded, both extenfive, with respect to the several kinds of Objects which it comprehends; and likewife intensive, as it sees every single Object with a most perfect and infallible view. He doth not only understand all Particulars; but he knows every Particular fo exactly, as if he were wholly taken up and intent in his Thoughts upon that alone. There is a vaft difference betwixt the wifeft of Men, and fuch as are grofly ignorant and fottifh; and much greater betwixt Men and other Creatures, the little Infects, Ants and Worms, which are no ways fit to pass a Judgment concerning human Counfels and Defigns. And yet these things hold fome proportion to one another, being both finite; whereas betwixt God's Knowledge and Man's, the diftance is infinite.

And that this Attribute doth belong to the natural notion of God, may appear,

1. From the Acknowledgment of the Heathen. Tully mentions it as an usual Saying of Thales, Deos omnia cernere, God beholds all things. So Seneca, Nihil Deo clausum, interest animis nostris, & mediis cogitationibus intervenit. Nothing is hid from God, i he

ke is intimate to our Minds, and mingles himself with our very Thoughts.

Befides, that general Practice amongst them of swearing by him, and attesting him in their most folemn Compacts, do sufficiently imply their belief of his Omniscience.

2. From natural Reason. Nothing can be more manifest, than that Knowledge is a Perfection, and therefore ought to be ascribed to that Being which is supposed to have all possible Perfection. 'Tis a Perfection that we know to be in some of the Creatures, and therefore must be much more in the Creator himself. He that made the Eye, shall he not see? He that gives to Men understanding, shall not he know?

Besides, that the denial of this Perfection would necessfarily infer many other Imperfections in the Divine Nature. It would destroy his Wisdom, Providence, Dominion. Where there is no Knowledge, there can be no Forecass or Provision for the Future, nor any kind of Regular Government. In brief, the denial of this Attribute must take away his Goodness, Veracity, Justice. That Being cannot properly be faid to be Good, which doth act either out of Ignorance, or blind Necessity.

2. As Knowledge doth respect Things absolutely, so Wisdom doth confider the relations of Things one to another, under the Notion Chap. 9. of Natural Religion. tion of Means and End, and of their fitnels, or unfitnels for the various Purposes to which they are defigned.

113

And that this likewife doth belong to the Natural Notion of God, may be evident,

1. By Testimony. The Heathen Writers Phad. are full of Expressions to this purpose. Plato afferts Wisdom to be a Thing of that Excellency, that it cannot properly be ascribed to any but God. It is a Saying of Tully, Sapi-Nat. Deor. ens est Homo, & propterea Deus. Man is lib. 2. wise, and therefore much more God. And in the same Book, Deo tribuenda est ratio recta, constainsque; To God is to be ascribed Right and steady Reason; and a little after he says, it must be such as is perfect and absolute.

Nothing more frequent in Seneca, Epietetus, Antoninus, than to perfuade Men to an Acquiescence under all the Dispensations of Providence, because they are ordered by the highest Wisdom.

2. By *Reafon.* The want of Wifdom is counted a very great Imperfection, and one of the worft Defects belonging to Men, and that which every one is moft unwilling to own, being content to be counted any thing rather than a Fool. And therefore there is very good Reafon why we fhould remove this Imperfection from that *Being*, which is fuppofed to have all poflible Perfections. And what was faid before concerning the I

114

denial of his *Knowledge*, must be equally true likewise in this case, that it must necesfarily destroy his other Perfections, or render them infignificant. What reason would there be for Men to trust either to his Goodness or his Justice, or his Providence in the managing of things, if he were not withal infinitely wise? And as for his *Power*, *That* without Wisdom would be but a kind of a blind force, as much to be feared and hated, as loved and trusted to.

3. The Third Attribute to be confider'd is his particular Providence, whereby he does superintend and take care of every individual thing in the World; continuing them in their Beings, disposing of their Operations and Effects, in fuch a wife Order, as may be most fuitable to those Ends and Purposes for which they are defign'd. This likewife doth belong to the Natural Notion of God. Though it must be granted, that the Belief of this Attribute has met with fome Opposition from feveral of the Philosophers, chiefly Epicurus; who in truth was an Atheift, and out of a pretended Respect to the Deity, did think it to be below his Greatnefs, and for the Trouble of it, inconfistent with his Happiness, to have any Regard to these Inferior Things; which he therefore imagied to be left to their own Courses, whilst the D vine Nature is wholly taken up in the Contemplation of it self.

Semota

Semota à nostris rebus sejunctaque longè, as Lucretius speaks. But because this might feem to argue too flight and narrow Apprehensions of the Deity, therefore others, to mend the matter, have thought that he might have Leisure, and perhaps an Inclination, to extend his Providence to Heavenly Things, but not to Earthly. Others yet more bountiful, will allow it to reach both to Celestial and Terrestrial Things : But then it must be only to the general kinds of them, which are to be put into a natural Course; not to every Particular of each kind by it felf, which they conceived must needs prove too great a Trouble and Distraction to his Mind.

But 'tis evident, that all these wild Conceits did proceed from a Misapprehension of what kind of Knowledge or Wisdom does belong to the *Deity*; namely, *infinite*, and *absolutely perfect*; not to be limited, nor capable of any Difficulty to be put upon it, by the Nature or Number of Things.

Any particular Man, whom we know to be a Perfon of *Diligence* and *Sagacity*, may without any Trouble to himfelf undertake the Management of any *fingle* Bufinefs. Why, God can with greater facility provide for *all*, than any fingle Man can for *one*. Tho' we fhould iuppofe that the Particulars to be taken care of are *Infinite*, yet fo is his *Wifdom* likewife; and there is the fame Propor- I_2 , ¹ , . .

tion of Infinite to Infinite, as of One to One. And that this Attribute doth belong to the Natural Notion of God, may be made evident,

1. By the more general Confent of the Wife and Learned Heathen Writers (notwithstanding the diffent of some amongst them.) Aristotle himself, or whoever else

Chap. 6.

was the Author of that Book de Mundo, amongst other Testimonies he gives of the Divine Providence, hath this for one, " That " as a Governor is to a Ship, as a Law to a " City, as a General in an Army, fo is God " in the World; but with this difference, " that they perform their Business not with-" out Labour, Care and Difficulty; where-" as the Divine Providence doth dispose of " all and every particular thing, without the " least kind of trouble." Tully doth acknowledge that the Providence of God doth Nat. Deor. extend not only, universo generi hominum, sed etiam singulis, to Mankind in general, lib. 2. but likewise to every particular Person. And in another place : Deorum providentia mun-De Divinatione. dus administratur, iidemque consulunt rebus humanis, neque solum universis, sed etiam fingulis. The whole World is govern'd by Divine Providence, and not only Human Affairs in general, but likewise every parti-Nat. Quaf. cular Busines. Seneca speaking of fuch as lib.1.Praf. denied particular Providence, hath this re-

markable Passage; Sunt qui putant, &c. " There Ł

116

" There are fome who think fo well of their " own Minds, that they are able to take care " of their own Business, and to provide for " other Men's Affairs likewife : And yet are " fo abfurd as to queftion, whether this great " Universe, whereof they themselves are but " a very inconfiderable part, be managed by " any kind of Wisdom or Counsel, and not " left wholly to Chance. Hierocles doth ac- Pythag. " knowledge, that the Providence of God Carm. doth extend to Contingencies." And to 60 fay no more by way of Teftimony, this may fufficiently appear, by the general Practice of Swearing by him, and Praying to him, which doth sufficiently evince their Belief of his particular Providence.

2. By Reason. The Denial of this Attribute will evacuate several others; namely, his Goodness, Justice, Dominion, which must all fignify nothing without Providence in the Application of them. And withal, the Denial of this doth take away the Ground of Worship. The Belief of a particular Providence, being necessary unto that Adoration which we owe to the Divine Nature. The Greatness and the Excellency of the Deity in it self, abstracted from any Concernment of our own, will have but a very flat and jejune Operation upon our Hearts. Do we not find by Experience, that Men have but little Regard to the Great Mogul, the Cham Amyra!of Tartary, the Emperors of China and Per-dus. ha,

I 3

118

fia, and fuch other Potentates of remote Countries? who though they are Princes of great Power and Magnificence, and are able to bring many hundred thousands of Fighting-men into the Field ; yet they having nothing to do with us, nor we with them ; we have therefore but a small Regard for them. Whereas, the next ordinary Gentleman, who is but Lord of a Manor, or Justice of Peace, with whom we are concerned to deal, and who hath any Power, of punishing or rewarding, of doing us either a Kindness or a Discourtefy, we use to be accordingly affected in our Efteem and Veneration towards him, And thus must it be likewise for our Adoration of the Divine Nature; which will be either more or lefs, according as we conceive ourfelves more or less concerned in his Providence towards us, denne de



CHAP;



СНАР. Х.

Of the Perfections relating to the Divine Will; Goodnels, Justice, Faithfulnels.

 T H E Perfections belonging to the Divine Will, were before reckoned
 to be, 1. His Goodnefs. 2. His Justice.
 3. His Truth and Faithfulnefs.

1. His Goodness. By which word is sometimes fignified, the notion of Perfection in general; and fometimes it denotes Moral Goodness, in opposition to all kind of Moral Imperfections. Of both which kinds of Goodness, God is the Fountain and Author, the Rule and Meafure, from whom all created Goodnefs is derived, and by conformity to whom it is to be estimated. But that more particular fenfe of this Word, according to which it is now to be treated of, doth respect the Inclination of the Divine Will toward his Creatures ; that propension of his, whereby he is generally disposed to procure their happiness, in opposition to Envy or Malice, which delights in withholding Good from others, or doing Mischief to them. And that this Attribute is natural to the Notion of God, may appear,

I. By

120

lib. 4.

Of the Principles, &c. Lib. I.

1. By Testimony. There being no one Perfection about which the generality of Men are more agreed than about this (excepting only the Epicureans, who attribute nothing to God but everlasting Happiness and Blessedness, which yet cannot be without Goodness.) Plato stiles him to xpeitov, the best Being. And his common Title amongst the Latins, was Deus Optimus Maximus. And our Fore-fathers in this Nation, feem to have given this very Name of God from Good. That is a known and an excellent Passage in Seneca, Primus est Deorum cultus, Deos credere; deinde reddere illis Majestatem suam, reddere bonitatem, sine qua nulla Majestas. " The most fundamental thing in Religion, " is to acknowledge the Being of God, and " then to demean ourfelves towards him fui-" tably to the greatness of his Majesty, and to " his Goodnefs, without which there can be no Majesty." And in another place, "He 66 De Benefic. 6 8 that doth not acknowledge the Goadness of the Divine Nature, doth not take notice (6 of the general Cuftom amongst Men, of 66 praying to him in their Diftrefs, and ma-" king Vowsboth publick and private, which " would not be, unless they had this Per-۰ ک fuasion well fixed within them, that God 66 was ready to hear and to help them, and 60 " that he is in his own Nature propense to " Kindness and Pity." Nec in hunc furorem omnes mortales consensissent, alloquendi Turda

Surda numina & inefficaces Deos. "Nor " is it poffible that allMankind fhould una-" nimoufly agree together in fo great a Mad-" nefs, of praying to fuch Deities as they did " not believe could either hear or help " them.

And in another Place, Quædam funt quæ De Ira, lib. nocere non poffunt, &c. "Some things there c. cap. 27. " are of fo benign and helpful a Nature, fo " mild and beneficial, that nothing of cvil " or hurt can proceed from them : Such is " the Deity, who neither can, nor will do " any thing that is mifchievous; being as re-" mote from any Action that is injurious to " others, as to itfelf."

And elfewhere, Ecce sceleratis fol oritur, Ibid. lib.4. & Piratis patent Maria. " He causeth his cap. 26. " Sun to fhine upon the Juft, and Unjuft, 66 and the Seas are open to Pirates as well as **6** Merchants. He communicates his Bounty 60 to us in our Infancy and Childhood, when we can have no sense of it : nor doth he DeBenefic. 66 " prefently withdraw and cease his Favours 7.31. towards fuch Wretches as make a question 66 66 and doubt concerning the Author of them : " Nor is there any Perfon fo miserable and De Benefic. " wretched, who hath not in feveral respects lib. 4-" had experience of the Divine Bounty." Hierocles afferts, that God is effentially good; Pythag. not by accident, and from external Motives and Confiderations.

2. By *Reafon*. It is fo plain, fo fundamental a Notion, that Goodnels must belong to God, that I know not how to go about the Proof of it. 'Tis the brightest Ray of the Deity, the first and clearest Notion we have of God. We may see every Day many thoufand visible Effects of this Goodnels in the World. And there are some Glimpses, and weak Impressions of it amongst the Creatures, and therefore much more must it be in the Creator himself.

122

This is the Foundation of all Worship and Religion amongst Men, the Reason of their Prayers to God, and Praises of him. Without this his other Attributes would not afford any fufficient ground for our Love and Adoration of him. Knowledge and Power without Goodness, would be but Craft and Violence. He can by his Wisdom out-wit his Creatures, and eafily impose upon them; and by his Power he could tyrannize over them, and play with their Mifery; but that he will not do thus we are affured by his Goodnefs. This is fo effential to him, that to imagine him without Goodness, were to imagine a God without a Deity, i. e. without That which chiefly conftitutes him what he is: Nay, it were to imagine, instead of a God, a worse Devil, and more qualify'd to do Mischief, than any is now in the World.

2. The

2. The Second Attribute belonging to the Divine Will, is his Justice. By which is meant not only the Rectitude of his Nature in general, but more especially his dealing with his Creatures according to the desert of their Deeds.

And that this Perfection is natural to the Notion of God, may appear,

I. By Testimony. It is an Affertion of Pla- Theatetus. to, Deo's idaun idauws adugs, and wis of redirayo'rar G. "God cannot be faid in any " kind or respect whatever to be unjust, but " fo far as is possible to be most just." *Tully DeLegibus*; lays it down as a Principle, that before Men^{lib. 2.} are fit to affociate under Government, they ought to be first convinced that God is the supreme Governor of the World, and doth take particular notice, Qualis quisque sit, quid agat, quid in se admittat, quâ mente, quâ pietate religionis colat, piorumque & impiorum habere rationem ; "" What kind " of Person every one is, what he doth, and " what he thinks, how his Heart stands in-" clin'd to the Duties of Religion, and will " deal with every one according to his Rea-" lity or Hypocrify in all fuch Matters.

And that this was the general Belief amongft them, may appear by the univerfal Cuftom of attefting him by Solemn Oaths; whereby they did appeal to him as a Righteous Judge, who would certainly revenge all Falfhood and Injuffice.

2. From

2. From *Reason*. And that not fo much because Justice is a Perfection, as because Injustice is so great a Blemish and Imperfection; especially in the great Sovereign and Judge of the World, who having all Power and Authority in his Hands, can have no Temptation or Byas imaginable to do any thing that is unjust.

3. His Truth and Faithfulness. By which is meant, the congruity of his Words to his Intentions, especially in respect of any Promises which he hath made.

And that this doth belong to the Natural Notion of God, may be made evident,

De Repub. lib. 1.

124

I. From *Testimony*. " *Plato* afferts, all " kind of Lying and Falshood to be Imper-" fections, most odious both to God and Man, " and that the Divine Nature is absolutely free " from all kind of Temptation to it; fo that there can be no imaginable Reason why " God should falsify."

Porphyry, in the Life of Pythagoras, tells us, that it was one of his Precepts $\mu \alpha \lambda r$ $5 \approx \delta \epsilon \alpha \lambda \epsilon \theta \delta' \delta \nu$, That Men should most of all endeavour after Truth, because this only can make them like God. And he adds afterwards, That Truth is so great a Perfection, that if God would render himself visible to Men, he would chuse Light for his Body, and Truth for his Soul.

2. From

125

2. From *Reason*. It is one of the greatest Reproaches, and an Argument of Baseness amongst Men, to be counted a Liar: And therefore it must necessarily be removed from that Being which is supposed to have all possible Perfections, and to be the *Father of Truth*, as the Devil is of Lies.

That which tempts Men to falfify, is ufually either the fear of fome Evil, or the hope of some Advantage. The Reason why they break their Words, is either because of their rashness and inconfiderateness in making Promises, or their forgetfulness in not minding them, or their Inconstancy in not keeping to them, or their Impotence to perform them. But now the Divine Nature being infinitely wife, and all-fufficient, can have no Temptation to be otherwise than true and faithful. His infinite Knowledge and Wifdom doth fecure him from being deceived himfelf; his Omnipotence doth exempt him from standing in need of deceiving others; and his Goodness secures us from the least suspicion of any inclination thereto.



CHAP.

CHAP. XI.

Of the Perfections belonging to the Powers and Faculties of Acting, viz. Power, Dominion, Diftribution of Future Rewards and Punifhments.

Those Perfections which are effential to the Notion of God, with respect to his *Faculties of working*, are likewise threefold:

- 1. His Power or Omnipotence.
- 2. His Dominion or Right to govern us in this Life.
- 3. His Diftributing of Future Rewards and Punishments after this Life.

1. By the Power or Omnipotence of God is meant, an Ability of doing all fuch things, the doing of which may argue Perfection, and which do not imply a Contradiction, either in the things themselves, or to the Nature and Perfection of the Doer. Some things are repugnant to the Perfection of God, either Naturally, as that he should be sick, or die; or elfe Morally, as that he should be sick, or deceive : Both which imply Imperfection. And some other Things may imply Contradiction,

diction, either directly, or by plain confequence. And of fuch Matters it is not fo proper to fay, that he cannot do them, as that they cannot be done. As the Object of the Understanding, the Eye, and the Ear, is that which is intelligible, visible, audible : Sothe Object of Power must be that which is possible. And as it is no prejudice to the most perfect Understanding, or Sight, or Hearing, that it doth not understand what is not intelligible, or fee what is not visible, or hear what is not audible; fo neither is it to the most perfect Power, that it doth not do what is not possible. Every kind of Faculty being necessarily determined to its own proper Object.

But as for all possible Things, it is natural and neceffary to apprehend of God, that he can do whatfoever any other fingle thing, or a Combination of all other things put together, can perform, and infinitely more; and that without any kind of Labour or Difficulty: So that his Power must be infinite, extenfively, with respect to all Objects; and intensively, with respect to the Acts of it, together with the Manner and Degrees of them.

That this kind of Omnipotence doth belong to the natural Notion of God, may appear,

1. By Testimony. It is a frequent Title given unto God by the Grecian Philosophers,

phers, who stile him marroxearup, Omnipotent.

And nothing is more frequent amongst the Latins, than the Titles of Jupiter Omnipotens, Optimus, Maximus : He is generally acknowledged to be the Creator and Governor of the World; upon which account they call him, Opifex rerum, and Rector Mundi. It is an Acknowledgment of Tully, Nihil eft quod Deus efficere non possit, & quidem sine De Diviullo labore. " There is nothing which God cannot do, and that without any kind of " Labour."

> 2. By Reason. If the Power of God could be limited or circumscribed, it must either be by fomething of greater Power, which is inconfistent with the Notion of his being Supreme and Sovereign : Or else by the Difficulty and Repugnancy which there is in the Nature of Things; which could not be in the first Creation of them, because there was nothing then to make any Refiftance; and fince that, there is nothing but what was made by him, derived from him, and is dependent upon him, and therefore must be fubject to him. And befides, all fuch things being finite, must therefore be at a vast diftance of Inequality from the infinite Power of God.

> To which may be added, that all his other Perfections would be infignificant and ineffectual, if his Power of acting, whereby they

nat.

129

they were to be communicated to inferior Natures, were not answerable to them. Mere Knowledge without Power, would be but an idle Speculation ; Wisdom to contrive, without Power to effect, would be but vain and useless. What could his Goodness and Mercy fignify to us, if he were not able to give any Proofs of it. And so likewise for his Juflice and Faithfulnefs, which there would be no reason to fear or to depend upon, if Rewards and Punishments were not at his Disposal, and he had not sufficient Power to perform what he promifes. Nor could there be any sufficient ground for his being acknowledg'd the Supreme Law-giver. For why should any one take upon him to intermeddle in the Affairs of the World, and to prescribe Laws to others, who had no Power to dispose of things, and were not able to enforce Obedience to his own Laws?

In brief, without the Belief of this Attribute, there can be no Foundation for Religion amongst Men; because there could be no Ground for our *Faith* or *Trust*, no Reason for our *Hope* or *Fear*.

2. Befides this *abfolute* Confideration of the Divine *Power*, there is likewife a *relative* Notion of it, respecting that *Dominion* and Jurisdiction which he hath over Reasonable Creatures, his Right to govern them in this Life; to command, and prohibit what he pleases, to reward and punish as shall seem K good 130

Of the Principles, &c. Lib. I.

good unto him. And that this doth belong to the Natural Notion of God, may appear,
symposiat. I. By Testimony. Plato and Tully, and lib. 8. q.1. Plutarch, do often stille him, the Lord of all things; the Eternal God, Father and Creator of the World, and all things in it. Deo nihil prestantius, ab eo igitur necesse
Nat. Deor. est mundum regi, faith Tully; "God is the "most excellent Being; and therefore it is "necessary that he should be the Governor "of the World." And in another place, Deorum immortalium numine, omnia regi gubernarique credimus. "We believe that God is the Governor of all things.

To which I fhall add that Teffimony of a Heathen King, Nebuchadnezzar, in that Dan.iv.34; Remonstrance which he published to all people, nations, and languages, that dwell in all the earth, viz. that God's dominion is an everlasting dominion, and his kingdom is from generation to generation, and all the inhabitants of the earth are reputed as nothing before him. And he doth according to his will, in the armies of heaven, and amongst the inhabitants of the earth; and none can stay his hand, or say unto him, what dost thou?

And as this was their declared Opinion, fo was their Practice fuitable to it; by owning that to be their Duty which they fuppofed to be agreeable to his Will, and which would render them acceptable to him.

2 By

2. By Reason. If we confider those feveral Titles which can give Right to Dominion amongst Men, we shall find them all to concur in God. Now Men claim a Right of Government, either by Conquest, or Purchase, or Compact, or by having others born in a state of Subjection under them, or by their having obliged others with any special Bounty or Favour; but above all these, there is another Ground of Subjection, which Men cannot pretend to, namely, the giving of Being to a thing. And this must needs, above all other Claims, be the greatest imaginable Right, for the Government and Dispofal of that thing, according to the Pleafure of him that made it. It is he that made us (fays Pfal. c. 3. the P (almist) and not we our selves; and therefore we are his People, and it is reafonable that we should be under his Dominion and Government.

3. The diffribution of future Rewards and Punifhments to Men, according as their Lives and Actions have been in this World.

That this likewife doth belong to the natural Notion of God, may appear,

1. By *Testimony*. From all kind of Heathen Writers. Nothing has been more universally believed in all Places and Times, not only amongst the civilized Nations, the *Grecians* and *Romans*; but likewise amongst such as were most wild and barbarous.

K 2

Alt

All Sorts and Professions of Men, of any special Eminence, as Princes, Statesmen, Soldiers, Philosophers, Poets, Artifts, have had great Impressions upon their Minds concerning a future State. And it may be reafonably Tuscul. q. prefumed (as Tully observes) that those who do fo much excel others in their Parts and their Virtue, are not generally mistaken in their Judgments about a Natural Truth.

> Whereas feveral other Opinions and Doctrines, which at some times have prevailed, have afterwards been rejected; this hath still kept up in its Vigour and Authority, amidst all the various Revolutions of Government and Religion, of Nations and Churches.

> The most ancient Philosophers amongst the Grecians, who reduced that People to Civility, were Thales, Pherecides, Pythagoras; the laft of whom was for a long time of fo great Authority, that no others were counted Learned but fuch as were his Followers; And each of these have most express afferted this Doctrine. And befides, there are many other Testimonies to this purpose, cited out of Plato, Empedocles, Plutarch, together with Homer, Euripides, Sophocles, for the Grecians; the ancient Druids amongst the Gauls; the Brachmans amongst the Indians, who are all mention'd as bearing Witness to this Truth, by Justin Martyr, Clemens Alexandrinus, and others.

lib. I.

132

And

And as for the Latins, I shall mention only two Testimonies ; That of Tully, Permanere animas arbitramur, consensu natio-Iusc. 1. 1. num omnium. "We do believe that the " Souls of Men do abide after Death, by the " Confent of all Nations." And that of Seneca, Cum de animarum æternitate differi- Epist. 117. mus, non leve momentum apud nos habet, consensus omnium, aut timentium inferos, aut colentium. "When we dispute about the " Immortality of the Soul, the general Con-" fent of Men, either fearing or worfhipping " the infernal Powers, is of no fmall Mo-" ment with us."

That common Practice amongst the Heathens, of worfhipping their departed Heroes, doth suppose a general belief that their Souls did remain after Death, and were advanced unto a higher State of Happiness and Power.

In brief, all the Attestations amongst them, concerning the Soul's Immortality, are founded in their belief of the Necessity of this Principle, That there must be a future State of Rewards and Punifhments.

Though it must be granted, that this State as to the Manner of it, is by them defcribed in fuch a Poetical way, as is more fit to amuse and make Impression upon the Vulgar, than to satisfy the Reason of the Judicious.

Part La Charles

K 3 They

They tell us, that Good Men shall after their Death be received into the *Elysian* Fields and Gardens, which are always flourishing and pleafant, where Men shall be continually exercised in such kind of Employments as are most suitable to their Inclinations; some in Combats, Running, Wrestling; others in Philosophical Discourses; others in Dancing or Musick; where such kind of Actions or Things, whether in themselves worthy, or merely innocent, in which good Men during the time of their Lives, did find any special Pleasure, should be enjoyed by them in the utmost Perfection.

And as this fhall be the State of fuch as have been Virtuous, fo those who have been Wicked shall be thrust down into the Infernal Regions, into Prisons and dark Caverns, where Furies are appointed for their Tormentors, who shall inflict upon them various kinds of Punishments, according to the Nature and Quality of the Crimes of which they have been guilty.

And though fuch kind of Enjoyments wherein these *Heathens* placed their future Happines. be not altogether so fenfual as the *Turkish Paradise*; yet are they too earthly and gross for any Rational Man to reft in, as his chief Felicity: And must, even to the Judgment of mere Reason, seem altogether despicable in comparison to the *Christian's Heaven*; which confists in the raising of

of our Natures to the higheft Perfection of which they are capable, in a perpetual Vision and Fruition of the Supreme Good.

It must be granted, that the principal Evidence for this Doctrine concerning a future State of Rewards and Punishments, is to be derived from *Scripture*, especially from the New Testament, where it is faid *that Life*²Tim.i. and Immortality is brought to light by the Gospel.

135

Not but that there is Evidence for it, both from the Old Teftament and from the Light of Nature. 'Tis true indeed, that Temporal things are more expresly infisted upon in the Promifes and Threats of the Old Teftament, upon account of the groffness and dulness of the People of the Jews, who being more immersed in sensible things, were therefore more eafy to be wrought upon by fuch Confiderations. But that these things were not then intended for the chief Motives of Religion, may appear from the Hiftories concerning fuch Religious Perfons as lived in those first Ages. Amongst whom, there were but very few (if any) that did attain to any fuch perfect Felicity in respect of worldly things, but that they might very well apply to them-felves the Words of old Jacob, and fay with him, Few and evil have the days of my life been. And if God had intended these Temporal Enjoyments, for the chief Felicity which that Religion was to entitle them K4 unto;

136

unto ; those very Histories upon Record, where these Promises are mentioned, concerning the Sufferings of the best Men in those times, must needs have been a Disparagement and Constitution to these Promises themselves.

But befides the Teftimonies to this purpole from Scripture and Revelation, it is not imaginable that in a Point of fo great Moment, and fo univerfal Confequence as this is, God fhould have *left himfelf without a Witnefs unto all the Nations of the World*; but that all Men fhould be endowed with fuch natural Capacities and Notions, as being improved by Confideration, will afford fufficient Evidence for the Belief of this Great and Fundamental Principle.

As for fuch Men who live under the Senfe of Guilt, whofe Intereft it is that there fhould be no future Account; it cannot be otherwife expected from fuch, but that they fhould be willing to disbelieve this. And from hence it is, that fome of the Ancient Philofophers have employed their Learning and Subtilty, to difpute themfelves into fome kind of doubt and uncertainty about it: And yet the generality even of thefe have been forced to acknowledge it much more probable than the contrary. And as for the Vulgar fort of People, who are guided by the more fimple Dictates of Nature, thefe have in all Ages and Nations fubmitted themfelves

to

to this Doctrine, and profeffed a firm Belief of it. And though Vulgar Opinion be but a very bad Topick, about fuch Matters as may gratify Men in their Eafe and Senfual Appetites; yet in fuch other Opinions, as are crofs to their worldly Interefts, it may argue fuch things to be from fome natural Impreffion upon their Minds, which they must believe, and cannot otherwife chufe.

137

The Arguments 1 would make use of to this purpose, may be reduced to these Three General Heads:

- 1. The Suitableness of this Principle to the most Natural Notions of our Minds.
- 2. The Neceffity of it to the Government of Men's Lives and Actions in this World.
- 3. The Necessity of it for the vindication of Divine Providence.

1. I begin with the Firft, this Suitablenefs of it to the most Natural Notions of our Minds, and those kind of Impressions which belong to us as we are reasonable Creatures. We see by Experience that all other things (so far as we are able to judge) Minerals, Plants, Beasts, &c. are naturally endowed with such Principles as are most fit to promote the Perfection of their Natures, in their several Kinds. And therefore it is by no means credible, that Mankind only, the most excel-

excellent of all other Creatures in this visible World, for the Service of whom fo many other things feem to be defigned, should have fuch kind of Principles interwoven in his very nature, as do contain in them mere Cheats and Delusions. And therefore whatfoever those things are, which the generality of Mankind, especially the most wise and the most confiderate part of them, do agree in, ought to be allowed for highly credible; otherwise it must follow, that we are fram'd with such kind of Faculties, as in our most cautious exercise of them, are more like to sed and expose us to Error, than to direct and lead us to the Truth.

But I fhall endeavour to manifest this more particularly, by these three Considerations.

1. This Principle is most fuitable to the general Apprehensions of Mankind, concerning the Nature of Good and Evil.

2. To those Natural Hopes and Expectations which the generality of Good Men have concerning a State of Future Happiness.

3. To those Natural Fears and Expectations which the generality of wicked Men are possession of with, concerning a Future State of Punishment and Misery.

1. This Principle is most fuitable to the general Apprehensions of Mankind, concerning the Nature of Good and Evil. All Men heretofore have agreed that there is such a Thing as the Law of Nature, whereby things

arc

are diftinguish'd into Good and Bad; according to which the Actions of Men are determin'd to be either virtuous or vicious. And as the one of these doth in the Essence of it imply Comcliness and Reward, so doth the other denote Turpitude and Punishment; these things being imply'd in the very Desinitions of Virtue and Vice. And from hence it will follow, That as there is some Superior Power, who hath put this Law into our Natures, so will he take care to enforce the obfervance of it, by rewarding and punishing Men accordingly. This being imply'd in the Nature of a Law.

If there be nothing in the naked Essence of things that makes them to differ, but what doth merely arife from Cuftom and politive Laws: why then; Cuftom and Law would be able to render it a very virtuous and commendable thing for a Man to be ingrateful, a breaker of Compacts, a false Witness, a perjur'd Perfon; which is fo monstrous a Pofition, that the common Reason of Mankind will abhor it upon the first Proposal. Nothing is more obvious than that there is an universal defire amongst Men of seeming honeft: the most impudent and profligate Wretch being loth to be efteem'd what really he is. The very Sin of Hypocrify, fo general amongst Men, doth give a large Teftimony to the Beauty of Goodness, and the Deformity of Vice. Nor is there any Account to

to be given why there fhould be imprefs'd upon the Nature of Men fuch a value for the one, and diflike for the other, if there were not in the things themfelves fomething fuitable to those contrary Affections.

140

We fee by experience that there is fuch a kind of Reft and Acquiefcence in the Mind, upon the difcovery of Truth, and the doing of Virtuous Actions, as belongs to natural Bodies when they are in their proper places; which may argue thefe things to have fome peculiar Suitablenefs to the Soul of Man, and that the Oppofites to them do offer violence to fome natural Principle belonging to it.

2. This Principle is most fuitable to those natural Hopes and Expectations which the generality of good Men have concerning a State of Future Happiness. From whence doth arife that Confidence and Courage whereby those of meanest quality and abilities (if otherwise virtuous Persons) can support themselves in their Sufferings for that which is good, which doth necessarily suppose in them a strong, and even a natural Belief and Persuasion of such a suture State, wherein their Sufferings shall be confider'd and rewarded.

Befides that, there is a ftrong Averfion amongft Men againft a dark State of Annihilation, which no Man can think of without great regret of Mind : And likewife a natural Defire in all Men after a State of Happinefs

nefs and Perfection. And no natural Defire is in vain. All other things have fomewhat to fatisfy their natural Appetites. And if we confider the utter impoffibility of attaining to any fuch condition in this Life, this will render it highly credible, that there must be another state wherein this Happiness is attainable; otherwise Mankind must fail of his chief end, being by a natural Principle most strongly inclined to such a State of Happiness as he can never attain to; as if he were purposely fram'd to be tormented betwixt these two Paffions, Desire and Despair; an earnest propension after Happiness, and an utter incapacity of ever enjoying it; as if Nature it felf, whereby all other things are disposed to their perfection, did serve only in Mankind to make them miserable. And which is yet more confiderable, the better and the wifer any Man is, the more earnest Desires and Hopes hath he after such a State of Happinefs. And if there be no fuch thing, not only Nature, but Virtue likewise must contribute to make Men miserable; than which, nothing can feem more unreasonable to those who believe a just and a wife Providence.

3. This Principle is most fuitable to those Fears and Expectations which the generality of wicked Men are posses with, concerning a future State of Misery. Witness those natural Suggestions of Conscience in the worst of Men, that upon any wicked Actions (tho' never

142

never so private) are oftentimes startling of them, with the apprehensions of another Judicature and Tribunal, before which they shall be called to an account for the closest Sins. All that secret Regret, and those inward Smitings, *Laniatus & IEtus*, which are so often felt in the Minds of Men, upon the commission of any great Sin, do argue some common Intimations, even in the Light of Nature, of another Judgment after this Life, wherein they shall be accountable for such Actions as Men do not punish or take notice of.

And these natural Fears do usually feize upon all kind of Men promiscuously : Even those who are most potent, who by their own will can give Laws to Nations, and command mighty Armies; yet cannot they avoid these checks and lashes of Conscience, but that they will feize upon them, and shake them as well as the poorest, meanest Subject. Nor can such as are most obstinately wicked, who with their utmoft ftudy and endeavour, apply themfelves to the fuppreffing and disbelief of these Notions, so wholly stifle them, but that they will be continually rifing up in their Minds, and purfuing of them.

Now as there is no Man whatfoever, that is wholly freed from these Fears of future Misery after Death; so there is no Creature below Man, that hath any Fears of this kind. And

And if there be no real ground for this, then it must follow, That he who framed all his other Works with fuch an excellent Congruity, did yet fo contrive the Nature of Man, the most noble amongst them, as to prove a needless torment and burden to it felf.

143

If it be faid, That these Notions may proceed from such Principles as Men have derived from Institution and the Teaching of others, but that they do not imply a necessity of any such natural Impressions.

To this it may be answered, That it is sufficient to denominate them Natural Notions, if they have fuch a fuitableness to the Minds of Men, as makes them to be generally owned by all those who apply their Thoughts to the confideration of them : And that they have such a natural suitableness, may appear, because Institution cannot so eafily eradicate these Notions, as it can fix them. Now if the mere teaching of others were it self fufficient to impress these Notions, without any fuch peculiar congruity in the things themselves, it would be as sufficient to deface them again; especially confidering the advantage on this side, from that natural Repugnancy which we have to any thing which brings disquiet to our Minds. And nothing is more troublesome in this kind, than the Fear which follows upon Guilt.

But now, though there have been feveral Men of no mean Abilities in feveral Ages, who

who have made it their Business to root out of the Minds of Men all fuch troublefome Notions about a future State, endeavouring to perfuade themselves and others, That as there was a Time before they were born into the World, when they were not; fo at their dying, or going out of it, they shall exist no more. And yet, though it be their Intereft to believe this, though they make it their Study and Business to persuade themselves and others of it, it may reasonably be doubted, whether ever yet there hath been fo much as one Perfon, that hath hereby become abfolutely free from these Fears: But for the most part, those who would have them efteemed vain and imaginary, without any Foundation in Nature, thefe are the Perfons who are most affaulted with them.

Hi sunt qui trepidant, & omnia fulgura pallent.

So powerful and unconquerable are these Impressions, and therefore Natural.

2. The fecond Reafon I proposed to speak to, was from the Necessity of this Principle, to the right Government of Men's Lives and Actions in this World, and the preferving of Society amongst them.

Nothing can be more evident, than that Human Nature is fo framed, as not to be regulated and kept within due Bounds, without

144

145

out Laws; and Laws must be infignificant, without the Sanction of Rewards and Punishments, whereby Men may be induced to the observance of them. Now the temporal Rewards and Punishments of this Life, cannot be sufficient to this end; and therefore there is a Necessity that there should be another future State of Happines and Misery.

All the Rewards and Punifhments of this Life are to be expected, either from the Civil Magistrate, who by virtue of his Place and Calling is obliged to the duty of distributive Justice: Or elfe from Divine Providence, according to that most usual course which we find by experience to be observed by him, in his dispensation of these Temporal Things. Now neither of these can afford fufficient Motives for the Government of Men's Lives and Actions.

1. Not all that may be expected from the Civil Magistrates, because there may be many good and evil Actions which they cannot take notice of; and they can reward and punish only such things as come under their cognizance. And if this were the only restraint upon Men, it could be no hindrance from any such Mischiefs or Villanies which Men had the opportunity of committing fecretly. Nor would it extend to those who had Power and Strength enough to defend themselves from the Law, and eleape the Penalty of it, but that such might without any kind of L check 146

Of the Principles, &c. Lib. I.

check or fear follow the Inclinations of their own Appetites: Nor would it afford any remedy in the cafe of fuch wicked Magistrates as should invert the Order of their Institution, proving Terrors to well-doers, and Encouragers to those that do ill.

2. Not all that may be expected from common Providence : For tho' it should be granted, that according to the most usual and general Course of things, both virtuous and vicious Actions are rewarded and punifhed in this Life, yet there may be many particular Cafes which this Motive would not reach unto; namely, all fuch Cafes where a Man's Reason shall inform him, that there is far greater probability of fafety and advantage by committing a Sin, than can be reafonably expected (according to his Experience of the usual course of things in the World) by doing his Duty. Suppose the Case of the Three Children, or of any other called to Martyrdom, who may be threatned with Torments and Death, unless they will blafpheme God, and renounce their Religion; if it appear to them very probable (suppose a Hundred to one) that upon their refufal, their Persecutors will really execute what they threaten : And if on the other fide, it prove very improbable (fuppofe ten Thoufand to one) that they shall be delivered by a Miracle: In fuch Cafes, it is not to be expected, that the Confideration of the ordinary courle

course of Providence in the dispensation of Rewards and Punishments, should be sufficient to restrain a Man from any kind of Blasphemy or Villany whatsoever.

But the Thing I am fpeaking to, will more fully appear, by confideration of those horrid Mischiefs of all Kinds, that would most naturally follow from the denial of this Doctrine.

If there be no fuch thing to be expected as Happinels or Milery hereafter, why then the only bufinels that Men are to take care of, is their prefent well-being in this World. There being nothing to be counted either Good or Bad, but in order to thele: Thole things which we conceive to be conducible to it, being the only Duties; and all other things that are crofs to it, being the only Sins. And therefore what ever a Man's appetite fhall incline him to, he ought not to deny himfelf in it (be the thing what it will) fo he can have it, or do it, without probable Danger.

Suppose it be matter of Gain or Profit he is desposed to; if he can cheat or steal securely, this will be so far from being a Fault, that it is plainly his Duty, that is, reasonable for him to do, because it is a proper means to promote his chief End.

And so for other Cases of Anger, Hatred, Revenge, &c. according to this Principle, a Man must take the first opportunity of satis-L 2 fying

fying these Passions, by doing any kind of mischief to the Person he is offended with; whether by false Accusation and Perjury, or (if need be) by poisoning or stabbing of him; provided he can do these things so, as to escape the Suspicion of others, and Human Penalties.

Now let any Man judge what *Bears*, and *Wolves*, and *Devils* Men would prove to one another, if every thing fhould be not only lawful, but a Duty, whereby they might gratify their impetuous Lufts; if they might either perjure themfelves, or fteal, or murther as often as they could do it fafely, and get any advantage by it.

But these things are so very obvious and undeniable, that the most prophane Atheistical Persons do own the Truth of them. And upon this they are willing to acknowledge, That Religion and the Belief of another Life, is a very politick Invention, and needful for the well-governing of the World, and for the keeping of Men in awe, from the doing any fecret Mischief. Which (by the way) is a Conceffion of no fmall advantage to the honour of Religion, confidering that it proceeds from the greatest professed Enemies to it. Whereby they grant, that it is fit these things should be true, if they are not; or at least, that it is fit that the generality of Men should believe them to be true. And tho' themselves pretend to believe otherwife.

wife, yet are they not fo far out of their Wits, as to be willing that those with whom they converse, their Wives, and Children, and Servants should be of the same Opinion with them; because then they could have no Reason to expect any Safety amongst them. What Security could any Man have of his Estate, or Honour, or Life, if such with whom he is most familiar and intimate, might think themfelves at liberty to do all the secret Mischiefs to them which they had the Opportunity to commit ?

But there is one thing more which those who profess to disbelieve this Principle should do well to confider; and that is this, That there is no imaginable Reason, why (amongst those that know them) they should pretend to any kind of Honessy or Confeience, because they are wholly destitute of all such Motives as may be sufficient to oblige them to any thing of this Nature: But according to them, that which is called Virtue and Religion must be one of the most filly and useless things in the World.

As for the Principle of Honour, which fome imagine may supply the Room of Conscience: This relates only to External Reputation, and the effecm which we have amongst others; and therefore can be of no influence to restrain Men from doing any secret Mischief.

L 3

From

From what hath been faid it will follow, That those who have any regard to their own Safety, ought to abandon all kind of Society with fuch pernicious Persons, who according to their own Principles, must take all Opportunities of doing any Mischief to others, which they are able to effect with any advantage to themselves.

Now if this be fo (as I have proved) that the Nature of Man is fo fram'd, as not to be effectually perfuaded and wrought upon, without the confideration of fuch a Future State ; if it be neceffary to add everlaftingMotives, as the Sanctions of that Law, by which the Human Nature is to be governed; this must render it highly credible, that there is fuch a State, because it must needs be very unworthy of God, to conceive of him, that he hath contrived the Nature of one of his best and most noble Creatures after such a manner, as to make it incapable of being govern'd without Falshood and Deceit. The neeeffity of this Principle to the government of Men's Lives and Actions, is the ground of that Saying among the Rabbins, That Paradife and Hell are two of the Seven Pillars upon which God is faid to have founded the World. As if it could not be upheld without fuch a Support.

3. The third and last Argument I proposed to speak to, was from the necessity of this

151

this Principle to the vindication of Divine Providence. Nothing is more univerfally acknowledged, than that God is Good and Juft; That well-doing shall be rewarded, and Evil Actions punished by him. And yet we fee that his Difpensations in this Life, are many times promiscuous and uncertain, so that a Man cannot judge of love or hatred, by all that is before him. The worst of Men are fometimes in the best Condition : If in this Cor.xv. life only we had hope, we should be of all 19. men most miser able, faith the Apostle, fpeaking concerning those primitive Times of Perfecution, when the better any Man was, the more washe expos'd to Suffering. Nor is it thus only in the Cafe of particular Perfons, or in the fuccess of private Differences betwixt Men and Men; but likewise for some of those Decisions that are made by the Sword, in the publick Contests of Princes and Nations ; these may sometimes be so stated, as to the Event of them, as may in the judgment of Wife and Good Men seem unequal, and not according to Justice, and the Right of the Cause.

Now the greater uncertainty there is, as to the prefent Affairs of this World, by fo much greater is the certainty of a Future Judgment. It is true indeed, that Virtue may be faid to be a Reward to it felf, and Vice a Punifhment; in regard of that Satiffaction, or that Regret of Mind which doth L4 accompany fuch things. But these are not fuch kind of Rewards and Punishments as Law-givers are to take care of; by which they are to excite those under the Government, to overcome the Labours and Difficulties that they may sometimes meet with in doing their Duty, and to restrain others from wicked Actions,

It would feem a wild extravagant Law, which fhould propole by Way of Reward, that thole who had upon account of Religion or Virtue, undergone any great Dangers and Troubles, fhould for their Reward be put again to undergo more and greater. That they who had been guilty of Robbery, fhould by way of Punishment be obliged to commit Murder.

Besides those moral Advantages or Mischiefs, which are properly the effects of Virtue and Vice; there is likewise some Physical Good or Evil, that may be expected as the Reward and Punishment of them.

Would it become a just Governor, to permit his Rebellious Subjects, those who contemn his Laws, to perfecute such as were obedient to him, with all kind of Scorn and Violence, Stripes, Imprisonments, Torments, and Death it felf; and that for this very Reason, because they were willing to do their Duties, and to observe the Laws? Would it be a reasonable Excuse for such a Ruler to say, That one of these had received sufficient Punish-

Punishment in the very commission of such Crimes; and that the other had a sufficient Reward, both in the doing of his Duty, and in his sufferings for it? What could be more inconfistent with the Rules of Justice, and the wife Ends of Government?

What could be a greater difparagement to divine Providence, than to permit the Calamities and Sufferings which good Men undergo in this World, many times upon the account of Religion, to pafs unrewarded; and the many Mifchiefs and Prophanations, which wicked Men take the advantage of committing by their Greatnefs and Profperity in this World to go unpunifhed?

What great Glory would it be to prefide over this material World, Stars and Meteors, Sea and Land, Plants and Beafts, to put thefe things into fuch a regular courfe as may be fuitable to their Natures, and the Operations for which they are defign'd; and in the mean fpace to have no proportionable regard either for those that reverence the Deity, or those who contemn him?

'Tis very well faid to this purpose by a late Author, That not to conduct the course And of Nature in a due manner, might speak dus. fome defect of Wisdom in God; but not to compensate Virtue and Vice, besides the defect of Wisdom, is not adjusting things fuitable to their Qualifications, but crossy coupling

Amyral-

154

Pf. lviij.

NI.

Of the Principles, &c. Lib. I.

coupling Profperity with Vice, and Mifery with Virtue, would argue too great a defect of Goodnefs and of Juffice. And perhaps it would not be lefs expedient (faith he) with *Epicurus*, to deny all Providence, than to afcribe to it fuch Defects: It being lefs unworthy of the Divine Nature to neglect the Universe altogether, than to administer Human Affairs with fo much Injuflice and Irregularity.

And therefore 'tis neceffary for the vindication of Divine Providence, that there fhould be a Future State, and Day of Accounts, wherein every Man shall be forced to acknowledge, that verily there is a Reward for the Righteous, doubtles there is a God that judgeth the Earth.



CHAP.

CHAP. XII.

Concerning the Duties of Religion naturally flowing from the Confideration of the Divine Nature and Perfections: And first, of Adoration and Worship.

Having difpatch'd the two first Things I proposed as the principal Ingredients to a State of Religion, namely, I. A Belief and an Acknowledgment of the Divine Nature and Existence. 2. Due apprehenfions of his Excellencies and Perfections : I proceed now to the Third, namely, fuitable Affections and Demeanour towards him : Which must naturally follow from the former. The ferious belief and confideration of those incomparable Excellencies which there are in the Divine Nature, ought not to be terminated in mere Speculation, but must derive an Influence upon the Heart and Affections; it being natural for Men to proportion their efteem of things according to that Worth and Dignity which they apprehend to be in them. And therefore that Being which hath in it all poffible Perfections, may justly challenge all poffible efteem and veneration as due to it.

In the enumerating of those feveral Affections and Duties, I shall observe the same method which I have formerly used in reckoning up the Attributes themselves.

1. God's Incommunicable Excellencies fhould difpose our Minds to Adoration and Worship.

2. The Communicable Attributes, which belong to the Divine

1. Understanding, namely, his infinite Knowledge and Wildom, and his particular Providence, should work in us, Faith, Affiance, Hope, Confidence.

2. Will, namely, his Goodness, Justice, Faithfulness, are naturally apt to excite in us, Love, Desire, Zeal.

3. Faculties of Alting, namely, his Power, which fhould produce in us Reverence and Fear: His Dominion over us, and diffributing of future Rewards and Punifhments, which calls for our Obedience, both Altive and Paffive.

Though I cannot fay, that each of thefe Affections and Duties are fo to be reftrained to those respective Attributes unto which I have afcribed them, but that the confideration of any of the reft, may have a proper Influence to dispose Men to any, or to all of them; yet that there is some more peculiar Reference and Correspondence betwixt these Attributes and these Affections and Duties, as they

Chap. 12. of Natural Religion. they are here conjoin'd, I shall endeavour to shew in treating concerning each of them :

1. Those incommunicable and superlative Excellencies of the Divine Nature, whereby God doth infinitely transferred all other Beings, are naturally apt to work in us, a high Esteem and Admiration of him; a readiness of Mind, upon all occasions, to express our Adoration and Worship towards him.

That Worship is due to God, hath been univerfally acknowledged in all Ages and Nations. And Aristotle afferts, that whoso-Topic. 1.9. ever doth doubt of, or deny this, ought not to be dealt with by Arguments, but by Punishments.

That it is the Excellency of any Being which is the proper ground of the Worship we pay to it, hath been generally acknowledged. The Philosophers have owned this. So Tully, Prestans Deorum natura, &c. Nat. Ber. " The Nature of God may justly challenge 1.b. s. " the Worship of Men, because of its super-" lative Excellency, Bleffedness, Eternity. " For whatfoever excels, hath upon that ac-" count a Veneration due to it. So Seneca; Deus colitur propter Majestatem eximiam, singularemq; naturam. "God is therefore " worshipped, because of his Excellent Ma-" jefty and Incomparable Nature. And to " this the Scripture likewife doth atteft. All Pf. laxxix nations whom thou haft made, shall come and 9. 10.

wor-

worship before thee, and shall glorify thy name, for thou art great, and dost wondrous things, thou artGod alone. And again, P fal. xcv. 3. having faid, For the Lord is a great God, and a great King above all Gods; it is prefently subjoined, O come let us worship, and fall down, and kneel before the Lordour Maker. And yet again, P fal. xcvij. 7. Worship him all ye gods: And the Reason is given prefently after; For thou Lord art high above all the Earth, thou art exalted far above all Gods.

By Worship, I mean in the general, the higheft Efteem and Admiration of him in our Minds, whereby we do continually bow down our Souls before him; in the Acknowledgment of his Excellencies ; depending upon him, invoking of him in our Neceffities, making our Acknowledgments to him, as being the Author of all the Mercies we enjoy; together with fuch external Services, as may be fit to teftify unto others that inward Veneration which we have for him, whether by the humbleft Geftures of Prostration or Bowing our selves before him, Kneeling, lifting up our Hands and Eyes unto him; being always ready to speak good of his Name, to make his praise glorious. Which must be accompanied with a hearty Zeal and Indignation against all fuch things as reflect Dishonour upon him.

Besides

158

Chap. 12. of Natural Religion.

Befides this general habit of Worship, with which our Minds should always be possed by the possible of the second services of the second services which by the light of Nature, and the consent of Nations have been judged proper to express our honouring of him : As the setting apart of particular Persons, and Places, and Times, peculiarly for his Worship.

It hath been the general Practice of all Nations, to have amongft them a diffinct calling of Men, fet apart to officiate *in Sacris*, to affift the People in their publick Worfhip, to inftruct them in their Duties, and to excite them to the Performance of them. Which being a Work of fo publick Ufefulnefs and general Neceffity, common reafon will affure us, that the beft Way of providing for it, is by fuch Perfons as are bred up to it, and fet apart for it. Such Men are like to have the greateft *Skill*, who have made it their Bufinefs and their greateft *Care*, and who are obliged to it by way of Office.

It is natural for Men who are joined together in *Civil Societies*, to join likewife in *Religious Worship*. And in order to this, 'tis neceffary that there should be publick Places, and solemn Times set apart for such Affemblies. Which hath accordingly been the practice of all civilized Nations. And in the manner of performing their publick Worship,

Of the Principles, &c. Lib. I.

ship, it was still required to be done with all imaginable Submiffion and Reverence. This the Stoick commends, and cites Aristotle for it; Egregie Aristoteles ait, nunquam nos verecundiores esse debere, quam cum de Diis agitur, &c. "Men are never more concerned to be humble and modeft, than when they " have to do about God. We should enter " the Temples with an humble and compo-" fed demeanour. When we approach to " Sacrifice, it should be with all imaginable " Expressions of Reverence and Modesty in " our Countenance and Carriage. As for the chief Matter and Substance of Natural Worship, unto which the Light of Reason will direct, I know no other than Invoking of the Deity, Returning Thanks to him, and Enquiring after his Will. Those things which are fuperadded to these in that most acceptable way of Worship revealed in the Gospel, are not proper to be discoursed of here, because they depend merely upon Revelation.

It is true indeed, that all Nations pretending to any Religion from the moft ancient Times to which any Record doth extend, have agreed in the way of Worship by Sacrifice. And from this general Practice, there may feem to be fome ground to infer, this way of Worship to have been directed by the Light of Nature. But when 'tis well confidered, what little ground there is to perfuade a Man, left to his own free Reafon, that

Chap. 12. of Natural Religion.

that God should be pleased with the killing and burning of Beafts, or with the deftroying of fuch Things by Fire of which better use might be made, if they were disposed of fome other way; I fay, when 'tis well confidered, what little Reason there is to induce fuch a Man to believe, that the killing or burning of Beafts or Birds, or any other thing useful to Mankind, should of it self be a proper and natural Means to teffify our Subjection to God; or to be used by way of expiation from Sin: It will rather appear probable, that the original of this Practice was from Institution, and that our first Parents were by particular Revelation instructed in this way of Worship, from whom it was delivered down to their fucceffive Generations by verbal Tradition; and by this Means was continued in those Families, who departed from the Church, and proved Heathen in the first Ages of the World; amongst whom this Tradition was in course of time, for want of care and frequent renewals, corrupted with many human Superinducements, according to the Genius or Interests of feveral Times or Nations.

As for the Reafons, why God was pleafed to inftitute to his own People this way of Worship, there are these two Things may be suggested.

I Sacrifices had a typical Reference unto that great Defign which was to be accom-M plifhed

plished in the fulness of time, by the Sacrifice of Christ upon the Cross, which is at large explained and applied in feveral parts of the New Testament, particularly in the Epistle to the Hebrews, from whence many strong Arguments may now be deduced, for confirmation of the Truth of the Gospel.

2. Because this way of Worship was most fuitable to those Ages; the Providence of God having purpofely adapted his own Inftitutions of Worship, unto the Abilities and Capacities of Men in feveral Times; difcovering himfelf to his People in divers man-Heb. i. 1. ners, according to fundry Times. And therefore in those first and ruder Ages of the World, when People were more generally immerfed in fenfible things, and flood in need of fomewhat to raife and fix their Imaginations, God was pleafed to amufe them with external Pomp and Solemnities, and to employ that time of their Nonage, about these plainer Rudiments or Elements of the Gal. iv. 3. World. Butwhen they were grown up from this Nonage, when the generality of Men became more notional, better able to confider and abstract things; when by the spreading of the Roman Conquests, which extended to the most confiderable Parts of the World, they had likewife fpread their Arts and Civilities, reducing the Provinces which came under their Power, from that Savageness and Barbarism with which they had formerly been

Chap. 11. of Natural Religion.

been overspread, to the love and defire of all peaceful Arts, and the ftudy of all useful Knowledge, whereby the Minds of Men were rendred more rational and inquifitive than before they had been, and confequently better prepared for the reception of the Christian Religion : In this fulness of time (as the Scripture stiles it) did the Providence of God think fit to introduce Christian Religion, a more rational and spiritual way of Worship, whose Precepts are most agreeable to the purest and fublimest Reason ; confisting chiefly in a Regulation of the Mind and Spirit, and fuch kind of Practices as may promote the good of Human Society, and most effectually conduce to the perfecting of our Natures, and the rendring of them happy.

And that the most rational kind of Worship doth confist in such kind of Qualifica= tions and Services, befides the Attestation of feveral Scriptures to this purpose, may likewife be made evident by the acknowledgment of the wifest Heathens. Eusebius quotes Menander, a Greek Poet, to this purpose, (fometimes cited by St. Paul) Men do in vain, faith he, endeavour to make the Gods prepars. propitious by their costly Sacrifices; if they Evangel: would have the divine Favour, let them love 13. C. 13. and adore God in their Hearts, be just and holy in their Conversations. And in another place he cites the like Sayings out of Porphyry, in his Book de Sacrificiis, and Apol-Lib. 4. Ionius. &c. M2 So^{c, 133} lonius, &c. M 2

Of the Principles, &c. Lib. I.

Differt.38

So Maximus Tyrius, speaking concerning those divers Solemnities wherewith several Nations did honour their Gods, faith, He would be loth, by denying any of these, to derogate from the Honour of the Deity; but Men should chiefly labour to have him in their Minds, isonar physor, desironar physor, they should principally endeavour to know him, and to love him.

Epist. 95.

So Seneca, having difcourfed concerning those external Adorations and Ceremonies, whereby feveral Men were wont to express their Devotion, he fays, Humana ambitio istis capitur officiis, Deumcolit qui novit; " Such Formalities may be acceptable to the " Ambition of Men, but he only can truly " worship God who knows him." The first ftep (faith he) unto Divine Worship, is to believe the Being of God ; and then to demean our felves towards him fuitably to the greatness of his Majesty. Vis Deos propitiare, bonus esto; satis illos coluit quisquis imitatus est. "Would you render him " propitious to you, endeavour to be good : " That Man only doth truly worship him, " who labours to be like him." So Tully; Cultus autem Deorum est optimus, idemque castissimus, atque sanctissimus, plenissimusque pietatis, ut eos semper purâ, integrå incorrupt a, mente & voce veneremur. To which I fhall only add that Saying of Perseus, where he prefers an honest and a vir-

De Nat. Deorum, lib. 2.

Satyr. 2.

Chap. 12. of Natural Religion. 165 a virtuous Mind, above all other coftly Sacrifices and Offerings.

Compositum jus fasque animi, sanctosque recessus Mentis, & incoctum generoso pectus honesto, Hæc cædo, ut admoveam templis, & farre litabo.

If true Worship did confist only in costly Sacrifices, then such alone as were rich could be religious; whereas God is more ready to accept the meanest Offering, from a Person of a just, and worthy, and generous Mind, who doth truly love and devote himself to him, than of the most pompous costly Sacrifices from others.

And thus have I done treating of those kind of Affections, which naturally follow from due Apprehensions of the *incommuni*cable Attributes belonging to the Divine Nature; namely, Adoration and Worship.

M 3 CHAP.

CHAP. XIII.

2021; XIC & C 92, 341, 547 59 23 62 97

166

Of Faith or Affiance in God.

Proceed to those other Affections whereby we are to give unto God (fo far as Creatures are capable) that Honour which is due to those communicable Perfections belonging to the Divine Understanding, Will, Faculties of Acting ; namely, his Wisdom, Goodne s, Power, Dominion, and Superiority over us, and his distributing of future Rewards and Punishments, which should respectively excite in us, Affiance, Love, Reverence, and Obedience, both active and passive. And though each of these Graces have fufficient foundation in every one of the Divine Excellencies promiscuoufly; yet there is some more peculiar reference and correspondence amongst them, according to this Order.

I purpose to speak to each of them severally and briefly.

Firft, Concerning *Affiance*; by which I mean an acquiefcence of the Mind, whereby it is fupported againft all unneceffary Doubts and Fears, upon Account of the Divine Allfufficiency in general, with more fpecial refpect to his Knowledge, and Wifdom, and Providence; whereby he doth take notice of

Chap. 13. of Natural Religion.

of our Conditions, and is able to order all things for the beft, and doth not permit any thing to befal us without his knowledge of it, and being concerned for it. This Grace, according to its different Relations, is ufually diftinguished into these Three Branches: I. As it respects an Act of the Judgment in affenting to all Divine Truths, whether difcoverable by Reason, or by Revelation; fo 'tis stiled Faith. 2. As it imports a Resting of the Will and Affections in the Divine Goodness, whether discovered to us by the Light of Nature, or by Revelation; fo 'tis filed Trust; and according to the greater Measure or Degree of it, Confidence and Plerophory. So the Heathen, who have no Revelation, can support themselves in their Sufferings for that which is good, with the Confideration that God will take care of them. As it relates to the Expectation and Desire after some future Good which we ftand in need of, or the Escaping of some Evil we are obnoxious unto; so 'tis stiled Hope. But I shall treat of these promiscuoufly, becaufe they agree in the general nature of Affiance. And how reasonable and proper this Affiance in God is, will appear from these Confiderations.

1. 'Tis neceffary to our prefent state in this World, that there should be something for us to lean upon, and have recourse unto, as our Support and Refuge.

M 4.

2. God

Of the Principles, &c.

2. God alone is an all-fufficient Stay, upon which the Mind of Man can fecurely repofe it felf in every Condition.

Lib. I.

1. 'Tis necessary to our present State in this World, that there should be something for us to lean upon, and have recourse unto, as our Support and Refuge. This the ancient Poets have fignified in their Fable of Pandora's Box, which when Epimetheus had opened, and faw all manner of Evils flying out of it, he fuddenly clofed it again, and fo kept in Hope at the bottom of it, as being the only Remedy left to Mankind, against all those Evils to which they are obnoxious. Every Man at his best Estate, is but a feeble infirm Creature : What from the Impotence of his Mind, and the Diforder of his Passions from within, together with the Troubles and Difficulties that he shall meet withal from without; the great Obscurity which there is in the nature of things, that Uncertainty which attends the Issues and Events of them; the mutability of all human Affairs, which cannot possibly be fecured by all the imaginable Wisdom and Forefight which Men are capable of. From all which it fufficiently appears, that Faith and Hope and Trust are altogether neceffary to the ftate of Men in this World; and that they must always be in an unsafe unquiet condition, unless they have fomewhat to fupport and relieve them in their Exigencies. 'Tis observed of the Hop, and

Chap. 13. of Natural Religion.

169

and other fuch climbing Plants, which are not of strength enough to bear up themselves, that they will by natural inftinct lean towards and clasp about any thing that is next, which may help to bear them up; and in want of a Tree or a Pole, which is their proper Support, they will wind about a Thiftle or a Nettle, or any other Weed, though in the iffue it will help to choak and deftroy the growth of them, instead of furthering it. The Application is easy, All flesh is grass, Ifa.x1.6. and the glory thereof, as the flower of the field, of a fading impotent condition, standing in need of something without its felf for its protection and support. And a mistake in the choice of fuch Helps, may fometimes prove fatal. Our conditions in this World are often in Scripture represented by a State of Warfare; wherein the Virtues of Faith and Hope are said to be our Breast-plate, our 1 Thesf. Shield and our Helmet, the chief defensive v. 6. Arms whereby we are to be guarded against allAssaults. And sometimes by a State of Travelling by Sea, wherein Hope is our Anchor, Heb.vj.19. that which must fix and keep us steddy in the midst of all Storms.

2. God alone is an all-fufficient ftay, upon which the Mind of Man can fecurely repose it felf in every Condition. For which Reafon he is in the Scripture Phrase stilled the Hope of Ifrael, the confidence of all the ends Pf lxv.5. of the earth, and of fuch as are afar off^{Prov.iii} upon²⁶.

Rom. xv. upon the Sea, the God of Hope. Which Titles he hath been pleafed to affume unto him-33. felf, to teach us this Lesson, that our Faith r Pet, i. and Hope (bould be in God. 2I.

170

5.

The principal Conditions requisite in that Person, who is fit to be a proper Object of our Confidence, are thefe four :

1. Perfect Knowledge and Wifdom, to understand our Conditions, and what may be the most proper Helps and Remedies for them.

2. Unquestionable Goodness, Love, Faithfulnefs, to be concerned for us, and to take care of us.

3. Sufficient Power, to relieve us in every Condition.

4. Everlastingness, that may reach to us and our Posterity to all Generations. All which are only to be found in God. From whence it will appear, that as he is the only proper Object of our Trust, so by not trufting in him, we do deny to him the Honour which is due to these Divine Excellencies, and confequently are deficient in one of the chief Parts of Religion.

1. He alone hath perfect Knowledge and Wifdom to understand our Conditions, and what may be the most proper Remedy for Pf. cxlvij, them. His Understanding is infinite. Our most fecret Thoughts and inward Groanings are not hid from him. He knows our Difcases, and what Physick is fittest for us, the beft

Chap. 13. of Natural Religion. 171 best Means of Help, and the most fitting Seafon to apply those Means. He is infinitely wife to contrive fuch ways of Safety and Deliverance, as will furmount all those Difficulties and Perplexities which would put Human Wildom to a Lofs. He doth fometimes accomplifh his Ends without any visible Means ; filling Men's bellies with his hid Pfal. xvij. treasure, making them to thrive and prosper 14. in the World, by fuch fecret Ways as Men understand not. And fometimes he doth blaft the most likely Means, fo that the battel Ecclef, ix. is not to the strong, nor yet bread to the wife, ". nor yet riches to men of understanding, nor yet favour to men of skill; but it may happen to them, as the Prophet speaks, that Hag. i. 6. they fow much, yet they bring in but little; they eat and have not enough, they drink but are not filled, they are cloathed but are not warm, earn wages but put it into a bag with holes. And therefore upon this account there is very good reason why God should be the Object of our Confidence.

2. He is likewife infinite as to his Goodnefs, Love, Truth, Faithfulnefs, whereby he is concern'd for our Welfare, and doth take care for us. The neareft and deareft Relations which we have in the World, in whom we have most Reason to be confident, Our Father and Mother may for fake Pf. xxvij. us: And as for fuch whom we have ob-^{10.} liged by all imaginable Kindnefs, they may deal

Of the Principles, &c. Lib. I.

deal deceitfully with us, and prove like win-Job.vi.15. ter Brooks, which in wet Seasons, when there is no need of them, will run with a Torrent, but are quite vanish'd in a time of Drought. Whilft we are in a profperous Condition, they will be forward to apply themfelves to us, with great Professions of Kindness and Zeal; but if our Condition prove any way declining, they prefently fall off and become Strangers, forgetting and renouncing all Obligations of Friendship and Gratitude, rather than run the least hazard or trouble to do us a Kindnefs. That Man hath had but little Experience in the World, to whom this is not very evident. But now the Mercy and Pf.Ixviij.5. Goodness of God is over all his Works, and more efpecially extended to fuch as are in a state of Misery, the Fatherless and Widows, CXV. 14cxlvj. 9. the Prisoners, the Poor, and the Stranger. Pfal. x. 14. He is a helper of the friendles. That which amongst Men is usually the chief occasion to take off their Affection and Kindnefs; namely, Mifery and Affliction, is a principal Argument to entitle us to the Favour of God, and therefore is frequently made use of by good Men in H. Scripture to that purpose. Pfal. xxij. O go not far from me, for trouble is nigh at hand, and there is none to help me; I am in 31. misery, O hear me speedily.

> 3. He is of infinite Power, for our relief and fupply in every Condition; being able

Chap. 13. of Natural Religion. 173 able to do what soever he pleaseth both in Pf. cxxxvi. heaven and in earth, and in the sea, and in " all deep places. He is the first cause of every thing, both as to its Being and Operation. We depend wholly upon his Power, not only for the Issues and Events of things, but likewise for the Means. And therefore 'tis in Scripture made an Argument why we fhould not truft in Riches, or in any Worldly thing, because power belongs to God. And Pf. lxii. 10, 'tis elsewhere urged for a Reason why we''. should trust in the Lord for ever, because in Isa. xxvj. the Lord Jehovah is everlasting strength.4. And upon this confideration Abraham is faid Rom. iv. to have hoped against hope, being fully per-18, 21. fuaded that what God had promis'd he was able to perform.

4. He is everlasting, whereas all other Helps and Comforts which we can propofe to ourselves are transient and fading. As zech.i. 3. for our fathers, where are they? And do the Prophets, or Princes, live for ever? Their Days upon Earth are a Shadow that fleeteth away, their breath goeth forth, and they return to the earth, and then all their thoughts perif: Whereas he is from Everlafting to Everlafting, God bleffed for ever; and his Righteousness extendeth to Childrens Children, even to all Generations. We fee by daily Experience, Persons of great Hopes and Expectations, when their Patrons die upon whom they had their dependance, to what

what a forlorn and helplefs Condition they are reduced: But now this can never befal Jer.xvij.7. the Man who trusteth in the Lord, and whose hope the Lord is. And 'tis one of the greatest Privileges of Religion, that it doth furnish a Man with such a support against all kind of Exigencies, whereby he may bear up his Spirit under those Difficulties wherewith others are overwhelmed.

174

'Tis true indeed, it cannot be denied, but that God doth expect, and the Nature of Things doth require, that Men fhould be fuitably affected with Joy or Sorrow, according as their Conditions are; but yet with this difference, that those who believe the Providence of God, should not be fo deeply affected with these things as other Men, they should weep, as not weeping, and rejoice, as not rejoicing. They should not upon any Occasion fear or forrow as men without hope, but should demean themselves as Persons that have an higher Principle to be acted by, and to live upon, than any of these fensible Things.

I cannot omit to fuggeft one Observation concerning this Duty of Affiance, which I have now been infifting upon; That tho' this particular Virtue, and others of the like Affinity, be evidently moral Duties, our Obligation to them being clearly deducible from the Light of Nature and the Prin-

Chap: 14. of Natural Religion.

175

Principles of Reafon, and confequently muft be owned by the Heathen Philofophers; yet they do in their Writings fpeak but fparingly concerning those kind of Virtues which are of a more fpiritual Nature, and tend most to the Elevating and Refining of the Mind. And on the other fide, the Scripture doth most of all infist upon the Excellency and Neceffity of these kind of Graces. Which is one of the main Differences betwixt the Scripture and other moral Writings. And for this Reason it is, that in speaking of these Graces and Virtues, I do more frequently allude to Scripture Expression.



CHAP. XIV. Of the Love of God.

SEcondly, As for those Perfections belonging to the Divine Will; namely, his Goodnefs, his Justice, his Truth, and Faithfulne/s: The due apprehension of these should excite in us the Virtue of Love, with all the genuine Fruits of it. By Love, I mean an esteeming of him, and a seeking after him, as our only Happines.

So that there are two Ingredients of this Virtue of Love, Estimation and Choice.

I. An

1. An *Estimation* of the Judgment; a duc Valuation of those Excellencies which are in the Divine Nature, whereby we look upon God as the Supreme Being *in genere boni*: From whom all created Goodness is derived, and by conformity to whom it is to be meafured. And this Notion is the proper importance of the word *Charity*, whereby we account a Thing dear or precious. And in thisSense doth our Saviour oppose Despiss Mat.v.24 to Loving; Either he must bate the one,

and love the other; or he must hold to the one, and despise the other.

Now these Perfections of the Divine Nature may be confidered, either absolutely or relatively.

1. Abfolutely, as they are in themfelves, abstracting from any Benefit that we our felves may have by them. And in this Senfe they can only produce in us an efteem of our Judgments, without any defire or zeal in our Will or Affections. The Devil doth understand these absolute Perfections of the Divine Nature, that God is in himself most wife, most just, and powerful: And he knows withal that these things are good, deferving Esteem and Veneration; and yet he doth not love God for these Perfections, because he himself is evil, and is not like to receive any Benefit by them

2. Relatively, with reference to that Advantage which may arrive to us from the Divine

Chap. 14. of Natural Religion.

177

Divine Goodnefs. When Men are convinced of their infinite need of him, and their mifery without him; and that their utmost Felicity doth confift in the Enjoyment of him : This is that which properly provokes Affection and Desire, namely, his relative Goodness as to us. There is scarce any one under such transports of Love, as to believe the Person whom he loves, to be in all Respects the most virtuous, wife, beautiful, wealthy that is in the World. He may know many others, that do in fome, if not in all these Respects, exceed : And yet he hath not an equal love for them, because he hath not the fame hopes of attaining an Interest in them, and being made happy by them. So that this Virtue doth properly confift in fuch a kind of efteem, as is withal accompanied with a hope and belief of promoting our own Happiness by them. And this is properly the true ground and original of our love to God. From whence will follow,

2. Our Choice of him, as being the only proper Object of our Happiness, preferring him before any thing elfe that may come in competition with them. Not only (as the Scripture expresseth it) loving him above fa-Mat. x. iij. ther and mother, but hating father and mo-Luk. xiv. ther, yea and life it self for his sake : Count-Philem. 3. ing all other things but dross and dung, in comparison of him.

Now it cannot otherwise be, but that a due apprehension of the Divine Excellencies m

in general, especially of his particular Goodness to us, must excite in the Soul suitable Affections towardshim. And hence it is, that the Misapprehension of the Divine Nature, as to this Attribute, doth naturally produce in Men that kind of Superstition stiled Sem-Saipovia, which imports a frightful and overtimerous notion of the Deity, reprefenting God as auftere and rigorous, eafily provoked by every little circumstantial Mistake, and as eafily appeafed again by any flattering and flight Formalities. Not but that there is fufficient Evidence from the Principles of Natural Reason, to evince the contrary: But the true ground of their Mistakes in this matter, is from their own vicious and corrupt Affections. 'Tis most natural for felfifh and narrow Men, to make themfelves the Rule and Measure of Perfection in other things. And hence it is, that according as a Man's own Inclinations are, fo will he be Pfal.1. 21. apt to think of God; Thou thoughtest that I was altogether such a one as thy self. Those that are of ill Natures and of little Minds, whofe Thoughts are fixed upon fmall and low Matters, laying greater weight upon Circumstances, Salutes, Addresses, than upon the real worth of Persons and substantial Duties, being themfelves apt to be provoked unto wrath and fierceness, upon the omission of these leffer Circumstances, and to be pacified again by any flattering and formal Services; fuch

Chap. 14. of Natural Religion.

fuch Men must confequently think themfelves obliged to deal just fo towards God, as they expect that others fhould deal with them. And according to the different Natures and Tempers of those Men who mistake this Notion of the Divine Goodness, so are the Effects and Consequences of this Mistake various (as a learned Man hath well Mr. Smith observed:) When it meets with stout and of Supersturdy Natures, who are under a Consciousnefs of Guilt, it works them to Atheifm, hardens them to an Opposition of him, to an endeavour of undermining and destroying the Notion of that Deity, by whom they are not like to be fafe or happy. If with more foft and timerous Natures, Men of base and flavish Minds, it puts such Men on to flatter and collogue with him, and to propitiate his Favour by their Zeal in leffer Matters. And though in this kind of Temper and Carriage there may be a shew of Religion, yet the terminating of it in such things is most destruclive to the nature of it, rendring all converse with the Deity irkfome and grievous, begetting a kind of forced and præternatural Zeal, instead of that inward Love and Delight, and those other genuine kindly Advantages which should arifeto the Soul from an internal frame of Religion.

And that the Perfections of the Divine Nature, and particularly his Goodnefs, fhould excite our Love of him, may be made evi-N 2 dent

Of the Principles, &c. Lib. I.

dent by all kind of Proofs; there being no kind of Motive to Affection, whether *imagi*nary or real, but 'tis infinitely more in God than in any thing elfe befides. I fhall mention only thefe three Things.

1. His absolute Goodness and Excellency.

2. His relative Goodness and Kindness to us.

3. The Neceffity we are under of being utterly lost and undone, without an interest in his Favour.

I. His absolute Perfections are infinite, being the Original of all that Good which we behold in other Things. Whatever Attractives we find diffused amongst other Creatures, by which they are rendred amiable. they are all derived from him, and they are all, in comparison to him, but as little drops to the Ocean. There is much of lovelines in the Fabrick of this beautiful World, the glorious Sun, the Moon and the Stars which be hath ordained; which is abundantly enough to render the Notion and the Name of him excellent in all the Earth. We may perhaps know fome particular Perfons fo very Eminent for all kind of Accomplishments, Virtue, and Wisdom, and Goodness, &c. as to contract an Efteem and Veneration from all that know them. But now the higheft Perfections that are in Men, befides that they are derived from him, are fo infinitely difproportionable to his, that they may be faid not

not to be in any of the Creatures. There is fome kind of communicated Goodnefs, and Wifdom, and Power, and Immortality in Men; and yet these Perfections are in Scripture appropriated to the Divine Nature in such a manner, as if no Creature did partake of them. There is none good, or wife, Mat.xix.7. but he. He is the only Potentate, who only "Tim. i. hath immortality. No Man can take a fe- ch. vj. 15. rious view of the Works he hath wrought, 16. whether they concern Creation or Providence, but he must needs acknowledge, concerning the Author of them, that he is altogether lovely ; and fay with the Prophet, How great Zech. ix. is his Goodness? and how great is his Boun-17. ty? The comeliness of them is upon all accounts fo eminent and confpicuous, as cannot but be owned by every one who confiders them. For any Man to ask, what Beauty is, this is, rugas ipwirn ug, as Aristotle speaks, the question of a Blind Man. Every Man who hath Eyes, may judge of it at first view: Not to discern it, is a sure Argument of Blindness and Darkness. And that the Divine Nature is not more amiable to us, fhews the great Imperfection of our prefent Condition. It shall be the perpetual Employment of our future State in Heaven, to celebrate these Excellencies of the Divine Nature. The Bleffed Angels, and the Spirits of just Men made perfect, do receive a chief Part of their Felicity, by contempla- N_3 ting

Of the Principles, &c." Lib. I, ting these Divine Perfections in the beatifical Vision.

2. His relative Goodnefs and Kindnefs to us; teftified in 10 many particulars, that when we would reckon them up, they are more in number than the fand. He is the Author of our beings, and our well beings. Pfal.c. 3. It is he that made us, and not we our felves. He spreads our tables, and fills our cups;

Pfal. xxiij. In him we live, and move, and have our beings. He doth daily follow us, compass us about, load us with his benefits. He gives us all that we enjoy, and he is willing upon our Repentance to forgive us all that we offend. And to whom much is given, or forgiven, they should love much. To love them that love us, is a Duty but of a low attainment, the Publicans and Sinners do the fame; nay, the very Beafts will do it, The Ox knows bs Owner, and the Afs his Master's Crib. That Perfon must be void of the Reason of a Man, who will not admire and love God for his Excellencies; but he that doth not love him for his Kindnefs, must be more slupid and sen liefs than the brute Creatures.

> 3. We are utterly undone without an Intereft in his Favour. So that if the apprehension of his *absolute* Goodness cannot work upon our *Reason*, nor the Sense of his *relative* Goodness or Kindness upon our *ingenuity* and *gratitude*; yet the Consideration of our undone estate without him, ought to 2 prevail

Chap. 14. of Natural Religion.

prevail with all fuch, as have not forfeited the first and most universal Principle of Selfpreservation. The not having him for our Friend, and much more the having him for our Enemy, puts a Man into an absolute incapacity of all kind of Happiness. 'Tis a Question proposed by St. Austin, why we are so often in Scripture enjoined to love God and our Neighbours, but have no-where any Precept commanding us to love our felves? To which he gave this Answer, Fingi non potest major dilectio sui, quam dilectio Dei; " The highest and truest Self-" love, is to love that which can alone make " us happy." Men do not need any Motive or Argument to perfuade them to love themfelves. 'Tis a natural Principle, rather than a moral Duty; they must do so, nor can they do otherwife. Only this is that wherein they stand in greatest need of direction, how to fet this natural Principle on work upon its due Object. Felicity must be every Man's chief End, there is no need of persuading any one to that; all the difficulty is to convince Men, wherein this Happiness doth consist, And there is no rational considering Man, but must needs grant it to be in the fruition of the first and supreme Good; so that to love God as our Happiness, is to love our felves, beyond which there is nothing to be faid or fancied by way of Motive or Perfuafion.

N4

'Tis

Of the Principles, &c. Lib. I.

'Tis a Duty this, upon all accounts, fo plain and reafonable, that no Man whatfoever can pretend to any kind of doubt or difpute about it. And therefore I shall add no more by way of proof or confirmation of the Neceffity of it.

Ishall only offer two Confiderations, which fhould engage Men's utmost diligence and caution in this Matter.

1. 'Tis a business of greatest consequence, to know whether we truly love God.

2. 'Tis a matter wherein we are very liable to miftake.

1. 'Tis a bufinefs of unspeakable concernment, to understand whether we love God, or not: It being the fame thing as to enquire, whether there be any thing in us of true Religion or not. 'Tis not a Question about the Fruits or the Branches, but about the Root; not about the Degrees, but about the very Essence of Grace and Holines. There being no Medium betwixt loving God and hating of him. He that is not with me, is against me, (faith our Saviour) Luk. xj. 23.

2. And then 'tis a matter wherein Men are liable to miftake. There is naturally in all Nations of men, who dwell on the face of the earth, a kind of confused Inclination to-Aas xvij. wards God, whereby they seek the Lord, if a7. haply they might feel after him, and find him, as the Apostle speaks. And Men are apt to mistake this natural Propension for the grace Chap. 14. of Natural Religion.

185 grace of Love; whereas this is rather an Inclination, than a firm Choice and Refolution; rather a natural Disposition, than an acquired or infused Habit. None could have more confident Persuasions of their love to God, and their Zeal for him, than the Jews had; and yet our Saviour tells them, But I know Joh. v. 42. you, that you have not the love of God in you. Tis not an outward Profession, though accompanied with Zeal, that is a fufficient Argument of our Love. Though there are many in the World, who both live and die under this delusion, Matt. vij. 22. Many will Say unto me in that day, Lord, Lord, have we not prophefied in thy name, and in thy name have cast out Devils, and in thy name done many wonderful works? And then will I profess unto them, I never knew you, depart from me you that work Iniquity. 'Tis not the being gifted and called for these extraordinary works of prophefying and Miracles; 'tis not an ability to undergo the Flames of Martyrdom, and the giving ourBodies to be burned: Neither Gifts or Privileges, nor some particular Acts of Duty, tho' of the most noble kind and greatest difficulty, can be a sufficient Evidence of this Love. So that 'tis a matter wherein Men are very liable to mistake, and where a Mistake will prove of infinite consequence. And therefore will it concern us, to be very confiderate and cautious in our enquiry about it.

There

There is one kind of affection feated in the rational part of the Soul, the Understanding and Will; and another in the Sensitive, the Fancy and Appetite : The one confifting in a full conviction, deliberate choice, and firm refolution; the other confifting more in fome sudden impetus and transport of defire after a Thing. The first of these may be stiled the Virtue, the other the Passion of Love. Now though a Man should, in some Fits of Devotion, love God with as great a degree of fervor, as to passionate sensitive Love, as some Martyrs have done; yet were it possible for him in his judgment, to effect any thing else but equally, or never so little more than God ; such a kind of Affection, though it were sufficient to make the other a Martyr, yet could not preferve him from being an Apostare, and renouncer or blasphemer of Mr. Pinke. Religion (as a learned Author hath proved more at large;) nay, I add farther, from the fame Author, though a Man should love God with an equal degree of Affection, yet because the Objects are so infinitely disproportionable, and 'tis the Nature of moral Duties to be measured from those Motives by which we are to be induced to them; therefore of such an one it may be affirmed, that he doth not love God. He that makes him but equal to any worldly thing, may be faid infinitely do despife and undervalue him.

186

For

Chap. 14. of Natural Religion.

For the farther Explication of this, I shall suggest to you a Distinction, not commonly (if at all) taken notice of by others, betwixt natural Principles and moral Duties. The misunderstanding of which, is the occasion of many Difficulties and Confusions about this and some other Points.

1. By Natural Principles, I mean fuch kind of Impressions as are originally stamp'd upon the Nature of Things, whereby they are fitted for those Services to which they are designed in their Creation; the acts of which are neceffary, and under no kind of liberty of being suspended : All things must work according to their natural Principles, nor can they do otherwife; as heavy Bodies must tend downwards. The beauty of the World, and the wifdom of the Creation, is generally acknowledged to confift in this, that God was pleased to endue the Kinds of Things, with fuch Nature and Principles, as might accommodate them for those Works to which they were appointed. And he governs all things by fuch Laws, as are fuited to those several Natures which he had at first inplanted in them. The most universal Principle belonging to all kind of Things, is felf-prefervation, which in Man (being a rational Agent) is somewhat farther advanced to strong Propensions and Desires of the Soul after a state of Happiness, which hath the predominancy over all other Inclinations,

Of the Principles, &c. Lib. I.

ons, as being the fupreme and ultimate End, to which all their Defigns and Actions must be fubfervient by a natural Neceffity.

2. Whereas, on the other hand, those Rules or Means which are most proper for the attaining of this End, about which we have a liberty of acting, to which Men are to be induced in a moral Way, by fuch kind of Motives or Arguments as are in themselves sufficient to convince the Reason: These I call moral Duties; Duties, as deriving their obligation from their conducibility to the promoting of our chief End : and moral, as depending upon moral Motives. So that Selflove, and the proposing of Happiness as our chief End, though it be the Foundation of Duty, that basis or substratum upon which the Law is founded, yet 'tis not properly a moral Duty, about which Men have a liberty of acting. They must do so, nor can they do otherwife. The most vile and profligate Wretches that are, who are most oppofite to that which is their true Happines, they are not against Happiness it self, but they mistake about it, and erroneously substitute fomething else in the room of it. So that if Men were upon all Accounts firmly convinced, that God was their chief Happiness, they would almost as necessarily love him, as hungry Men do eat, and thirfty Men do drink. I have enlarged fomewhat the more upon this particular, the better to manifest the

Chap. 15. of Natural Religion. the true Cause or Ground of this Love, to confist in this Persuasion, that our chief Happiness is in the Favour of God, and the Enjoyment of him.



CHAP. XV.

Of Reverence, and the Fear of God.

Thirdly, As for those kind of Affections, which should be wrought in us, more especially from the apprehension of the Divine Power; these are Reverence, Fear, Humility, a submissive and filial awe, which is so suitable to the notion of Omnipotence, and so necessary a consequence from it, as not to be separated.

By this *Reverence*, I mean fuch an humble, awful, and ingenuous regard towards the Divine Nature, proceeding from a due Efteem and Love of him, whereby we are rendred unwilling to do any thing which may argue contempt of him, or which may provoke and offend him. 'Tis a Duty which we owe to fuch as are in a fuperior relation, and is in the Fifth Commandment enjoined under the Name of *Honour*; which in the Notion of it doth imply a mixture of *Love* and *Fear*, and in the Object of it doth fuppofe *Goodnefs* and *Power*. That Power which

Of the Principles, &c. Lib. I.

which is hurtful to Men, and devoid of goodnefs, may raife in their Minds a Dread and Terror, but not a Reverence and an Honour. And therefore all fuch Doctrines as afcribe unto God what is harfh and rigorous, and unworthy of his infinite goodnefs, inftead of this *filial*, do beget a *fervile* fear in Men. This is the meaning of that Citation in St. Auftin, where he mentions it as Varro's judgment, Deum à religiofo vereri, à Iuperfitiofo timeri. The Paflion of Fear and Dread belongs to fuperfitious Perfons, but the Virtue of reverence to those that are Benefic. I religious. And that of Seneca, Deos nemo

4. cap. 19. fanus timet, furor enim est metuere falut aria, nec quisquam amat quos timet. No Man in his right Mind will fear God in this Sense; itis no less than Madnels to have frightful Apprehensions of that which is most benign and beneficial; nor can true Love consist with this kind of Fear.

But as for this Reverence or filial Fear, it is so essential to a state of Religion, that not only the Scripture, but the *Heathen Moralists* likewise do describe Religion it self by this very Name of *fearing God*. And Men who are pious and devout, are by the *Gentiles* stiled *inlacas* and *polsiperon*, Men of Reverence and Fear.

Now though every one of the Divine Perfections may justly challenge this Affection as due to it, particularly his infinite Wisdom and Chap. 15. of Natural Religion.

and Goodness, yet doth it more particularly belong to his Power. I shall speak briefly of each of these.

I. For his infinite Knowledge and Wifdom, which are things that have been always counted venerable. He knows all our Infirmities and most fecret Faults, and therefore ought to be feared upon that account. 'Tis a notable Saying in Cicero to this purpose; Quis non timeat omnia providentem E cogitantem, & animadvertentem, & omnia ad se pertinere putantem, curiosum & plenum negotii Deum. "Who would not " fear that God who fees and takes notice of " all Things, fo curious and full of business, " as to have a particular concern for every " action and perfon in the World?" And in another place he makes this Notion of the Deity, and the Fear consequent thereupon, to be the chief basis of Government, the first Foundation of that civil policy whereby Men are gathered together and preferved in regular Societies. Sit persuasum civibus, Deos, De Legib. qualis quisque sit, quid in se admittat, Lib. 2. quâ mente, quâ pietate religiones colat, intueri; piorumque & impiorum habere ratio-" This is one of the first Principles, nem. " which Men who would affociate under " Government ought to be convinced of, that " God takes particular notice, what kind of " Perfon every one is, with what Mind and " Devotion he applies himself to the Duties " of

Of the Principles, &c. Lib. I.

" of Religion, and will deal with Men according as they are pious or impious." From whence will follow, fuch a Fear of offending him by any difhoneft action, as muft make Men capable of living under Government.

2. His Goodnefs, Holinefs, Kindnefs, and Mercy, do afford another Reafon why he ought to be feared; though thefe are the most immediate Objects of our Love and Joy, yet will they likewife afford ground for our Reverence. We read in one Text, of Hof. iij.5. fearing the Lord and his goodnefs; which

is, when Men have fuch a Senfe of his Goodnefs, as thereby to be affected with an holy awe and fear of offending him. And elfewhere, 'tis faid, There is forgivenefs with him, that he ought to be feared. The meaning of which place may be this, We ftand

in continual need of Pardon and Remiflion, being utterly undone without it; and God only doth give this, and therefore upon this account we ought to reverence and fear him.

3. This Duty doth more especially refer to that Attribute of his *Power*, together with the Effects of it, in the *Judgments* which he executes in the World. Now nothing is more natural to Men, than to fear such as have power over them, and are able to help or to hurt them. The Civil Magistrate is tobe feared and reverenced upon this account, because Chap. 15. of Natural Religion.

193 because he bears the fword, and is a revenger: Rom. 13. Much more the Supreme Governour of the World. Men can but kill the body, and after that must die themselves; but God lives for ever, and can punish for ever; he can cast both body and soul into hell: And there-Mat. 10. fore we have very great reason to fear him. 18. 'Tis mention'd in Scripture, as one of those Attributes and Titles whereby the Divine Nature is describ'd, The fear of Israel, He Pfal. 76. that ought to be feared. And that by those 11. who need not to fear others, the Princes and Potentates of the World. Those very Persons, whom others are most afraid of, ought themselves to stand in fear of him; for he cuts off the spirits of Princes, and ver. 12. is terrible to the Kings of the earth, as it follows in that Place.

The great Prejudice which ignorant Men have against this Affection of Fear, is, that it is a Check and Restraint to a Man in his Liberty, and confequently brings Disquiet to his Mind; which is so far from Truth, that on the contrary it may be manifested, that one of the greatest Privileges belonging to a State of Religion, doth arise from this true Fear of God, as being that which must fet us at liberty from all other tormentful Fears. That which hath the greatest Influence upon the Troubles and Discontents of Men in the World, whereby their Conditions are rendred uncomfortable, is their inordinate \mathbf{O} Fear,

Of the Principles, &c. Lib. I.

Fear, those misgiving Thoughts and Surmifes, whereby they are apt to multiply their own Dangers, and create needless Troubles to themselves. And whatever a Man's outward Condition may be, as to the fecurity and flourishing of it, yet while fuch Fears Pf. 25. 13. are in his Mind, His foul doth not dwell at. ease, as the Phrase is; whereas, he that fears the Lord, his soul shall dwell at ease, i. e. fuch an one need not be afraid of any thing else. Discat timere, qui non vult timere; discat ad tempus esse solicitus, qui vult esse Semper securus, faith St. Austin; "He that " would not fear other things, let him learn " to fear God; let him be cautious and fo-" licitous for a Time, that would be ever-" laftingly fecure." And in another Place, Homo time Deum, & minantem mundum ridebis; "O Man! learn to fear God, an "thou wilt despise the Threatnings of the "World." And again, Exhorresce quod minatur Omnipotens, ama quod promittit Omnipotens, & vilescet mundus sive promittens live terrens; "He that hath a true Fear of " what the Omnipotent God doth threaten, " and a Love to what he promises, to such a " one the World, whether fmiling or frown-" ing, will seem contemptible." The Heaven, and Earth, and Men, are all but his Instruments, and cannot do any thing otherwife than as they are permitted or acted by him. Though they should seem to be angry Chap. 15. of Natural Religion.

195

gry with us, yet he can reftrain their Wrath, and, when he pleaseth, can reconcile them to us. But if he himself be offended, none of these things will be able to afford us any Comfort or Relief. 'Tis above all other things the most fearful to fall into the hands of the living God. That's a notable Speech to this purpose, which I find cited out of Plutarch; "They that look upon God as " the chief Rewarder of Good and Evil, and " fear him accordingly, are thereby freed " from other perplexing Fears." Such Persons, minùs animo conturbantur, quam qui indulgent vitiis audentque scelera, have " more inward Peace than others who in-" dulge themselves in their Vices, and dare " commit any Wickedness."

And as on the one fide, the more Men have of this Fear towards God, the lefs they have of other Fears: So the lefs they have of this, the more subject are they to other Fears. Amongst the many Judgments denounced against the want of this Fear of God, the Scripture particularly mentions a fearful Mind; If thou wilt not fear that glori- Deut. 28. ous and fearful name, the Lord thy God, 58. the Lord will make thy plagues wonderful, &c. And this is reckoned as one of them, The Lord shall give thee a trembling ver. 65. heart. And if we consult Experience, there are none more obnoxious in this kind, than prophane atheistical Persons, who by their O_2 vile

Of the Principles, &c. Lib. I.

vile Doctrines and Practices endeavour to harden themfelves and others against this fear of God. None so cowardly and timorous as these, none so easily frightned with the least Appearance of Danger. The Satyrist of old observed it of them:

Hi sunt qui trepidant, & ad omnia fulgura pallent.

None are so fearful, as those that pretend not to fear God at all. And 'tis but justice, that those who will not reverence him as Sons, should be overwhelmed with Dread and Aftonishment towards him as Slaves. And this Confideration ought to be no small Inducement to Men, to labour after this Judg.9.2. Disposition. As Abimelech said to the Men of Sichem, Judge, I pray you, whether it be better for you, that threescore and ten persons reign over you, or that one reign over you. So in this case, consider whether it be better for you, to be distracted by the great Variety of worldly Cares and Fears, which, as fo many Tyrants, will domineer over you, and keep you in perpetual Slavery, or to fubmit yourfelves to this one Fear, the Fear of God, which is perfect Peace and Liberty.

To all which may be added, That it is by this Fear that we are to give unto God the Glory of his Power and Justice. 'Tis

this

Chap. 15. of Natural Religion.

this that must make us pliable to his Will, and effectually remove all such Obstacles as may hinder us from submitting to him; subdue our Reluctancies, and make us bow down before him. Upon which Account this Expression of fearing God is frequently used in Scripture for the whole Business of Worship and Religion; because where this Fear is well fixed in the Heart, all other Parts of Holiness and Righteousness will naturally follow.

It hath a more peculiar Influence to flir up in us Watchfulnefs and Caution, and like a wary Friend is apt to fuggeft to us the fafeft Counfel and Advice: 'Tis the vigilant Keeper of all Virtues, that which must fortify us in our Temptations, and reftore us in our Lapfes.

He that will but ferioufly ponder upon what the mere Light of Nature dictates, concerning the Omnipotence of him, who is the great Creator and Governour of the World, his infinite Holinefs and Juftice, and that wife Providence, which extends to every particular Perfon and Action, whereby he takes notice of them, and will be fure to reward or punifh them, according as they are good or evil; fuch an one must needs have his Heart affected with a great Awe and Dread towards the Divine Nature.

The very *Heathens* were wont upon this Account to paint their *Jupiter* with a Thun-O 3 derbolt

Of the Principles, &c. Lib. I.

derbolt in his Hand; to strike an awe into Men, from daring to offend him who stands always ready arm'd with Vengeance against fuch as provoke him.

CHAP. XVI.

Of Obedience: And first of Active Obedience to the Laws of God.

H Aving dispatched the Duties we are more especially obliged to, with regard to God's Wisdom, Goodness, Power; I shall now treat concerning such other Duties, as refer more particularly to his Dominion and Superiority over us, his Right to command and govern us, which are comprehended under the general Name of Obedience.

The Habit of which may be describ'd to confift in fuch a fubmiffive Frame of Spirit, whereby a Man doth always devote and refign up himself unto the Disposal of his Maker, being ready in every Condition to do or fuffer that which he apprehends to be most reasonable and acceptable, and whereby he may best express his Love and Subjection.

By which Description it may appear, that this Obedience is of two kinds, SActive. Passive.

I. Active.

Chap. 16. of Natural Religion.

1. Active. Which confifts in a Readiness of Mind to do what God shall enjoin.

2. Passive. In an Acquiescence of Mind under what he shall inflict. Both which do necessarily flow from the Apprehension of God's Dominion over us, his Right to govern and dispose of us as he pleaseth. Obedience, in the true Notion of it, being nothing else but that Homage which we owe to fuch as are in a fuperior Relation, who have a Right to command us. Every Relation of Superiority and Dominion being a diftinct Engagement to Subjection; whether Oeconomical, as that betwixt Parent and Child; Political, as betwixt Magistrate and Subject; Moral, as betwixt Benefactor and Beneficiary; or laftly, that which is Natural, which above all other things gives the highest Title to Dominion, as that betwixt the Maker and his Work, the first Cause, and that which he bestows Being upon. And God by all these Titles, and many more, may justly challenge Dominion over us.

Under this first kind of Obedience, stiled Active, are comprehended these three Particulars: 1. A Knowledge of, and an Acquaintance with those Laws which we are to obferve. 2. A Consent to them, or an Approbation of them. 3. A Conformity to them. 1. An Acquaintance with the Laws of God, whether discovered to us by Revelation (the Principles of Nature obliging us to 0 4 observe

Of the Principles, &c. Lib. I.

observe and submit to all things which we have reason to believe do proceed from God;) or by natural Light, abstracting from Scripture and Revelation, as the Substance of that which we call the Moral Law is. Now tho' fuch Perfons only are under the Obligation of those Laws which depend upon Revelation, to whom a Revelation is made and sufficiently proposed, because Promulgation is effential to a Law; yet the Moral Law being discoverable by natural Light to every Man, who will but excite the Principles of his own Reason, and apply them to their due Consequences; therefore there must be an Obligation upon all Men, who have but the use of their Reason, to know these Moral Laws; and the Ignorance of them must be an inexcufable Sin. Ignorantia juris can be no Plea in this Case, because the Law is written in every Man's Heart by Nature, and the Ignorance of Mankind, as to any part of it, hath been wilfully contracted.

The Duties concerning natural Worfhip, our Adoration of the Deity by affiance, love, reverence, praying to him, expecting Mercies from him, returning to him our Thanks and Acknowledgments, being reverent and folemn in all our Addreffes towards him, our Thoughts and Speeches of him, and of the Things that refer to his Service, may be evidently inferred from those natural Notions, which we have concerning the Excellencies Chap. 16. of Natural Religion. lencies of his Nature, and our own Dependance upon him.

The Duties which concern the promoting of our own and our Neighbours Welfare, that mutual Justice, Charity, Helpfulness, which we are to exercife towards one another; thefe may each of them be deduced from that common Principle of Self-love, whereby every one doth naturally feek his own Welfare and Prefervation. We are all of us defirous that others fhould be just to us, ready to help us, and do good to us; and because 'tis a Principle of the highest Equity and Reason, that we fhould be willing to do to others as we defire and think them obliged to deal with us, this must therefore oblige us to the fame Acts of Charity and Helpfulnefs towards them. Now the drawing out of these General Rules, and fitting them to particular Cafes; a studious and inquisitive Endeavour, to find out what our Master's Will is, in several Relations and Circumstances; this I call the Duty of knowing the Commandments. And 'tis neceffary, that they fhould be thus diftincly known, before a Man can keep them.

2. A Confent to them, or Approbation of them, as being holy, just, and good. Which Rom. 7. will neceffarily follow from a true Notion of 12. the Ground and Reason of them, and must neceffarily precede a genuine Obedience and Conformity to them. He that looks upon them as Fetters and Bonds, doth rather endure

Of the Principles, &c. Lib. I.

dure them out of Necessity, than obey them Rom. 7. out of Choice and Love. I confent to the 16.

Law that it is good, faith the Apostle; that is, I do in my judgment own the fitness and reasonableness of the things therein enjoin'd, as being the most proper means to advance Pf. 19. 7. the Perfection of our Natures. The Law of the Lord is perfect (saith the Pfalmist;) not only formaliter, in itself; but also effe-Etive, as to us, it makes us to be so. And in 119. 142. another Place, Thy Law is the Truth, namely, fuch as it ought to be. There is a congruity betwixt our Well-beings, and the Nature of the things enjoin'd. And it is this Conviction alone, that must beget in us a Love of it, and a Delight to practife it. He that harbours any Prejudice in his Mind against the Ways of God, as if they were unprofitable, or unequal, can never submit to them willingly, but out of a Constraint; he may look upon them as his Task and Burden, but not as his Joy and Delight. Our external Submiffion to the Law, can never be kindly and regular, till our Minds be cast into the fame Mould with it, and framed unto a fuitableness and conformity to it. And such a Temper doth, in the Judgment of Seneca, De Vita render the Mind truly great and noble, Hic Beata, 15. est magnus animus qui se Deo tradidit. And in another Place, in regno nati sumus, Deo parere libertas eft. "Such a Man hath a " truly great and generous Mind, who can " refign

Chap. 16. of Natural Religion.

203

" refign up himfelf to God's disposal." The greatest Liberty is to submit to the Laws of our Sovereign. His Service is perfect Freedom.

3. An Observance of them, and Conformity to them in our Lives. This is the End both of the Commandments themselves, and likewise of our Knowledge and Approbation of them, namely, the Practice of Holiness and Virtue in the Conduct of our Lives; whereby we are to be advanced unto that State of Happiness, wherein the Perfection of our Natures, and our Resemblance of the Deity doth confist.

And becaufe the beft of Men do frequently fall fhort of that Obedience, which is due to the Laws of God; therefore in cafe of Tranfgreffion, natural Light doth direct Men to Repentance, which is an hearty Sorrow for our Neglects and Violations of the divine Law, accompanied with a firm and effectual Purpofe and Refolution of Amendment for the future. Which tho' it do fuppofe the Commandments of God not to have been duly obferv'd, yet is it the only Remedy left in fuch Cafes.

Some have queftioned, whether there be any Obligation upon us for this by the light of Nature; partly, because the *Stoicks* deny it; and partly, because Reason will tell a Man that it cannot afford any compensation to Divine Justice. To which I should fay, That Of the Principles, &c. Lib. I.

That the Stoicks indeed do deny this, becaufe it implies Paffion, which their wife Man muft be without; yet they will admit a Man to be difpleafed with himfelf for any Error or Miftake, which is much the fame thing with Sorrow, tho' under another Name. And tho' this be not enough to fatisfy infinite Juftice, yet it is that which Reafon doth oblige us to. We expect from those who offend us, that they should profess their Sorrow and Shame, beg Pardon, and promise Amendment. And the Men of Nineveh did upon a natural Principle betake themselves to this Remedy, and with good fucces, tho' they were doubtful of it, Who Jon. 3. 9 can tell if God will turn and repent?

This Conformity to the Law of God requires a twofold Condition,

SUniversality.

Regularity.

204

1. Univerfality; Both as to the Time, and the Duties themfelves; without any fuch picking and chufing amongft them, as may bend the Laws, to make them fuitable to our own Interefts and Humours.

2. Regularity; In the due proportioning of our Love, and Zeal, and Observance, according to that Difference which there is in the true Nature and Consequence of the things themselves; preferring Mercy and Obedience, before Sacrifice; and the weighty matters of the Law, before tything of Mint

and

Chap. 16. of Natural Religion.

and Cummin: Righteousness and Peace, before Meat and Drink. 'Tis true, the least Commandment is not to be neglected, as having stamped upon it the Authority of the great God : But then we are to confider, that the fame Authority by which that is enjoined, doth oblige us to prefer other things before it. So that a Man doth difobey in doing a good thing, when upon that account he neglects what is far better. And the Mistake of Men about this, is the true Cause of that which we call Superstition; which is one of the Opposites to Religion, and so destructive to the true Nature of it : Men being apt to think themfelves privileged for their Neglects and Failings in some greater Matters, by their Zeal about lesser Things. Things.

Now nothing will contribute more to banifh this Superfition out of the World, than a fober Enquiry into the Nature and Caufes of Things, whereby we may be able to take a just Estimate of their Evidence and Importance, and confequently to proportion our Zeal about them.

I mention this the rather, becaufe it hath been by fome objected, that human Learning and Philofophy doth much indifpofe Men for this humble Submiffion to divine Laws, by framing their Minds to other Notions and Inclinations than what are agreeable to Religion.

But

205

Of the Principles, &c. Lib. 1.

But that this is a false and groundless Prejudice, may be made very evident: The true Knowledge of the Nature of things being, amongst natural Helps, one of the most effectual to keep Men off from those two Extremes of Religion, Superstition and Prophaneness.

206

1. For Superstition; this doth properly confift in a Misapprehension of things, placing Religion in such things as they ought not, for the Matter; or in such a Degree as they ought not, for the Measure; which proceeds from Ignorance.

2. For Prophaneness; this doth consist in a Neglect, or Irreverence towards sacred Things and Duties, when such Matters, as ought to have our highest Esteem, are rendred vile and common. And this likewife doth proceed from Ignorance of the true Nature of things. Now one of the best Remedies against this, is the Study of Philosophy, and a Skill in Nature, which will be apt io beget in Men a Veneration for the God of Nature. And therefore to those Nations who have been destitute of Revelation, the same Persons have been both their Philosophers and their Priests; those who had most Skill in one kind of Knowledge, being thought most fit to instruct and direct Men in the other. And if we confult the Stories of other Places and Times, we shall constantly find those

Chap. 16. of Natural Religion.

those Nations most solemn and devout in their Worship, who have been most civilized and most philosophical. And, on the contrary, those other Nations in America and Africa, whom Navigators report to be most destitute of Religion, are withal most brutish and barbarous as to other Arts and Knowledge.

207

It cannot be denied indeed, but that a flight superficial Knowledge of things, will render a Man obnoxious either to Superstition, or to Atheistical Thoughts; especially if join'd with a proud Mind and vicious Inclinations. He that hath made fome little progress in natural Enquiries, and gotten fome smattering in the Phrases of any Theory, whereby (as he conceives) he can folve fome of the common Phanomena, may be apt to think, that all the reft will prove as eafy as his first Beginning seems to be; and that he shall be able to give an Account of all things: But they that penetrate more deeply into the Nature of Things, and do not look upon fecond Causes, as being fingle and scatter'd, but upon the whole Chain of them, as linked together, will in the plainest Things, fuch as are counted most obvious, acknowledge their own Ignorance, and a Divine Power; and so become more modelt and humble in their Thoughts and Carriage. Such inquisitive Persons will easily discern, (as a noble Author hath well expressed it) that

Of the Principles, &c. Lib. I. that the higheft Link of Nature's Chain is

fastened to Jupiter's Chair.

This (notwithstanding it be a Digression) I thought fit to fay, by way of Vindication and Answer to those Prejudices, which some Men have raised against human Learning and the Study of Philosophy, as if this were apt to dispose Men unto Atheistical Principles and Practices. Whereas a sober Enquiry into the Nature of things, a diligent Perusal of this Volume of the World, doth of itself naturally tend to make Men regular in their Minds and Conversations, and to keep them off from those two Opposites of Religion, Superstition and Prophaneness.

CHAP.

CHAP. XVII.

Of Paffive Obedience, or Patience and Submission to the Will of God.

THus much may suffice concerning the Nature and Duty of Active Obedia ence:

I proceed to that of *Palfive* Obedience; or patient Submission under the afflicting hand of God.

And tho' this may feem one of the most difficult of all other Duties, and most repugnant to human Nature; yet is there no Subject more excellently discussed by the Heathen Moralists, and wherein they seem more to exceed themselves, than this.

I shall mention out of them some of those Passages, which seem to me most apposite and material to this purpose, under these sour *Heads*, which contain the several Arguments to this Duty; viz.

- 1. Such as refer to God, by whole Providence all our Sufferings are procured, or permitted.
- 2. Such as concern our felves.
- 3. Such as may be derived from the nature of Affliction.

P

4. And

200

Of the Principles, &c. Lib. I. 4. And lastly, such as refer to this Grace of Patience.

1. There are many Arguments to convince us of the Reafonableness of this Duty, from the Nature and Attributes of God, who either sends Afflictions, or permits them to fall upon us. I shall rank them under these three Heads. 1. His infinite Knowledge and Wisdom. 2. His Goodness and Patience towards us. 3. His Power and Dominion over us.

1. From the Confideration of his infinite Knowledge and Wisdom, whereby he takes notice of, and doth concern himself about every particular Event in the World, making all things beautiful, and in their time, difposing of all to the best: which is an Argument, that divers of the Heathen Philosophers do very largely infift upon; particu-Lib. 6. 39. larly Antoninus, who hath this Passage : " If " God (faith he) do not take particular no-" tice of, and care for me and my Affairs, why do I at any time pray to him? And 66 if he doth exercife a special Providence 66 towards all Events, no doubt but he doth 66 •• confult well and wifely about them; " nor would he fuffer any Hurt or Pre-" judice to befal me, unless it were for a greater Good upon fome other account; 66 " and in this I ought to acquiesce." And

Lib. 8.23 in another Place, faith the fame Author, " I " refer Chap. 17. of Natural Religion. " refer every thing that befalls me to God,

" as the Contriver of it, by whom all Events are disposed in a wife Order."

211

There are also many great and excellent Sayings in Epictetus to this purpose. " That Lib.4.c. 73 " must needs be much more desirable, which " is chosen by the Wildom of God, than " that which I chuse." A Reluctancy against the Divine Will, is the Ground of all Irreligion and Atheifm in the World. "Why Lib. i. e. " may not a Man refuse to obey God in 22. " what he commands; as well as to fubmit " to him in what he inflicts? And then " what ground can there be for any Pre-" tence to Religion? We should all (faith " be) conform our Minds to the Will of " Providence, and most willingly follow " whither ever he shall lead us, as knowing " it to proceed from the best and wisest "Contrivance. I do in my Judgment more Enchirid." " confent to that which God would have, " than to that which my own Inclinations " lead unto. I would desire, and will just Dister.3.7. " fo, and no otherwise than as e doth." And in another Place, " Use me as thou -2. 26. " pleasest, I do fully consent, and submit to " it, and shall refuse nothing which shall " feem good unto thee. Lead me whither " ever thou wilt; put me into what Condi-« tion thou pleasest; must I be in a private, " not in a publick Station; in Poverty, not " in Wealth? 'Eye' ເພ ລົກ ລົກ ລົກ ເພ່າ Terw ares P 2 (1799

Of the Principles, &c. Lib. I.

" τές ανθρώπες απολογήσομαι, I will not only " consent to it, but make it my Business to cc apologize for it, to justify and maintain ćć before all Men, fuch thy Dealing with me to be most fitting and prudent, most suit*cc* able and advantageous to my Condition." 66

And befides the Reafons to this purpofe from natural Light, which are fo excellently improved and urged by fome of the Philosophers, there are likewife feveral Attestations of this nature in Scripture, wherein God is Pfal. 119. said to afflict out of faithfulnefs: To be wife in counsel, and excellent in working ; fignifying all the Works of his Providence to be most excellent, because they proceed from the wifest Counsel.

> And tho' some particular Dispensations may seem unto us to be difficult and obscure, His judgments being unsearchable, and his ways past finding out; yet we may be most fure, that there is an excellent Contrivance in all of them. Though clouds and darkness may be round about him, yet righteousness and judgment are the habitation of his throne.

And besides the more general Assertions, which the Scripture doth frequently mention to this purpose, it doth likewise more particularly infift upon those special Reasons and Ends, whereby the Wildom of fuch Dilpen-Heb. 12. sations are to be justified; as namely, To make us partakers of God's holiness; to work

in

75.

II.

212

Chap. 17. of Natural Religion.

in us the peaceable fruits of Righteoufness; to fave us from being condemned with the 1 Co:. 11. world; to preserve in us a holy Awe and³². Reverence. They have no changes, therefore they fear not God, Pfal. 55. 19. To quicken our relish of those Mercies which we enjoy, and our Thankfulness for them; to wean our Affections from the things of this World; to prevent the Surfeits of Prosperity; to enlarge our Experience; to contract such a kind of Hardiness and Courage as may become a militant State; to keep up in our Minds a continual Sense of our dependent Condition; which are some of the principal Things wherein our Happiness doth confift.

213

To which may be added, that the Scripture doth likewise contain several express Promises, to assure us of the Benefit and Advantage to be had by the Croffes that befall us. That all things in the issue shall work together for our good, Rom. 8. 28. So that there is not a Trouble or Affliction that we meet with, which we could be without, but it hath its necessary Place and Work, in that Frame and Defign of Events, which the Providence of God hath ordained, for the bringing of us to Happiness. And tho' all of them may for the present seem grievous, and some of them perhaps not suitable to the divine Goodness and Promises; yet P of 3

б.

Of the Principles, &c. Lib. I.

of this we may be most assured, that all the Pf. 25. 10. ways of the Lord, are mercy and truth, to fuch as keep his covenant, and his testimonies. And there are few Persons who have been observant of God's Dealings towards them, but are able to fay from their own Experience, that it is good for them, that they have been afflicted.

2. A fecond Argument to this purpofe, is from the Confideration of God's Goodness and Patience towards us. I have shewed before from several Acknowledgments of the Heathen, what Apprehensions they had of the Divine Goodness and Forbearance towards Sinners, from whence 'tis easy to infer the Equity and Reafonablenefs of our patient Submission under his afflicting Hand. Exod. 34. He is merciful and gracious, long-suffering, abundant in goodness and truth. The Apo-Rom. 2.4. ftle speaks of the riches of his goodness, and forbearance, and long-suffering. He doth indulge us in our Failings and Infirmities, with fuch a kind of Tenderness, as Nurses use to their young Children. Now there is all imaginable Equity in this Consequence, that if he bear with us, in what we cannot lawfully do, that we fhould bear with him, in doing what he will with his own. If he be patient towards us in our finning against him, when we oppose and provoke him, 'tis but reason that we should be patient in our SufferChap. 17. of Natural Religion. 215 Sufferings from him, when he endeavours to heal and reclaim us.

It is of the Lord's mercies that we are Lam. 3. not confumed, and because his compassions²². fail not. 'Tis a great Argument of Favour and Tenderness, that God is pleased to spare us in the midst of our Provocations. 'Twere but justice if he should fuddenly snatch us out of this Life, and cast us into Hell: If he doth abate any thing of this, he doth then punish us less than our iniquities deserve, and we have more Reason to praise him, than to complain against him: For he hath not dealt with us after our sins, nor rewarded us according to our iniquities.

He that confiders the Mercies he enjoys, as well as the Evils he fuffers, and will impartially compare them both together, may find that though his afflictions do abound, 2 Cor. 1, yet his confolations do much more abound;5. and that upon the whole Matter, when his Condition is at the worft, 'tis much better than what he himfelf deferves, or what many others enjoy.

They that are fensible of every thing they enjoy, as being the free Gift of God, will not murmur against him, when he is pleased to refume any thing from them. There must needs be much unreasonableness and want of Equity in that Disposition, which cannot bear with some Sufferings from that Hand, from which we receive all our En-P 4 joyments.

Of the Principles, &c. Lib. I.

216 Job 2. 10. joyments. Shall we receive good at the hand of God, and shall we not receive evil?

The Evils we fuffer are much fhort of our defert; the Good we enjoy is much beyond our deserts. And therefore upon either account, it must be highly unreasonable for a Man to be guilty of Impatience, and Mur-muring. Iniquus est qui muneris sui arbi-Ad Polyb.trium danti non relinquit, faith Seneca; ¢. 29. " That Man must needs be unjust and une-" qual, who doth not think fit to leave the "Giver unto the Liberty of his own Gift, " to refume it again when he pleafeth." And fuch an one may justly be reputed greedy, who is more sensible of Loss in the restoring of a thing, than of Gain in the Enjoyment of it. He is an ingrateful Wretch,

who complains of that as an Injury, which is but Restitution of what was freely lent. And he is a Fool, who knows not how to receive Benefit by good Things, any otherwise than by the present Fruition of them.

Differt.

So Epictetus speaking concerning the un-1. 3. c. 26. reasonableness of murmuring at any cross Events, he hath this Passage, Ti in Sewpara; "What Reason have I to fight against God? "Why should I desire things not desirable? "He that gave, hath Power to take, and why " should I result? This would not only be " great Folly, to oppose one that is much " ftronger, but great Injustice likewise, to fight against a Benefactor. You have re-" ceived

Chap. 17. of Natural Religion.

" ceived all that you have, and your own " very Being from him, and why fhould " you take it fo heinoufly, if he is pleafed " to refume fomething back again?"

217

3. The Confideration of the Divine power and dominion over us, must needs engage us to a quiet Submission under his Hand. There are many excellent Difcourses to this purpose amongst the Heathen Philosophers, as particularly in Seneca: "There is no-" thing (faith he) more defirable, than for a " Man to arrive unto this Temper of Mind, " to be able in all Troubles and Afflictions, " to quiet himself with this Thought, Diis " aliter visum est; God thinks not fit to " have it fo, and therefore I ought to be " content." Which is the fame Senfe with that in the Scripture, It is the Lord Jeho- 1 Sam. 3. vah; let him do what seemeth good unto 18. him. I was dumb, and opened not my mouth, because thou didst it.

" In all those Conditions which seem hard " and grievous to me (faith the same Author) Epist. 96. " I do thus dispose my self; I confider they " come from God." Et non pareo Deo, sed assentior; ex animo illum, non quia necesse est, 'sequor: " And I do endeavour not meer-" ly to submit, but to assent to him in his " Dealings; not to follow him only out of. " Necessity, but out of Choice." And in another place giving Counsel to such as were in Epist. 107. an afflicted Estate, he thus adviseth, Quacunque Of the Principles, &c. Lib. I.

cunque fiunt, debuisse fieri putet, nec velit objurgare naturam: Optimum est pati quod emendare non poss, & Deum (quo autore cuncta proveniunt) sine murmuratione comitari: " Let such a Man think that nothing " comes to pass, but what ought to be; and " let him not take upon him to reprehend " Providence: 'Tis best for a Man to bear " what he cannot mend, and to follow God " (by whom all Events are disposed) with-" out murmuring." Let us (*faith he*) bespeak God as Cleanthes did,

218

Duc me parens, celsique dominator poli, Quocunque placuit, nulla parendi mora est. Assum impiger; Fac nolle, comitabor (gemens, Malusque patiar, quod pati licuit bono.

"Let the great Governour of the World lead me into what Condition he pleafeth, I am moft ready to follow him; or fuppofe I fhould find a Reluctancy against his Dealings with me; yet I will still follow him, tho' it be fighing, and fuffer that as an evil and wretched Man, which I ought to bear as a good Man, with Patience and Submisfion." And a little after, Sic vivamus, fic loquamur — Hic est magnus animus qui se Deo tradidit; & contra, ille pusillus ac degener, qui obluctatur, & de ordine mundi malè existimat, & emendare mavult Deos quam se. "It Chap. 17. of Natural Religion.

219

" It becomes Men both to speak and live up " to this Principle. He only is a truly ge-" nerous Man, who doth thus refign up him-" felf to God; and on the contrary, he is a " little Wretch of a degenerate Mind, who " ftruggles against him, having a hard Opi-" nion of the Government of the World, " and thinks it fitter to mend God than him-" felf." Where is there any thing amongst those who profess Christianity better and more becomingly faid to this Purpose? Or how can the Wit of Man frame any Senfe or Words, that do more fully express this Self-refignation and Submiffion to the Providence of God, than is done in these excellent Speeches of a Heathen Philosopher?

Epictetus likewise, speaking concerning the reasonableness and fitness of Mens resigning themselves up to God's Disposal, hath this Paffage, Quis vero es tu? aut unde venisti? aut quare? " Do you confider what " you are, and whence you came, and upon " what Business? Did not he give you a Be-" ing in the World? Endow you with fuch " a Nature? Put you into fuch a Condition " wherein you fhould be fubject to his Go-" vernment and Disposal? Did not he ap-" point the Time, and Place, and Part you " are to act upon the Theatre of this World? " And this is properly your Business, to ap-" ply your self to the fittest Means of ref presenting the Part allotted to you, not to " take

Of the Principles, &c. Lib. I,

220

" take upon you to murmur or repine a-Enchirid. " gainst it." Hoc tuum est, datam per sonam cap. 23. bene effingere; eam autem eligere alterius, " It doth not belong to us to chuse our parts, " but to act them. Would it not better be-" come us to go off the Stage with Adora-" tions and Praises of him, for so much as " he hath permitted us to hear and fee, ra-" ther than mutinying against him, because " we had no more?" And in another Place, he suggests this Consideration; "That our Differt. Lib.3.cap." Condition, whilft we are in this World, " is militant, wherein every one is without 24. " Reluctancy to submit to the Orders of " his great Captain or General, in what-« ever he shall appoint; whether or no it be " to dig in the Trenches, or fland upon the "Watch, or to fight. Every Man cannot " be a Commander; and a common Sol-" dier is to obey, not to dispute or offer " Counsel. If thou mayest refuse the Con-" dition or Work affigned thee, why may " not another do fo; and according to this, " what Order could there be in the World? To the fame purpose Antoninus: " That Lib. 10. cap. 25. " Man (faith he) is to be effeemed a Fugi-" tive and an Apostate, who runs away from " his Master. Now the great Lawgiver who " governs the World, is our common Master " and Ruler, and his Will is the only Law " we are to fubmit unto. And therefore " for a Man to be angry or grieved, be-" caufe

Chap. 17. of Natural Religion.

" caufe things fall not out according to his "Will, what is this but revolting from him, " and declaring Enmity against him?"

Besides these Testimonics from some of the wifer Heathens, the Scripture likewife doth abound in several Attestations to this purpose, as particularly that in Job 34. 31. Surely it is meet to be said unto God, I have born chastifement, I will not offend any more; that which I see not, teach thou me; if I have done iniquity, I will do so no more. And chap. 33. 12, 13. God is greater than man, why dost thou strive against him? He gives not account of any of his matters. As if he had faid, that Man doth strangely forget his Condition, who by his murmuring and repining doth think to call God to an account; why, he is the supreme Lord of all, and may do whatever he pleaseth. Should not the Potter have power over the Clay? There is no Man but must think it just that the Potter should dispose of his Clay as he pleaseth, giving it such a Shape, and designing it to fuch a Use as he shall think meet. And can any one judge it reasonable, that God should have less Power over us, than we have over the Works of our hands? Behold, O Lord, thou art our Father, we are the Clay, and thou art the Potter. - Wo to him that Stri-Ifa. 64. 8. veth with his Maker; Let the Potsherd strive with the Potsherds of the earth: shall the Clay say to him that fashioneth it, what

Of the Principles, &c. Lib. I.

what makest thou? or thy work, He hath no hands? Ifa. 45.9. This Sin of Impatience and Murmuring, is here ftyled striving against God; contesting with his Wildom and his Power, faying to him, What makest thou, which reflects upon his Wisdom; and he hath no hands, which reflects upon his Power, as if he were not able extremam apponere manum, to finish what he had begun; both which are not only high Affronts to the Divine Nature, but exceeding foolifh and mischievous in the Consequence of them. The mutual Contention of Men amongst themselves, testæ cum testis, one Potsheard with another, may prove fatal to them: If two earthen Veffels dash together, they can get nothing by it, they may both be broken; but for the Clay to strive with the Potter, that is so foolish and so unequal a Contention, as nothing can be more, and must needs expose it to the worst of Dangers. Murmurers are in the Scripture-phrase styled Children of rebellion, Numb. 17. 10. Because they that speak against God, would actually refift him likewife if they could.

If we receive all that we are or have, our Beings and our Well-beings from God, nothing can be more evident, than that he may juftly refume any thing again, or inflict upon us any evil, that is either fhort of, or but equal unto, the Good he hath beftowed upon us.

Thus

Chap. 17. of Natural Religion.

Thus much shall serve for the first kind of Arguments, referring to the Divine Nature and Attributes.

2. I proceed to the fecond fort of Arguments to this purpofe, from the Confideration of ourfelves; which I shall treat of in these three Particulars. 1. We are Men. 2. We are Sinners. 3. We are living Men. Upon each of which Grounds it will appear a very unreasonable thing, that we should murmur and complain against God. The Prophet hath put these three Considerations together, Why doth a living Man complain, a Man Lam.3.39: for the Punishment of his Sin?

1. We are Men, which is a Mercy far above any temporal Affliction that we can fuffer. God might have made us Worms instead of Men, such despicable Creatures as are below common Notice. Whereas in being Men, we are become Lords of Heaven and Earth, having an Excellency above all other Creatures that ever God made, excepting the Angels. And is it not a shame for fuch an one, to be a Slave to every flight Trouble? that any light Affliction, which is but for a Moment, should make our Souls, which are *immortal*, to bow down under it? Should not the Nobility of our Natures advance us to a more generous Temper, and make us erect and chearful under fuch Troubles? See how David was affected with this Thought; Lord! what is Man that thou art Pfal. 8. 4. mindful

13.

Of the Principles, &c. Lib. I. mindful of him, or the Son of Man that thou visitests him? 'Tis a Mercy and a Condescension to be admired, that God doth so much as take notice of us, though with his Chastisements, and therefore ought not to be the Ground of our Complaint. He might fuffer us to go on fecurely in our Sins, without any Restraint. We do not think ourfelves concerned to take notice of every little Fly or Insect, or the poor Worms under our Feet. And therefore, when he shall take fuch special Care of us, as to restrain us in our Wanderings, to administer Physick to us in our Diseases, we ought, upon this account, rather humbly to thank and admire him, than to murmur against him.

Again, we are but Men; Creatures of a dependent Being, not Lords of our own Happinels. And who art thou, O Man! that repliest against God? How vile and despicable in comparison to him, and how unfit to judge of his Ways? It is the common Condition of Humanity, to be exposed Job 5. 7. to Sufferings. For Man is born to troubles as the sparks fly apwards; that is, by a 1 Cor. 10. natural unavoidable Necessity. And there is no Temptation or Trouble that befals us, but what is common to men. We are born into, and must live in a troublesome tumultuous World, where,

Luctus;

Chap. 17. of Natural Religion.

Luctus, & ultrices posuere cubilia cura, Pallentésque habitant morbi; tristique (senectus.

"Which is the proper Place of Grief, " and Care and Diseases, and the Infirmities " of Age;" and therefore we cannot expect a total Exemption from these Things. Om-Sen. Ep. nia ista in longà vità sunt, quomodo in 96. longà vità, & pulvis, & lutum, & pluvia. " These things in a long Life, are like Dust, " and Dirt, and Rain in a long Journey;" which it were a vain Thing for a Man to think he could wholly avoid, but that he must some time or other have his Share of them. Now Men usually vex and repine at that which is extraordinary and unufual, not at that which is general and common to all.

2. We are Sinners, and fo Afflictions are our Wages, our Due; and there is no reasonable Man that will repine at just and equal Dealing; there is a special Emphasis to this Purpose in the very Phrase of that Text forecited; A Man for the Punishment of his Sins : implying, that if he be but a Man, if he have but rational Principles, he must needs acknowledge the Equity of being punished for Sin. The Thief upon the Crofs had fo Luke 23. much ingenuity, as to confess it reasona-41. ble, that both he and his Fellow should fubmit

Q

225

Of the Principles, &cc. Lib. I.

mit to just Punishment. Now the Apostle tells us, that every Man is by a natural Con-

Rom. 3. viction concluded under Sin, for this very Rea-19.

- ion, that every Mouth may be stopped, and that God may be justified in his saying, and ver. 4. clear when he judgeth. One chief Reason
- Ezek. 18. which makes Men apt to complain, that God's 25.

ways are unequal, is because they do not confider that their own are so. It is the Pride and Folly of our Natures, as to afcribe all the Good we enjoy to our own Endeavours and Merit, fo to murmur and complain against God for the Evil we suffer ; than which nothing can be more false and unequal. The

- 3.

31.

39.

Prov. 19. wife Man hath observed it, that the foolishness of Man perverteth his Ways, and his Heart fretteth against the Lord. We first run our felves into Mifchief, and then complain against God; whereas according to common Reason, the Blame should be where the Fault is. It would be a much more befitting Temper, to demean ourselves upon this Confideration, as Elibu advises; Surely it is meet Job 34. to be said unto God, I have born chastisement, I will not offend any more, &c. And upon this Ground it is, that the Prophet having in one Verfe, in the fore-cited Place, diffuaded from Murmuring and Complaints, he doth in the very next Verse, exhort to Self-Examination, Let us search and try our Iam. 3. Ways: implying, that he who rightly understands his own Sinfulnefs, will find little

Reason to repine at his Sufferings.

3.

Chap. 17. of Natural Religion.

3. We are living Men, whereas the Wages of Sin is Death; all the Plagues that we are capable of, either in this or the other World, being but the due Reward of Sin. And we have no Reason to repine at kind and moderated Corrections. He might have struck us dead in the Act of fome Sin, and fo have put us out of a possibility of Happiness. It was David's Comfort, that though the Lord had Pfal. 118. chastened him fore, yet he had not given him 18. over to Death: And the Advantage, which he enjoyed in this Respect, did abundantly silence him against any Complaints in regard of the other. It is of the Lord's Mercies Lam. z. that we are not confumed; because his Com. 22. passions fail not. The Words are very emphatical, Mercies in the Plural, for the Number, intimating a Multitude of Favours in this one Act of his Forbearance. And 'tis Compassions or Bowels for the Nature of them, which signifies tender affectionate Mercy.

3. From the Confideration of Afflictions, which in themfelves are neither good nor evil, but *fecundum modum recipientis*, according to the Disposition of the Subject. To wicked Men they may prove Curses and Judgments, Testimonies of God's Hatred and Anger. But to others they may upon these two Accounts prove Benefits; from their

> Indication, what they fignify. End, what they effect.

> > Q 2

i. From

227

Of the Principles, &c. Lib. I.

1. From the Indication of them, what they denote and fignify; not God's Hatred of us, but his special Care towards us. They may be Testimonies or Earnests of God's Fa-Heb. 12. VOUR, for whom he loves he rebukes and cha-5. stens, even as a father a son in whom he Rev. 3. 19. delighteth. Blessed is the man whom thou Prov. 3.12. chasteneth, O Lord. Ye are the Children of God (faith Seneca) and therefore, ficut severus pater duriùs educat, he carries a stricter hand over you, as having a special regard to your Welfare, that you may not miscarry; 1 Cor. 11. Or, as the Apostle expresseth it, that you may not be condemned with the world. The Ho-32. ly Ghoft effeems Afflictions to be a special Pri-Acts 9.15. vilege. Speaking of St. Paul's being a chosen veffel, to bear his name before the Gentiles and Kings, in the next Verse it is reckoned up as another Privilege, that he should suffer many things for his name sake. And therefore the fame bleffed Apostle speaks of Affli-Phil. 1.29. Etions as a Gift; To you 'tis given, not only to believe on him, but alfo to suffer for his Heb. 12.8. Sake. If ye are without afflictions, then are ye bastards, and not sons. 'Tisreckon'd upon Luk. 16. as a Curfe to have our good things in this life. And that was one of God's feverest 25. Punishments, which he threatens to those, Hof. 4. 14. that he will not punish them for their Pfal. 73.5. Whoredoms and Adulteries. Not to be troubled like other Men, may be a fign of Neglect and Disfavour. 'Tis necessary to our Conditions

tions in this World; and God doth afflift his own Children out of faithfulness. He hath Pfal. 119. so appointed, that the way to the heavenly 75. Canaan shall be through the Wilderness.

2. From the End of them, what they are defigned for and effect, namely, our Profit and Improvement; being intended either for our Correction or Probation, for our Amendment or Trial, as I have shewed before.

4. This Virtue of Patience and Submission is highly reasonable, upon account of those Advantages, which do follow fuch a Temper of Mind.

1. It keeps our Happiness in our own power, by bringing our Minds to our Conditions, which is the only remedy things are capable of, when we cannot bring our Conditions to our Minds. Hanc rerum conditio-Sen. Ep. nem mutare non possumus; id possumus, mag-107. num sumere animum, & viro bono dignum, quo fortiter fortuita patiamur. " It is not " in our power to change our Condition ; " but this is in our power, to attain unto " fuch a greatness of Mind, as becomes wor-" thy Men, whereby we may be lifted up " above the hurt of outward Croffes." If a Man would be fure never to meet with any Impediment in the thing he defires, never to be forced to any thing against his Will, his only way is to conform his Mind to the Will of God, and to let him do with us what Differt. seemeth good unto him. " If he would have 1. 3. c. 26. 66

 Q_3

me

Of the Principles, &c. Lib. I.

230 Diff. 1. 3. 40

cap. 26.

ç. 16.

me (saith Epictetus) to be fick or poor, I 66 will be willing to be fo; whatever Em-" ployment he will design for me, I will not " decline; and whatever he would not have " me be or do, I will be against it likewife."

2. It will be a means to promote our Peace, Comfort, Quiet, and to alleviate our Troubles, and make our Yoke more caly. Ducunt volentem fata, nolentem trabunt. The ftruggling with our Yoke will but make it gall us so much the more; 'twill be a greater Ease for us to follow it willingly, and to be led by it, rather than to be dragged along with Seneca de it. Nullum tam arctum est jugum quod non Ira. lib. 3. minus lædat ducentem qu'am repugnantem. Unum est levamentum malorum ingentium, pati, & necessitatibus suis obsequi. " There " is no Yoke fo streight and hurtful in itfelf, " but will prove more hurtful for our ftrug-" glings with it. The only Allay under great " Sufferings, is to bear them quietly, and " obey Neceffity, to fubmit to what we can-" not remedy." It may be in the power of others to diffurb our outward Conditions, but it fhould be in our power, that they thould not difturb our Minds. And fo long as we can preferve our Tranquillity there, we may be faid to be truly happy.

> An impatient Man is in the Scripture Phrase, compared to a wild Bull in a Net, being full of the fury of the Lord, Ifa. 51.20. As that fierce Creature, being muzled in the Huntle

231

Huntsman's Toil, doth by all his Struggling but farther intangle himfelf; so do Men increase their own Perplexities, by their Impatience under them. There is no one thing wherein the Folly of Men doth more appear than that foolifh Exchange which they make of their inward Quiet and Peace, for outward Trifles; both as to their Impatience under the Things they fuffer, and their impetuous Desires after the Things they want. Ex eo Ep. 42. stupor noster apparet (saith Seneca) quod ea sola putamus emi, pro quibus pecuniam solvimus, ea gratuita vocamus, pro quibus nos ipsos impendimus. " Herein appears the " Stupidnefs of Men, that they effeem those " Things only to be bought, for which they " pay Money; but count fuch Things of " Free-coft, for which they pay themselves; their inward Quiet and Tranquillity, which is far more to be valued than their outward Possefions. Whereas if they were but as wife in this kind of Merchandize, as in others, they would confider the just Rate and Value of every thing, and pay no more for it, either in the Purchase of it, or parting with it, than it is really worth.

3. Tis very much for our Honour and Reputation, to bear Afflictions decently.
" Take away from a good Man (faith Maxi" mus Tyrius) the Honour of his Suffer" ings, ½ ἀπος εφανείς ½ ἀποκερυπίες, and you
" rob him of his Crown, you hide and Q 4 " obfcure

Of the Principles, &c. Lib. I.

Sen. Ep.

41.

232

" obscure his Glory." Si hominem videris, interritum periculis, inter adversa felicem, in mediis tempestatibus placidum, ex superiore loco homines videntem, ex æquo Deos, non subit te veneratioejus, &c? " If thou " feest a Man undaunted in the midst of " Danger, happy in Adversity, placid and " serene in a Tempest, placid in a Station " equal with the Gods, whence he looks " down upon other Men, as being in a " Vale below him; art thou not prefently " poffeft with a high Reverence and Venera-" tion for fuch a Perfon?" And in another place (saith the same Author,) Quam venerationem præceptoribus meis debeo, eandem illis præceptoribus generis humani. Speaking of fuch Persons, faith he, " Such Vene-" ration as I owe to my Master and Tutor, " fuch and much more ought I to pay to " these Teachers of Mankind, who set them " fuch excellent Lessons for their Imita-" tion."

job. 2.

Ep. 54.

God himself, upon this account, seems (as it were) to glory and to triumph over the Devil, in the behalf of Job: Seeft thou my fervant Job, that there is none like him upon earth. 'Twas an high Elogium, and tended much to his Honour. And the Apostle tells I Pet. 4. us elsewhere, that a meek and a patient spirit is with God of great price. The spirit of glory and of God resteth upon such as endure Sufferings. Men think to set out them

themfelves, and to get Repute amongst others, by their Haughtiness, looking upon every little Injury as a high Indignity; but of fuch a Frame of Mind, it may be truly faid, non est magnitudo, tumor est; it is not Greatness, but a swelling of Mind. It shews a Narrow-ness and Littleness of Soul, Invalidum omne naturâ querulum. "The more weak " any thing is, the more apt to complain." Whereas, on the other fide, Patience doth enlarge the Minds of Men, and raise their Efteem, making them triumphant without fighting. The Heathen and their Idolatries were heretofore subdued, non à repugnantibus, sed à morientibus Christianis, as St. Austin speaks; Not by the Resistance, but by the patient Sufferings of the dying Christians. So mightily did this Grace conduce in the primitive Times, to the spreading and propagation of Christianity through the Heathen World.

But are all Complaints then in Affliction unlawful? To this I answer,

1. Natural Expressions of Grief are allowable. A Man must be sensible of his Sufferings, and consequently cannot but grieve under them. That Stupor and Benumbedness of Spirit, whereby Men are made unapprehensive of their Afflictions, is in itself both a great Sin, and a great Judgment.

2. But then these Expressions of our Grief must be rightly qualified with their due Circumstances. 1. They

Of the Principles, &c. Lib. I.

1. They must not be *disproportionable* to the Occasion. A great Complaint for a little Cross, like Jonah's Trouble for his Gourd.

2. Not unfitting for the Manner; not accompanied with bitter Invectives against fecond Causes and Instruments; they should rather express our Humility, than our Anger.

3. They must not be *immoderate* for the Degree; as if we were without Hope, like David's passionate Complaints for the Death of his Son Absalom.

4. They must not be *finful* for the Nature of them, blaming God's Justice, and reviling his Providence.

And now that I have fo abundantly fhewed the Reafonableness of this Virtue of *Patience* and *Submiffion*, I am still sensible how hardly Men are brought to it, when there is real occasion for the Practice of it; and therefore I think it may be of great use to add some *Directions*, which may help to prevent, or at least abate our Impatience under Afflictions, and to promote this submissive Temper and Disposition. And accordingly they shall be of two forts, some Negative, others Positive.

I begin with the Negative.

1. Take heed of aggravating Afflictions beyond their due Proportions. Do not fix your Eye or your Thoughts chiefly upon the Smart of them, without regarding the Benefit of them. 'Tis true indeed (as the Apostie

235

Apostle tells us) No affliction is joyous for Heb. 12. the time, but grievous, nevertheless after-". wards it yieldeth the peaceable fruit of righteousness, to them that are exercised thereby. 'Twere an unreasonable thing, and an Argument of great Frowardness, for a Patient to mind only the Bitterness of his Potion, the Corrofiveness of his Plaister, without having any regard to the Remedy and the Health, which may be procured by them. For a Man always to have his Hand upon his Sore, will increase the Pain, and hinder the Cure of it. To infift upon every particular Circumstance, whereby Men may aggravate their Afflictions, is the ready Means to add Fuel to their Impatience, and to drive them to Defpondency. This is a fure way to bring upon ourselves much needless Trouble. 'Tis all one as if a Man fhould chew the Pills, which ought to be fwallowed whole; which will make us more fick, and thereby rather hinder the due Operation of them than promote it.

2. Beware of refufing Comfort, or rejecting the Means that are afforded us for our Relief and Support, under the Troubles that befall us. This were to take part with our Difeafe against ourselves, to refuse the Phyfick, and to pull off the Plaisser that should heal us; which argues much Frowardness, besides the Folly and Ingratitude of rejecting the confolations of God, as if they were but Job 15. Small to us, as Eliphaz speaks. Whatever 11. Our Of the Principles, &c. Lib. I.

our Losses or Disappointments are, he can be ten times better to us, than those Things are, by the Loss of which, we are provoked to Discontent and Murmuring.

3. Do not give liberty to Passions; which, of all other things belonging to the Soul, are most impetuous and unruly, if not restrained within fitting Bounds. The sensitive Appetite (to which the Paffions belong) is the inferior and brutish part of the Soul, answerable to the Dregs of the Pcople in a political Government, of themselves apt to be heady, tumultuous, rash, mutinous; if not reftrained by fome fuperior Power : So is it with the Passions of the Soul, which therefore ought to be watched over with great Circumspection ; and the rather, because they have ufually the Empire over us, during our younger Years, before Reason comes to exercise its Sovereignty: And if once we give way to them, 'twill be a Business of no small difficulty to reduce them into Order again.

Those very Thoughts which occasion much Discontent and Trouble to the Soul, whilst they lie in the Breast in a Huddle and Confusion, if they be but distinctly confidered, and coolly debated, will seem much less, if not vanish into nothing. 'Tis the Nature of Disorder, to make Things appear more than indeed they are. Which is one Reason that *Philosophers* give, why the Stars feem

feem innumerable; because they are commonly looked upon, as being wildly fcatter'd up and down, out of all regular Form. 'Tis fo likewise with Mens inward Discontents, which are exceedingly multiplied by the Confusion of them; and would appear much lefs, if but diffinctly reduced and examined. Most of those which occasion much perplexity, whilst they are mixed with many others in a Croud, would upon a clear View and severe Examination, appear much less confiderable: And that's another good Means for the preferving of our Minds from this Impatience; to put a stop to our Passions in the beginning of their Course, before they be in their full Career, and then grow too hard for us.

4. Do not chiefly regard the Inftruments of your Troubles, which will be apt to provoke Impatience and Diftemper; but rather the fupreme Difpofer of them. Tho' Men may deal very unworthily with us, yet God is juft in all his Ways. This was that which fatisfied old *Eli*, *It is the Lord*, *let* 1 Sam. 3. *him do what feemeth him good*. Tho' the ¹⁸. *Sabæans* had fpoil'd *Job* of his Oxen and Job 1. 15. Affes, and the *Chaldeans* plundered him of ^{17.} his *Camels*; yet we find no Complaints againft them: he takes notice only of God as the Author of his Sufferings. The Lord gives, and the Lord takes away, and therefore bleffed be the Name of the Lord. 'Tis worth

Of the Principles, &c. Lib. I.

worth your notice to observe the strange Vatiety of David's Carriage, according as he was either mindful or forgetful of this Confideration. How meek and humble upon 2 Sam. 15. the Rebellion of Abfalom : If the Lord shall fay I have no delight in thee; behold here I 26. am, let him do to me as seemeth good unto him. And so in the next Chapter, when ver. 10. Shimei did fo bitterly revile him, that which pacified all impatient revengeful Thoughts, was this Confideration, The Lord hath bid Shimei curse. Whereas at another time, when he was not fo careful to fix his Thoughts upon this, how strangely is his Carriage altered ? How furious at the Churlishness of 1 Sam. 25. Nabal? How passionate at the Death of Ab-22. *Salom?* Such great power is there in this one Meditation, if seriously fixed upon, to sub-33. due the natural Rage and Diftemper of our When he looks upon God, he fub-Hearts. mits and is filent. I was dumb and opened Pfal. 39. not my mouth, because thou didst it. But when he confiders the Instruments, his Heart begins to rife, and his Paffions to tumultuate and ferment into a Storm.

5. Take heed of engaging your Defires upon these transient perishable things. Learn to estimate every thing, according to its just Rate and Value; and this will be a Means to work in us weaned Affections from the World. They that love too much, must grieve too much. If we would weep as not weeping,

239

weeping, we must rejoice as not rejoicing. They that think the greatest Gain to be but fmall, will think the greatest Loss to be fo too. Neminem adversa fortuna comminuit, Sen. Helv. nisi quem secunda decepit. " Those that cap. 5. " are most apt to be deceived and pust up " by the Flatteries of Prosperity, will be most " apt to be dejected by the Frowns of Ad-" verfity." And therefore one of the fureft Ways, to make all Croffes eafy to us, is to have a low Efteem of these temporal Things; for which we shall find reason enough, if we confider the Vanity and Vexation of them. There being a thousand Ways of Fraud and Oppression and Casualties, whereby we may be deprived of their Possession; and as many, whereby they may be render'd useles to us in their Possession; as in the case of Pain and Sickness, either of Body or Mind : And as many, whereby they may be render'd hurtful, and expose us to the Envy of others, to many kind of Temptations unto Sin, and particularly to many kind of Griefs and Vexations upon the account of our Unwillingness to part with them. All which are to be provided against, by our entertaining fuch Thoughts of them, as may be fuitable to their Value.

6. Take heed of being folicitous about the Iffue of Things, and of determining yourfelves too peremptorily to particular Events. 'Tis our Business indeed to serve Providence in

Of the Principles, &c. Lib. I.

in the use of Means, but the Issue of things belongs to God. We have nothing to do with them, and that which is not within our Power, should be out of our Care. Every Man's great End is Happiness. The various Events that befal us in the World. are but several Ways to this End. And therefore 'tis very reasonable and congruous, that every one fhould have a Traveller's Indifferency towards them. A Man upon the Road, who is travelling to fuch a Town, and comes to some doubtful Turnings, is not concerned either for the right or the left-hand Way, hath not an Inclination to one more than the other, any farther than to be directed to that, which is the true Way, and will bring him to his Journey's End. Now that Way, which the Providence of God doth lead us into, must needs be the best and the furest Way to this End.

Lib. 2. c.7.

"Thou foolish Man (saith Epictetus) "dost not thou desire that which may be "most convenient for thee? And can there "be any thing better than what God ap-"points? Do but then confider (saith he) "what is the meaning of being eagerly folicitous about particular Events, diaqle-"peus & xeillud, waeayeus & Cúplertor, thou "dost thereby as much as in thee lies to "corrupt thy Judge, and seduce thy Coun-"fellor; than which there cannot be a "greater Folly." These are the Negative Directions.

I proceed to those that are positive; and, I. Labour for true Apprehensions of the divine Nature and Excellencies; his infinite Power, and Wifdom, and Goodnefs. When our Hearts are once posseft with right Notions, and a due Efteem of these Perfections, they will not be fo apt to break out into murmuring against him. That which Benhadad spake proudly to Ahab; Thy filver 1 Kings and thy gold, thy wives and thy children are^{20.3.} mine: That may God truly fay to us; what hast thou that thou hast not received? And if we have received it, as we have no reason to glory in the Possession, fo neither have we to complain at the Lofs of it, when he that hath lent it us, doth resume it again. It is, or should be our daily Prayer, that God's Will may be done on Earth as it is in Heaven. And it were a most unreasonable thing for Men to murmur at the Grant of their Petitions. 'Twas a notable Saying, which is commonly reported of Luther, when Philip Melanethon was much disquieted in his own Thoughts, at the confused State of things in the first Reformation; Monendus est Philippus, definat effe rector mundi; " MelanEthon " is to be admonished, that he would cease " to take upon him the Government of the "World, as if the Issue of things did be-" long to his Care." God is infinitely wife 1 Cor. 16. and faithful, and will proportion our Suf-13. ferings to our Abilities. He hath promi-

fed

28.

Of the Principles, &c. Lib. I. sed that all things shall work together for Rom. 8. our good.

2. Consider the Mercies you enjoy, as well as the Evils you suffer. That was a most unworthy Temper in Ahab, and in Haman, to receive no Satisfaction in all their great Possessions and Enjoyments, because they were disappointed in some one small Particular. 'Tis the Advice of the Wise man, Eccles. 7. 14. In the day of prosperity rejoice, in the day of adversity consider. But what is that which we fhould confider? Why, that God hath set the one against the other: And fo fhould we too, fet one against another; and then we shall find, that we have as much reason to be patient under our Sufferings, as to rejoice in our Mercies. 'Tis a remarkable Paffage that, concerning Mephi-

1 Sam. 19. bosheth; when Ziba had, by his falle Acculation, cauled the King to confiscate his Goods, and beftow them upon himfelf; this had been enough one would think to provoke Mephibosheth unto high Complaints, both against the Injustice of David, and the Baseness and Unfaithfulness of his Servant Ziba: But fee how he demeans himfelf! I

ver. 27 28. have been flandered unto my Lord the King, but do what is good in thine eyes. Thou haft fet thy fervant among ft them that eat at thine own table, what right therefore have I to cry any more unto the King ? Where he makes the Kindness that David had formerly shewn. him,

him, to weigh down and fatisfy for the Wrong that he then fuffered. And if Men had but fuch a grateful Temper of Spirit, they would not be fo apt to murmur. Those that deferve least, do usually complain most. The most unworthy are the most impatient.

-243

Suppose all manner of Evils and Afflictions, which are now promiscuously scattered up and down in the World, whether they concern Soul or Body; Spiritual Blindness and Obduracy, Poverty, Slavery, Reproach, Sickness, Pain, Maimedness, Deformity, &c. I fay, suppose all these were now to be distributed amongst Mankind, so as every one were to have an equal share of them: Would you be content to stand to this new Distribution ? I suppose there are not many Perfons in this Nation, in fo miserable and forlorn a Condition, that upon ferious Confideration of the special Advantages they do or may partake of, above many other Millions in the World, would confent to it. And if this be fo, certainly then it must be both an unreatonable, and a very ungrateful thing for fuch Men to be impatient, who enjoy more than their fhare comes to.

3. Confider the Deferts of your Sins, and then it will eafily appear, that your Condition is not at any time fo bad, but you have deferved it fhould be worfe. That you have more reafon to commend the Care and Wifdom of the Phyfician, than to complain of R_2 the

Of the Principles, &c. Lib. I.

Greg. Moral.

4.

the Bitterness of the Potion. Tanto quis patientiùs ferrum medici tolerat, quanto magis putridum esse conspicit quod secat; " The more the Patient doth discern the Cor-" ruption and Danger of his Sore, the more " willingly doth he endure the Lance of his " Surgeon." That is a remarkable Story in Genesis, c. 42. to shew that this Consideration of the Defert of our own Sins, is a very powerful Means to pacify us against all Impatience under Sufferings. The Story concerns Joseph's Brethren, who coming into Egypt to buy Corn, were there roughly treated, accused for Spies, clapt into Prison; fo that one would have thought, they had teason enough to fret and murmur at that hard unjust Dealing. And yet we find their Carriage to be very humble and patient; but what that was which made them fo, you may see ver. 21. they remember'd their Cruelty to their Brother Joseph, and That brought them to acknowledge this Diffress to be defervedly come upon them, because they had not pitied their brother, when he befought them in the anguish of his soul. The like Confideration did stop Job in his Complaint, after all his high Contestations and Arguings with God; he no fooner thought upon his own Vileness, but he was presently filenced. Chap. 40. Behold I am vile, what shall I answer thee? I will lay my hand upon my mouth.

4. Bc

4. Be careful whilft you are in a profperous Estate, to prepare for Trouble and Afflictions, by a prudent Confideration of the Mutability of Things. This will be a Means to alleviate the Burden of them. Pracogitati Sen. mali mollis ictus venit. And in another place, 76. inexpectata plus aggravant, novitas adjicit Ep. 91. calamitatibus pondus; " That Stroke will " have lefs Force which is forefeen and ex-" pected ; whereas the Suddenness and Sur-" prize of it, will add to the Weight and " Smart of it." In tanta rerum sur sum ac Sen. Trandeor sum euntium ver satione, si non quicquid quil. An. fieri potest, pro futuro habes, das in te vires rebus adversis, quas infregit quisquis prior vidit; " In that various Change and Revo-" lution of Events, which we behold in the "World, if we do not look upon possible " Dangers and Troubles as future, we do " thereby strengthen our Adversaries, and " difarm ourselves." When we see at any time the Losses and Imprisonments, or Poverty, or Funerals of others, we ought prefently to reflect, this may be our Cafe. Cuivis potest accidere, quod cuiquam potest. One loses Husband, Wife, Children, Estate : We ought from all fuch Spectacles to infer, that tho' this be not at present, yet it may fhortly be our Condition; and accordingly by Expectation to fortify ourfelves against it. Hic nos error decipit, hic effæminat dum Sen. ad patimur, quæ nunquam pati nos posse præ-cap. 9. R 2 vidimus.

10.

37.

10.

20. 7.

Of the Principles, &c. Lib. I.

vidimus. Aufert vim præsentibus malis, qui futura prospexit. " This is the Error " which doth deceive and effeminate Men, " whilft they fuffer fuch things as they did " not expect, and are not prepared for. It " breaks the Force of Evils when they come, f to foresee they will come."

5. Often reflect upon your former Experience: That will be a Means to prevent all Despondencies, to work in us Hope and Confidence. There is no Man fo mean and inconsiderable, if he will but take an impartial View of what he hath formerly feen and obferved concerning God's dealing with himfelf and others, but may upon this account find reason enough to allay all murmuring discontented Thoughts. We have frequent Gen. 32. Examples to this purpose in Scripture, Jacob, David, Jehosaphat, the Apostle St. Paul, 1 Sam. 17. in feyeral places; who all have had recourfe to ² Chron. this Remedy, when they would ftrengthen. Cor. 1. themselves against Discontent and Despondency. And I suppose, there is scarce any ferious Man of so little Experience, but hath taken notice of, and can remember how fome Crosses and Disappointments have in the iffue proved Mercies and Benefits to him. And if it have been to formerly, why may it not be so again?

> 6. And lastly, Labour after those particular Virtues, which are of near Affinity to this of Patience; whereby it will be very much

much strengthened and promoted. There is a certain Chain of them mentioned, Gal. 5. 22. and stiled by the Apostle the fruits of the spirit, as belonging more particularly to the Spirit of Christianity. The first is Love, ayam, which beareth all things, and endureth all things : The next is Joy, zapa, a chearful Temper of Mind, in opposition to Morofeness and Frowardness: Then Peace, eiphun, a Composedness and Sedateness of Spirit, free from all inordinate Perturbations, and without any kind of itch of quarrelling with others: And next Long-Suffering, µaxpolupia, whereby the Mind is not eafily provoked or tired, but is eafily appealed : Then Gentleness, zongorns, Generosity, Benignity, which fignifics a Mind most ready to part with any thing, towards the Help and Relief of others, in their Necessities: Then Goodness, alabaσύνη, (i. e.) fuch an equal and ingenuous Simplicity of Manners, whereby Men are render'd eafily tractable, and placable, and most amiable in the whole Course of their Conversations: Then Faith, mique, a Dependence upon God for our Support and Deliverance : Then Meekness, megorns, whereby we put a Restraint upon our Anger, so as not to be provoked for any leffer Caufe, or in a greater Measure, or for a longer Time, than may be fitting for the Occafion; always preferving our Minds free from any fudden Gufts of Paffion. And lastly, Temperance, ¿Supareia, R 4 ContiContinence, whereby we contain all our Paflions within their just Bounds, either of Joy in the Affluence of Things, or of Grief in the Loss, or of Desire in the Want of them.

248

A Mind that is modelled and prepared with these kind of Virtues, will thereby be render'd generous and couragious, fit for the undergoing of any kind of Trouble or Suffering, which the Providence of God shall think fit to call a Man unto.

I have now done with the First thing I proposed to treat of, namely, The Reasonableness and Credibility of the Principles of Natural Religion; in which I have endeavoured to establish the belief of God's Being, to clear the natural Notions of his Excellencies and Perfections, and to deduce the Obligation of Moral Duties, from the Belief and Acknowledgement of the divine Nature and Perfections.

(249)

THE

SECOND BOOK,

OF THE

Wisdom of practifing the Duties of NATURAL RELIGION.

CHAP. I.

Shewing in general how Religion conduces to our Happines.

Proceed now to the *fecond* Part of my Defign, which was to fhew *The Wifdom* of practifing the Duties of Natural Religion. In which I fhall endeavour to convince Men, how much it is, upon all accounts, their chief Happines and Interest to lead a Religious and Virtuous Course of Life.

Solomon, who is fo much celebrated in Scripture for his Wifdom and Knowledge, hath purpofely written a Book, the main Argument whereof is to enquire, wherein the chief Happiness of Man doth consist: And having in the former Part of it shewed the Insufficiency of all other Things that pretend

Of the Principles, &c. Lib. II.

pretend to it, he comes in the Conclusion to fix it upon its true Basis, afferting every Man's greatest Interest and Happiness, to

13.

Ecel. 12. confist in being Religious. Let us hear the conclusion of the whole matter; Fear God and keep his commandments; for this is the whole of man. That is, the ferious Practice of Religion is That which every confiderate Man, after all his other Disquisitions, will find to be his chief Interest, and That which doth deferve his utmost Care and Diligence.

> And because these Words of Solomon do fo fully express that, which is to be the main Argument of my following Discourse, I shall, by way of Preface or Introduction to it, more particularly confider the Commendation, which he here gives to the Practice of Religion, in that full and fignificant Expression, this is the whole of man.

> Which Words are by the Septuagint and Vulgar thus rendered, this is All, or Every man; the word Duty, which is supplied by our English, being not in the Original, or in other Translations. This ought to be the way and courfe of all mankind; so the Targum. This is the course to which every man is designed; so the Syriack. This will be most profitable and advantageous to men; so the Arabick. Hoc est totum hominis, this is the whole of man; fo fome of our later Interpreters, most properly to the Scope of the Place, it being an usual Enallage in the Hebrew.

Chap. 1. of Natural Religion. 251 Hebrew, totius universalis pro toto integrante, All for Whole.

So that according to the various Interpretations of the Words, they may contain in them a threefold Reference : To the E_{f} fence, the Happine fs, the Busine fs of Man.

According to which, the Sense of them must be, that Religion, or the *fearing of God*, and *keeping his Commandments*, is a Matter of s great Consequence to Human Nature, that,

1. The *Essence* or Being of Man may be faid to confift in it.

2. The great *Business* or Duty of Man, is to be conversant about it, and to labour after it.

3. The Happinefs, or Well-being of Man, doth depend upon it.

These Particulars I shall endeavour to make out by such clear Principles of Reason, attested to by several of the wisest *Heathen* Writers, as may be enough to satisfy any serious Man, who is able to understand the Reason and Consequence of Things, and will but attend and consider.

First, Religion is of so great Importance, that the Essence of Man may be faid to confiss in it. Man may be confidered under a two-fold Notion:

1. In his *fingle Capacity*, according to that Principle whereby he is conftituted in fuch a Rank of Creatures. Of the Principles, &c. Lib. II,

2. In Society, for which Man feems to be naturally defigned, and without which he could not well fubfift. Now Religion will appear to be *effential* to him, in both thefe Respects.

252

1. As confidered in his single Capacity, according to those Principles by which he is framed. That which doth conflitute any thing in its Being, and diffinguish it from all other things, this is that which we call the Form or Effence of a Thing. Now the things which diftinguish Human Nature from all other things, are the chief Principles and Foundations of Religion, namely, the Apprehension of a Deity, and an Expectation of a future State after this Life : Which no other Creature, below Man, doth partake of; and which are common to all Mankind; notwithstanding the utmost Endeavours that can be used for the suppressing of them.

As for what is commonly alledged in the behalf of *Reason*, it may be observed, that in the Actions of many brute Creatures, there are discernible some Footsteps, some imperfect Strictures and Degrees of Ratiocination; such a natural Sagacity as at least bears a near Resemblance to Reason. From whence it may follow, that it is not Reason in the general, which is the Form of Human Nature; but Reason, as it is determined to Actions of Religion, of which we do not find the

the leaft Signs or Degrees in Brutes: Man being the only Creature in this visible World, that is formed with a Capacity of worshipping and enjoying his Maker. Nor is this any new Opinion, but what several of the ancient Writers, Philosophers, Orators, Poets, have attested to; who make the Notion of a Deity, and Adoration of him, to be the true Difference betwixt Man and Beast.

So Tully; Ex tot generibus nullum est De Leg. animal præter hominem, quod habeat notiti-Lib. 1. am aliquam Dei; ipsisque in hominibus, nulla gens est neque tam immansueta, neque tam fera, quæ non etiamsi ignoret, qualem habere Deum deceat, tamen habendum sciat. " A-" mongft all the living Creatures that are in " the World, there is none but Man, that " hath any Notion of a Deity; and amongst " Mankind, there is no Nation fo wild and " barbarous, but pretends to some Religion." Whence it fhould feem, that this is the most proper Difference betwixt Man and Beafts. And in another place, he makes this to be the Character of that Reason, which is the Form of Man, that it is Vinculum Dei & hominis, which imports both Name and Thing.

Of the fame Senfe is that of the Satyrist, who speaking of Religion and a Sense of divine Things, saith this of it;

Separat

Of the Principles, &c. Lib. II.

254

Juv. Sat. 15. A grege mutorum, atque ideo venerabile

Sortiti ingenium, divinorumque capaces.

"'Tis this, faith he, which doth diftinguish us from brute Creatures, that we have Souls capable of divine Impressions."

There are abundance of Expressions to this purpose in several other of the Heathen Wri-De super-ters. That in Plutarch, where he stiles Irreligion a kind of Stupor, whereby Men are stitione. as it were deprived of their Senfes. And in another place, he afferts it to be " an ex-" ceeding improper Thing, to afcribe true " Reafon to those who do not acknowledge Nat. Deor. " and adore the Deity." So again, Tully, Effe Lib. 2. Deos qui negat, vix eum sanæ mentis existimem. "" I can hardly think that Man to be " in his right Mind, who is deftitute of Re-" ligion." And in another place of the fame Book, Quis hunc hominem dixerit? &c. "Why fhould any one ftyle fuch an one a " Man, who by what he fees in the World, " is not convinced of a Deity, and a Provi-" dence, and of that Adoration he owes to " the Deity?" Non modo non philosophos, Lactant. sed nec homines quidem fuisse dixerim, (faith another.) " Men that are destitute of Reli-" gion, are so far from being learned Philo-" fophers, that they ought not to be effeemed " fo much as reasonable Men. 'Tis

255

'Tis true, nothing is more ordinary than for fuch Persons as are sceptical in these first Principles, to entertain great Thoughts of themfelves, as if they had confider'd things more deeply, and were arriv'd unto a higher pitch of Reason and Wit than others. But yet the plain Truth is, they who have not attained to this Conviction of placing their chief Interest in being religious, they are fo far from exceeding others in Degrees, that they come short of the very Nature and Essence of Men, as being destitute of those first Notions concerning Truth and Falfehood, Good and Evil, wherein the Essence of a rational Being doth confift: besides their palpable Deficiency in fuch plain Confequences and Deductions of Reason, as would become those, who in any measure pretend to that Principle.

So that, by what hath been faid, it may appear, that the Definition of Man may be render'd as well by the Difference of Religiofum as Rationale. As for that Inconvenience which fome may object, that atheiftical and prophane Perfons will hereby be excluded: Why, fo they are by the other Difference likewife; fuch Perfons having no just Pretence to Reafon, who renounce Religion: And it were well, if they might not only be reckoned among Beasts (as they are by the Pfalmist, where he styles them brutist,) but driven out amongst them likewise, and

Of the Principles, &c. Lib. II.

and banifhed from all Human Society, as being publick Pefts and Mifchiefs of Mankind, fuch as would debafe the Nobility of our Natures to the Condition of brute Creatures, and therefore are fit only to live amongft them. Which brings me to the

2d Confideration of Man, as a *fociable* Creature. Religion is *effential* to him, in this Refpect alfo; as being the fureft Bond to tye Men up to those respective Duties towards one another, without which, Government and Society could not fubfist.

There is a remarkable Paffage in Plutarch to this purpole; where he ftiles Religion ouverlix or andons row vias, row obsolas eperoma, the Cement of all Community, and the chief Basis of all Legislative Power. And in another place he says, "That 'tis much "more easy to build a City in the open Air, "without any Ground to sound it upon, "than to establish Government without Religion." A City (saith he) may make some shift to subsist without Walls, Schools, Theatres, Houses, nay, without Money; but not without Religion.

If it were not for this Notion of a Deity, and those natural Impressions which we have concerning Justice and Probity, so necessary for the Conservation of Human Society; instead of those well-ordered Governments and Cities which are now in the World, Mankind must have lived either wild and solitary

Against Colotes.

tary in Caves and Dens, like favage Beafts; or elfe in Troops of Robbers, fubfifting upon the Spoil and Rapine of fuch as were weaker than themfelves.

Pietate sublatà, fides etiam, & societas Nat. Dec. humani generis, & unà excellentissima vir-Lib. 1. tus justitia tollitur, saith Tully. " Take " but away the Awe of Religion, and all " that Fidelity and Justice, so necessary for " the keeping up of Human Society, must " perish with it."

257

Tis this Fear of a Deity, and the Senfe of our Obligation to him, that is the only effectual Means to reftrain Men within the Bounds of Duty. And were this wholly extinguifhed, there would follow fuch wild Diforders and Extravagancies amongft Men, as would not leave fo much as the Face or leaft Shadow of Virtue or Honefty in the World: There being no kind of Vice which Men would not abandon themfelves unto, confidering the Impetuoufnefs of their own natural Appetites, and the Power of external Temptations, were this Reftraint from Religion once removed or abolifhed.

The two chief Opposites to Religion, are **Prophanenefs** and Superstition. Both which are prejudicial to Civil Government : the one by destroying Conficience, the strongest Obligation to political Duties; the other, by perverting and abusing it; introducing in the stead of it a new Primum mobile, which ra-N visheth

fays.

Of the Principles, &c. Lib. II.

visheth the Spheres of Government, and puts them into a præternatural Course, as a Noble Lord Ba- Author expressent it.

The two grand Relations that concern Society, are *Government* and *Subjection*: And Irreligion doth indifpose Men for both these.

1. For Government. Without Religion Magistrates will lose that Courage and Confidence belonging to their Stations, which they cannot fo well exert in punishing the Offences of others, when they are guilty of the fame or the like themselves. Those that sit on the throne of judgment, should be able to scatter away evil with their eyes, as Solomon speaks, Prov. 20. 8. By their very Presence and Looks to strike an Awe upon Offenders. Which will not be fo eafily done, if they lie under the fame Guilt themfelves. Sine bonitate nulla majestas, saith Seneca; the very Nature of Majesty doth denote Goodness as well as Power. And without this, Governours may eafily lose that Reverence, which is due to them from others; and confequently that Authority, which they ought to have over them. When they cease to be Gods in respect of their Goodness, they will foon diminish in their Power. And tho' they should be able to keep Men under, as to their Bodies and Eftates, yet will they decline as to that awful Love and Reverence, whereby they fhould fway over the Hearts and Affections of Mcn.

The

The Philosopher in the fifth Book of his Cap. 11. Politicks, doth lay it down as a Rule for Magistrates, that they must be careful to give publick Testimonies of their being Religious and Devout; for which he gives this double Reason: Because the People will be less subject to entertain any Jealousy or Suf-picion of *suffering Injury*, from such whom they believe to be religious : And withal, they will be less subject to attempt the doing of Injury against such ; as knowing that good Magistrates are after a more especial manner under the divine Favour and Prote-Ation, ż ouppazes Ezortas Tes Sees, having God to fight with them, and for them.

259

2. The want of this will indispose Men for the Condition of Subjects, and render them loofe and unstable in those Duties of Obedience and Submission required to that State. How can it be expected from that Man, who dares affront and despise God himself, that he should have any hearty reverence for his Deputies and Vicegerents?

He that is subject only upon the account of wrath, and the power of the fword which is over him, will be no longer to, when he hath an opportunity of cleaping or refilting that Power. Nor is there any possible way to secure Men in their quiet Subjection and Obedience, but by their being obliged for Conscience-sake. And therefore such kind of Rom. 13. Persons, as by their open Prophaneness ands. S 2 Con-

Of the Principles, &c. Lib. II.

tempt of Religion, do endeavour to destroy Conscience from amongst Men, may justly be esteemed as the worst kind of seditious Persons, and most pernicious to Civil Government.

That Temper of Prophanenes, whereby a Man is disposed to contemn and despise all Religion (how flightly foever Men may think of it) is much worse than Infidelity, than Fanaticalness, than Idolatry; and of the two, 'tis much more eligible for a Man to be an honest Heathen and a devout Idolater, than a prophane Christian.

Whatever Disputes have been raised concerning the Lawfulness of punishing Men for their diffenting Consciences in matters of Religion; yet never any Man queffioned the Lawfulness of punishing Men for their Prophaneness and Contempt of all Religion. Such Men as renounce Conscience, cannot pretend that they fuffer for it. And certainly this Vice doth upon many Accounts deferve the greatest severity of Laws, as being in its own Nature destructive of the very Principles of Government, and the Peace of all human Societies; besides, the Mischiefs consequent upon it, from divine Vengeance.

De Benef.

'Tis an Observation of Seneca, " That lib. 3. c. 6. « several Countries do appoint several Pu-" nishments for the Violation of Religion; " but every Country appoints some, and it " doth not any where escape unpunished. Plato

261

Plato in his Book de Legibus, would have Lib. 10. it punished capitally, as being a thing of most pernicious consequence to Government. 'Tis a Rule in the Civil Law, that Religio contaminata ad omnium pertinet injuriam; The Lib. 4 c. Abuse of Religion is to be looked upon as being de Hæret. a common Injury, and every Man is concerned to endeavour a Vindication of it. And there Grotius de are some Instances in Story, of Wars that & pac's, I. have been undertaken upon this very Ac-2. cap. 2c. count, to bring a Nation to Punishment for fect. 51. that Prophaneness they have expressed towards the Religion they professed and pretended to, as being injurious to Mankind, Quod orbis viribus expiari debuit, as Justin Lib. 8. the Historian speaks, which the whole world ought to vindicate and expiate by their common Forces.

There can be no Assurance from loofe irreligious Persons, that they will be faithful in the ordinary Duties belonging to their feveral Ranks and Stations. And as for any extraordinary heroical Action, by which the publick Welfare is to be promoted, Men that are without Conscience of Religion, and a sense of Virtue, can never apply themselves to any thing of that kind, as having their Minds destitute of all such Principles as are fublime and generous, without any the least Seed of Honour, and Piety, and Virtue; and therefore they can have no Sparks of Magnanimity, nor any the leaft Inclina-S 3 tion

Of the Principles, &c. Lib. II. tion to Actions that are truly Great and

Noble. So that upon all Accounts, it is very evident, that Religion is totum hominis in this first Sense, as it refers to the Essence of Man, confidered either in his single Capacity, or as a Member of Society.

262

2. 'Tis so likewife as it refers to the Bufinefs and Duty of Man, that which he ought to be most intent upon, and conversant about, as to his Employment in this World: That General Calling, in which every Man, of what Rank or Quality soever, is to be engaged. Men are distributed under other particular Callings, according as their Education, Abilities, Friends, and feveral Opportunities do dispose of them. But the Obligation of Religion, being of universal Concernment, doth extend to all and every Particular, there being none exempted from it. Hoc est omnis homo. Every Man is concerned in it. And it is totum hominis likewise: 'Tis his Calling, the chief Business about which he is employed.

I do not fay, that a Man's Thoughts are alway to be taken up about the immediate Acts of Religion, any more than a Traveller is always to have his Mind actually fixed upon the thought of his Journey's End. This would be inconfiftent with the Infirmity of our Natures, and the Neceffity of our Conditions in this World. But yet, as he, that

is

is upon a Journey, doth fo order all his particular Motions, as may be most conducible to his general End; fo should Men habitually, though they cannot actually, in every Affair, have respect to their chief End, so as to observe all the Duties of Religion, and never to allow themselves in any thing against the Rules of it. And he that hath this Care continually upon his Mind (tho' he be but a fecular Person) may properly be faid to make Religion his Busines.

The Wife Man, in the Beginning of his Ecclef. 2. Book, had proposed it as his great Question³. to be discussed, to find out what was that good for the fons of Men, which they (hould do under the Heavens all the days of their lives. (i. e.) What was the chief Employment or Business, which they should apply themselves to in this World? And in the Conclusion of his Discourse, after an Induction and Refutation of all other Particulars, which may feem to have any Claim or Prctence to this, he afferts it to be the Business of Religion, Fearing God, and keeping his Commandments: Suitable to that Precept of Moses, Deut. 10. 12. And now, O Israel, what doth the Lord thy God require of thee, but to fear the Lord thy God, to walk in his Ways, and to serve the Lord thy God, and keep his Commandments? And the Practice of St. Paul, who made Acts 24. this his daily Exercise, to keep his consci-16. 5 4 ence

Of the Principles, &c. Lib. II. ence void of offence, both towards God and towards Man.

Moral, 1. ad Eudem. To the Reafonableness of this, several of the wifest *Heathens* have attested. That's a remarkable Passage in *Aristotle* to this purpose, where he states that to be the most defirable proportion of all worldly Felicities and Enjoyments, which is most consistent with Men's devoting themselves to the business of Religion : And that to be either too much or too little of Wealth, or Honour, or Power, *Orc.* whereby Men are hindered in their meditating upon God, or their worshipping of him.

Differ.1.6.

So Epictetus, discoursing concerning the Work and Business he was designed to, hath this excellent Paffage : " If I had been made a Nightingale or a Swan, I should have " " employed the time of my Life in fuch a " Way as is fuitable to the Condition of those " Creatures : But being made a Man, capa-" ble of ferving and worshipping that God " from whom I had my Being, 'tis but Rea-" fon that I should apply myself to this, " as being my proper Work and Business;" τυτο μυ το έρίον ές ι. " And therefore here-" unto will I devote myself, as being the " chief Employment to which I am de-" figned." I am now, as to the Condition of my Body, lame and old, (faith he in the fame place) to which he might have added, that he was fickly and deformed; and as for his

Chap. 1. of Natural Religion.

his outward Quality, he was Poor, and under Servitude, being a Slave to Epaphroditus, one of the Roman Courtiers; which are Conditions that ufually expose Men to repining and discontent: and yet he concludes it to be his Duty, "wholly to devote himself to "the Praises and Worship of that God who "was the Author of his Being." Which upbraids so many Professors of Christianity, who have both more Advantages of knowing their Duty, and greater Engagements upon them to exercise themselves in the Duties of Religion.

There is another apposite Testimony to this purpose in Antoninus. "Every thing Lib. 8. "(faith he) is designed for some kind of Sect. 19. "Work. Beasts and Plants, the Sun and "Stars; où in megis ri; and what do you con-"ceive your Business to be? sensual Pleasures? "Bethink yourself a little better, whether "this be suitable to your natural Sentiments, "to the Nobility of your Mind, and those excellent Faculties with which you are en-"dowed."

Now 'tis the usual Course of Men to apply themselves to that as their chief Business, by which their Interest is most promoted, and which may most conduce to that main End which they propose to themselves. And can any thing be more reasonable, than for that to be the chief *business* of a Man's Life, which is the chief End of his *Being*?

265

3. Reli-

Of the Principles, &c. Lib. II.

3. Religion is totum hominis, with respect to the Happiness and Well-being of Man. That is properly faid to be the chief End or Happiness of a Thing, which doth raise its Nature to the utmost Perfection of which it is capable, according to its Rank and Kind. This is the chief End which he ought to propose, that alone wherein his true Felicity doth confift, that which doth advance his Nature to the utmost Perfection it is capable of. The chief Good belonging to a Vegetable or Plant, is to grow up to a State of Maturity, to continue to its natural Period, and to propagate its Kind, which is the utmost Perfection that kind of Being is capable of. And whereas sensitive Creatures, befides those things which are common to them with Plants, have likewife fuch Faculties, whereby they are able to apprehend external Objects, and to receive Pain or Pleafure from them: therefore the Happiness proper to them, must confist in the Perfection of these Faculties, namely, in sensible Pleafures, in the Enjoyment of fuch things as may be grateful to their Senses. But now Mankind (if we allow it to be a diftinct Rank of Creatures, fuperior to Brutes) being endowed with fuch Faculties, whereby 'tis made capable of apprehending a Deity, and of expecting a future State after this Life; it will hence follow, that the proper Happiness of Man must confist in the perfecting of these Facultics;

Chap. 1. of Natural Religion.

culties; namely, in fuch a State as may reconcile him to the divine Favour, and afford him the best Assurance of a blessed Immortality hereafter: Which nothing else but Religion can so much as pretend to.

'Tis true indeed, the Nature of Man, by reason of those other Capacities common to him with Plants and Brutes, may stand in need of several other things, to render his Condition pleasant and comfortable in this World, as Health, Riches, Reputation, Safety, &c. Now herein is the great Advantage of Religion, that besides the principal Work which it doth for us, in securing our future Estates in the other World, it is likewise the most effectual Means to promote our Happiness in this World.

In my Discourse of this, I shall first suggest comething more generally, concerning the Nature of our chief End; and then descend to those *Particulars*, which are esteemed to be the chief Ingredients to a State of Happines.

Under the *First* of these, I shall speak priefly to these three Things.

1. There is a Neceflity that every Man who will act rationally, should propose to himself some chief Scope and End.

2. The chief End of every thing must be of such a nature, as may be most fit to promote the Perfection of that thing in its Rank and Kind.

3. This in rational Beings which are capable Of the Principles, &c. Lib. II.

ble of it, must confist in a Communion with, and a Conformity unto the chief Good, and confequently in being religious.

1. There is a Necessity that every Man who will act rationally fhould propose to himfelf fome chief Scope or End. The having of an End, is not so much a moral Duty, which supposeth a Liberty of Acting, as a natural Principle, like that of the Descent of heavy Bodies; Men must do so, nor can they do otherwise. Such is the Principle of Selfprefervation in all things; and this of acting for an End, in all rational Agents. The most loofe and profligate Wretches that are, do and must act for an End, even in those very Courses, wherein they put the Thought of their future State and their last Account far from them. The very suppressing and hardening themselves against the Thought of their true End is in order to their present Peace and Quiet, which they do erroneoufly fubstitute in the room of their chief End. That wherein Men are commonly defective, is in not exciting the Thought of their chief End, and not fufficiently confidering and flating in their own Minds, the most proper Means for the attaining of it. There are too many in the World that do autoogeolia Eeu to's Biov, live ex tempore, without any particular reference to their chief End, being immersed only in present Matters, animalia sine præterito & futuro, without any regard

268

Chap. 1. of Natural Religion. 269 regard to what is past or future ; like Ships upon the vast Ocean, without any Compass or Pilot, that do rather wander than travel, being carried up and down according as every Wind or Tide doth drive them. And this the Philosopher doth worthily brand with the name of Folly; Vita sine proposito, stultitiæ Seneca." argumentum est; " There is no greater Ar-" gument of Foolishness, than for a Man not " to be fixed upon some particular Design." Proponamus, oportet, finem summi boni, ad Idem Ep? quem omne factum nostrum dictúmve respi-85. ciat; veluti navigantibus, ad sidus aliqued dirigendus est cursus, saith the same Author. " There ought always to be fome particular " Scope and Mark proposed, as the main " End and Drift of all our Actions, as the Star " by which we are to be guided in our " Voyage." Non disponet singula, nisi cui jam Ep 31. vitæ suæ summa proposita est. " 'T will be a " hard matter to proportion out Particulars, " till we know what is the main Sum." This is the true ground of the common Mistakes amongst Men, whilst they deliberate concerning the several Parts of their Lives, but negleft the stating of what should be the main defign of the whole. He that intends to fhoot at any thing, must fo manage the whole Action in levelling his Arrow, and regulating his Hands, and exerting his Strength fo as may be molt advantageous for hitting the Mark. As the Efficient is in natural, so is the End amongst moral

Of the Principles, &c. Lib. II.

moral Causes, of principal efficacy. 'Tis this which is the chief Rule of all our Actions. And therefore there is a Necessity that some End be proposed and fixed upon.

The chief End of every thing muft be of fuch a Nature, as may be moft fit to promote the Perfection of that thing in its Rank and Kind. Any thing that is fhort of this, may be a Means, or a fubordinate End; but cannot be the chief and ultimate End, if there be any thing defirable beyond it; τέλ Gui equilibre μηθέν eri mego δεόμηθα, Mag. Mo. faith Ariftotle; That is truly the chief End, ral. lib. 2. which is defired for itfelf; which being once

obtained, we want no more; "That which "doth fatiate and fill up the Defires. Hæc Epift. 74. nibil vacare patitur loci, totum animum tenet, defiderium omnium tollit, fola fatis eft (faith Seneca.) In brief, 'tis that State, wherein a thing enjoys all that good that 'tis capable of, and which is most fuitable to

its Nature.

3. This in rational Creatures must confift, in a Communion with, and a Conformity to the fupreme Good; and confequently, in being religious. Which is the meaning of those Scripture Expressions, of walking with God, and as becomes the fons of the Most High; being followers of him; holy as he is holy; being made partakers of a divine Nature. And to this the Philosophers do likewise consent. This is the meaning of Chap. 1. of Natural Religion.

of that Speech in Pythagoras Ting. is ugiwois Sig, " Every man's chief End should " be a Resemblance to God, a being made " like to the Deity." So Plato and Epictetus will have it to confift in following of God, πίλ G. ές · έπεσθαι Seu. And another, imitari quem colis, in imitating him whom we worship. So Seneca, Summum bonum est, Epist. 74. quod honestum est, & quod magis admirêre, folum bonum est quod honestum est. Not only the chief, but the only Good doth confift, in what is honeft and virtuous. Now the Fruition of God cannot confift in any external Union or Contract of our Souls with the Deity, which Spirits are not capable of; nor in any mere Speculation or intellectual Gazing upon his Excellencies: But in fuch an Influence, whereby he doth communicate to us, fuch divine Qualities, as will exalt our Faculties beyond their natural State, and bring them into an Aflimilation and Conformity to the most perfect Idea of Goodness, together with an inward Senfation of the Effects of this in ourselves.

Having thus dispatched what I had to suggest concerning the Nature of Happiness in general, I proceed to speak to such Particulars, as are esteemed to be the most usual Ingredients into such a State, and which do conduce to the compleating of it: whether they concern

Our

271

Of the Principles, &c. Lib. II.
Our present Condition in this World; ei-
ther our
External Welfare; confisting in
I. Health.
2. Liberty, Safety, Quiet.
3. Possessions; with respect either
to the Sufficiency of them, for
answering our Necessities; which is called <i>Riches</i> or <i>Profit</i> :
Or to
4. The Delight or Satisfaction we
<pre> receive in the Enjoyments, in </pre>
the Use and Suitableness of the
things we posses; which is cal-
led Pleasure.
5. The Effeem which we have a-
mongst good Men, whereby we
are rendered acceptable and ufe- ful to others; ftyled Honour or
Reputation.
Internal Welfare, or the Happiness of
our Minds; which doth confift in
these two things:
I. The due regulating and exalting
of our Faculties to their proper
Function.
2. The Peace, Joy, Contentment,
L confequent thereupon.
The Happiness of our <i>future</i> State. This doth confist in such a Fruition of the
Supreme Good, as our Souls are ca-
pable of; and must depend upon such
Courfes,

Chap. 1. of Natural Religion.

Courses, as can afford us the most rational Assurance of Blessedness and Glory hereafter.

I NOLL - J

273

Now, I fhall endeavour to make it out by plain Reafon, that the Happinefs of our Condition, in all thefe refpects, doth depend upon Religion : and that not only morally upon account of that Reward which virtuous Actions do entitle a Man unto, from a juft and wife Providence; but naturally alfo, by reafon of that phyfical Efficacy which the Duties of Religion have, to procure for us all those things wherein our temporal Happinefs confifts; to promote the Welfare, not only of particular Persons, but of publick Communities of Mankind in general, and of the whole Universe.

I A TEA STATE OF STATE AND STATE AND A

t and

CHAP.

Of the Principles, &c. Lib. II.

CHAP. II.

274

How Religion conduces to our present Happiness in this World: And first to the Happiness of the Outward Man. 1. In respect of Health.

ND because these things I have mentioned, (especially those of them which concern our external Happiness in this world) are the great Aims and Designs, by which the generality of Men are chiefly fway'd in their Actions; and therefore like to prove very powerful Motives to make Men religious, if they could be once effectually perfuaded, that Religion is the most proper Means for the attaining of these Things: I shall therefore endeavour to make out this Truth, by the plainest and most convincing Evidence that may be. And the rather, because in such kind of Assertions, as are befides the common Opinion, and feem Paradoxes, Men will be apt to be jealous of their being imposed upon by some kind of Sophifm or Fallacy.

In order to this, I fhall observe this Method : First, I shall endeavour to state and define the Nature of these Things, and Chap. 2. of Natural Religion.

and to shew wherein the true Notion of them doth confist. And then proceed to the Proof of this Proposition, that Religion is the most proper Means to procure and promote these Ends. And besides the Evidence to this purpose, from the concurrent Opinions of wise Men, in several Ages; I shall likewise make them out both by Reason and by Experience, which are all the kind of Arguments that such Matters are capable of.

Only I must premise one Caution; that when I fay Religion is the Caufe of these Things, the Meaning is not, that it is fo necessary, and so infallible a Cause, as can never fail of its Effect. This would not be confistent with our dependent Condition, there being nothing in this World fo much under the power of human Endeavours, but that the Providence of God may interpole for the Disappointment of it. To whom it must be left, to make what referved Cases he pleases from the ordinary Course of Things. But tho' it be not an infallible Cause, yet it is fuch a Cause as doth generally and ini το πολύ, produce its Effect : And all Mankind do think it a fufficient Inducement, to apply their Endeavours unto fuch Courfes for the procuring of any thing, as are the best Means to be had, and do for the most part effect the Ends they are defigned for.

T 2

This

275

Of the Principles, &c. Lib. II.

This being premised, I doubt not but to offer such Arguments for the Proof of these Things, as shall be sufficient for the Conviction of any Man who will but understand and consider them.

I begin with the First. The Welfare of our prefent Condition in respect of our Outward Man doth depend upon Religion.

First, Religion is the best Means for Health. By Health I mean such a Constitution of our Bodies, whereby our Members and Faculties are inabled for the due Performance of their natural Functions, and freed from Pain; 'tis properly opposed to Sickness or Disease. As for the Infirmities of Old Age, these are so effential to all living Creatures, so necessarily spring from the very Principles of our Natures, that though they may be somewhat lessened and alleviated yet are they not capable of any complete Remedy.

This Bleffing of Health is fo neceffary to our Well-beings in this World, that without it we cannot enjoy any thing elfe; no, not our own felves: infomuch that Men do, and may juftly put a great Value upon it, and are willing to purchafe it at any Rate. And therefore to all fuch, this Confideration mult needs be a very powerful Motive.

Now I shall make it plain that this dotl depend upon Religion,

Morally

Chap. 2. of Natural Religion.

277

{Morally, Naturally.

1. Morally, By reason of those Bleffings of this kind, which, by the Light of Nature, Men may reasonably expect from the Goodness of God, upon the Observance of his Laws; besides the several Assertions and Promifes in Scripture to this purpofe, where Sin is often represented as the meritorious Cause of Sickness, and Diseases are often threatened, and accordingly inflicted as the due Rewards of Sin: And on the other fide, Deut. 28. upon Mens observing the Duties of Religion, 61. God promises to take away sickness from the Exod. 23. midst of them, to bestow upon them health 25. and length of days. The fear of the Lord, Deut. 7. and departing from evil, shall be health to thy 15. navel, and marrow to thy bones. Prov. 3. 7, 8. Prov. 11. 19. As Righteousness tend-Prov. 4. eth to Life, so he that pursucth Evil, pur-22. fueth it to his own death. c. 2. 22. The Ifa. 58.8. wicked shall be cut off from the earth, and the transgressors shall be rooted out of it.

2. Religion is the *natural* Caufe of Health, which may appear upon this two-fold Reafon; becaufe it doth remove those Things that will hinder it, and doth promote such Things as will help it.

1. It doth *removere prohibens*, it is apt to prevent and remove fuch Things as are the T 3 great Of the Principles, &c. Lib. II.

great Impediments of our Health. Nothing is more evident, than that there are feveral Vices which have a physical Efficacy in the producing of Difeases, as all kind of Intemperance of Body, all inordinate Paffions of Mind; to one of which, the greatest Part of the Sickness amongst Men may be ascribed; and confequently the Virtues opposite to these, Temperance, Sobriety, Moderation, must needs have a natural Causality for the hindring of these Diseases. 'Tis by Religion that Men are inabled to prevent all fuch Exceffes as are prejudicial to Nature, to reprefs all fuch violent Transports of Passion, Hatred, Anger, Fear, Sorrow, Envy, &c. as are in themselves very pernicious to our Bodily Health, and by that violent Commotion, which they are apt to put the Humours. into, do sometimes cause present Sickness, and always lay in us the Seeds of future: Diseases.

2. It doth promovere adjuvans, promotes all fuch things as may most effectually conduce to the improving of our Health; by obliging us upon the Account of Duty and Conficience, to a careful Observance of the most proper Means to this End; keeping us within due Bounds in our Eating, Drinking, Exercise; preferving our Minds in an equal Frame of Screnity and Calmness; supporting our Spirits with Contentation and Chearfulness under every State of Life: so that

278

Chap. 2. of Natural Religion.

that nothing can be more true than that of Solomon, That a chearful Mind doth good Prov. 17. like a medicine, and makes a healthy coun-^{22.} tenance; whereas heavinefs and cares will -12. 25. break a man's spirit, and make it stoop.

279

I know there are other Means to be made use of, in order to the procuring of Health, various kind of Medicaments to be applied by the Art of Physick, according as the Nature of several Diseases shall require, which Religion doth oblige a Man not to neglect: But yet this, I think, may be truly faid, that those who are most expert in the Profession of Physick, are not able to prescribe any Catholicon, which shall more effectually operate, both by way of Prevention and Cure, than the Observance of those Duties which Religion and Virtue do oblige us unto.

Nor is this true only in Theory and Speculation, but it may appear to be fo upon common Experience, to which I shall appeal for the further Confirmation of it. What kind of Perfons are those who enjoy the best State of Health, and the longest Lives? Are they not fuch generally, who are most fober and regular in their Conversations, most temperate as to their Bodies, most free from all kind of inordinate Pallions, Fierceness, Anxiety, Cares, as to their Minds? 'Tis faid of Moses, that though he were exceeding old, Deut. 34. yet his eye were not dim, nor was his natural?. force abated. Which (amongst other Cau-T 4 fcs)

Of the Principles, &c. Lib. II.

280

fes) may be afcribed to those eminent Virtues he was endowed with, the Temperance of his Body, and Meekness of his Spirit. That beloved disciple, whose Thoughts and Writings seem to be wholly taken up with the divine Virtue of Love, is upon account of this Temper of his Mind, thought to have enjoyed a more vigorous old Age than any of the reft: Such a Power is there in Religion, tho' not wholly to prevent the Infirmities of old Age, yet in a great measure to alleviate and abate them.

And on the other fide, if we confult Experience; Who are the Men moft obnoxious to Difeafes? are they not fuch generally as are moft vicious in their Lives? moft given to Surfeits, Debaucheries, and Leudnefs; whereby they do fo far enflame their Blood, and wafte their Spirits, as not to live out half their Days: Infomuch, that no Man of ordinary Prudence, who is to take a Leafe for Lives, will be content (if he can well avoid it) to chufe fuch a one, whom he knows to be vicious and intemperate.

But these things are so obvious to common Experience, that I need not enlarge upon them: Only I would not be missaken. I do not say, that none of those are religious, who are liable to Diseases, and are taken away in their younger Years; or that all such are religious, who are free from Diseases, and live to old Age. Some may be naturally of

ol

Chap. 2. of Natural Religion.

fo tender and brittle a Make, that every little Blow will break them; others of fo tough and ftrong a Conftitution, as to hold out against many Batteries and Affaults; and yet neither of these to be afcrib'd, either to the Vices of the one, or the Virtues of the other, but do rather belong to their Condition and Temper; which being Natural, and not falling under the Choice of our Wills, is not therefore capable of any moral Good or Evil.

Besides, there ought Allowance to be made (as I faid before) for such exempt Cases, as shall seem good to the Providence of God in the Government of Human Affairs. Some good Men may be taken away from the evil to come, others may be exercised with Discases in their Bodies for the Cure of their Minds, or to make their Patience and Courage exemplary to others. And fome that are good Men for the Main, may yet by their own Careleffness in using the fittest Means for the Prefervation of their Health, expose themselves to Sickness; none of which can be any prejudice to the Thing I have been proving. This being that which I affirm, that so far as the Infirmities of our natural Tempers are capable of Remedy by any thing in our power, it is the Observance of the Duties of Religion, that doth for the most part and generally prove the most effectual Means

to

Of the Principles, &c. Lib. II. to this purpose. Which is all I shall fay to the first thing I proposed to speak to, concerning the Health of our Bodies.

CHAP. III.

How Religion conduces to the Happinefs of the Outward Man, in respect of Liberty, Safety, and Quiet.

S Econdly, Religion is the most proper Means to procure our external Safety, Liberty, Quiet.

By Safety, I mean a Freedom from those common Dangers and Mischiefs which others are exposed to.

By *Liberty*, the being at our own Difpofal, and not under Bondage, Reftraint, Imprifonment.

By Quiet, an Exemption from those many Molestations and Troubles by reason of Disappointments, Enmity, Contentions, whereby the Conditions of most Men are render'd very burthensome and uncomfortable.

I put these things together, because of their near Affinity to one another.

Now Religion is both the Moral and the Natural Cause of these Things.

I. 'Tis

Chap. 3. of Natural Religion.

1. 'Tis the Moral Caufe of them, upon account of that Divine Protection and Affiftance, which the Light of Nature will affure us we are entitled unto in the doing of our Duties; befides the many Affertions and Promifes in Scripture to this purpofe, of being protected in our Ways, and fecured in Times of Danger. If you will keep my fta-Lev. 25. tutes, ye shall dwell in the land in fafety. 18. Whofo hearkeneth to me, shall dwell fafely, Pro. 1. and shall be quiet from the fear of evil.^{33.} There shall no evil happen to the just, but Prov. 12. the wicked shall be filled with mischief.^{21.} The Lord delivers the righteous out of allPfal. 34. their troubles. When a man's ways please^{17.} the Lord, he will make his enemies to be at peace with him.

283:

2. 'Tis the natural Cause of these Blesfings, by preventing or removing all fuch Things, whereby the contrary Evils are occasioned. The most usual and general Cause of Mens Sufferings, is from the Neglect of their Duty, and the Violations of Law; they are obnoxious to the Punishments of Banishment, Imprisonment, Loss of Goods, or of Life, upon the account of some illegal irreligious Acts; Murder, Theft, Sedition, injuring of others, needlefs Contentions, meddling in other Men's Affairs, where they are not concerned. 'Tis observable, that in the legal Form of indicting Men for Crimes, our Law doth ascribe their Guilt to their want of

Of the Principles, &c. Lib. II.

284

of Religion, their not having the fear of God before their eyes, which doth dispose them to commit fuch Acts as makes them obnoxious to legal Punishment. Now nothing can so effectually prevent such things as Religon. This will teach Men to obey Laws, and fubmit to Government : This will keep them within the Bounds of their Duty, both towards God and Man. This will remove all those dividing Principles, of Selfifhness, and Pride, and Covetousness: It will teach them Charity and Meeknefs, and Forbearance, to study publick Peace and common Good, to be generous and large in their Well-wifhing and their Well-doing : Which are the most proper Means to provide for our own Quiet and Safety.

And the Truth of this may be evident likewife from common Experience; by which it will appear, that for the general, no kind of Men do enjoy fo much external Peace, and Freedom, and Safety, as those that are truly religious. The *Apostle* feems to appeal to that common Notion in the Minds of all Men concerning the Safety belonging to Innocence, when he puts it by way of Question, *Who is he that will harm you, if you be followers of that which is good*? Implying that 'tis a Thing generally known and taken notice of, that there is a kind of natural Reverence and Awe amongst the worst of Men towards such as are innocent and virtuous.

And

Chap. 3. of Natural Religion.

285

And on the other side, no Men do incur fo many Hazards, Molestations, Contentions, as those that are vicious; what from their Violations of Law, their needless Provocations of those they converse with, being scarce ever free from Danger and Trouble; which the Wise-man seems to appeal to, as a Thing evident from Experience, in those short Questions which he proposeth: Who hath Prov. 23. woe? who hath forrow? who hath contentions? who hath babblings? who hath wounds without cause? who hath redness of eyes ? 'Tis particularly spoken of the Drunkard, but 'tis proportionably true of is to the must all a other Vices likewife.

There is one Objection that lies very obvious against what I have been proving; and that is from those Scriptures where 'tis faid, that whoever will live godly in Christ Jesus, must suffer persecution, and that the world should hate them; besides what may be alledged from common Experience to this purpose, concerning the Sufferings of some that are good Men.

To this two Things may be faid by way of Answer.

1. Every thing is not Perfecution for Religion, which Men may be apt to file for Some Perfons who for the main may be traly religious, may yet by their own Follies and Imprudence, expose themseves to needles Sufferings. And in such cases, Religion

* :

Of the Principles, &c. Lib. II.

is not to be charged, as being the Caule of their Suffering, but their Defect in it, and Mistakes about it.

2. There may be (as was faid before) fome exempt Cases from the general Rule, and fuch must those be granted to be, which concern Times of Persecution; when Religion will be so far from protecting a Man, that it will rather expose him to Danger and Sufferings. And fuch were those primitive Times to which these Scriptures do refer, when it seemed good to Divine Providence, to make use of this as one Means for the propagating of Christianity in the World, namely, by the Suffering of those that professed it. And in fuch Cafes, when Men are perfecuted properly upon the Account of Religion, God doth usually compensate their outward Sufferings with some inward Advantage, fupplying them with fuch Patience and Courage, as will support them with Joy and Comfort in their Suffering for that which is good. But then it must withal be granted, that these Scriptures are not equally applicable to fuch other Times and Places, when and where the true Religion is publickly professed and encouraged, when Kings are nurfing Fathers, and Queens nursing Mothers to the Church; because in such Times and Places, the Profession of Religion will be so far from hindring, that it will rather promote a Man's secular Advantage.

СНАР.

Chap. 4. of Natural Religion.

on is to be due to both the or of

CHAP. IV.

287

How Religion conduces to the Happiness of the Outward Man, in re-The property of spect of Riches.

Hirdly, as to our Estates and Posselfions, I shall shew that Religion is the Cause of Riches. In order to the Proof of this, the First Thing to be inquired into, is, what is the true Nature of Wealth or Riches, and wherein it may properly be faid to confift. And here it is to be noted, that the Word Riches is capable of a two-fold SAbsolute, Relative. Sense,

r. In the more absolute Sense, it may be defined to confift in such a Measure of Estate, as may be sufficient for a Man's Occasions and Conveniencies; when his Pofsessions are so proportioned, as may fully answer all the Neceffities of his Condition, and afford him a comfortable Subliftence, according to his Quality, the Station wherein he is placed. In which fense, Men of all Ranks and Degrees are capable of being rich, A Husbandman, or an ordinary Tradefinan, may

Of the Principles, &c. Lib. II.

may be as truly stiled a rich Man, as he that is a Gentleman, or a Lord, or a King. Tho' perhaps what these can very well afford to fling away upon their Diversions, be more than all the Estate and Possessions which the other can pretend to. And upon this Ground it is, that all Men will grant, one Person to be as truly *liberal* in giving but a *Penny*, or a poor *Mite*, as another in giving a *hundred Pounds*, because these Things are to be measured by the different Conditions of the Givers: And a Man may as well be rich with a *little*, as *liberal* with a *little*.

2. In the more relative Sense, Riches may be described to consist in the having of large Possefions, when a Man's Estate and Revenue is of fuch a Proportion as is commonly effeemed Great, whether with relation to the Generality of other Men, and fo only those at the upper End of the World are capable of being counted rich; or else with respect to others of the same Rank and Order, and so all such are counted rich, who do in their Possessions exceed the common fort of those that are of the same Rank with them; this kind of Wealth confifting properly in Comparison: There being not any one determinate Sum, or Proportion of Revenue, to which the Name of Riches may be appropriated, but that it may be as much below the Occasions of some Persons as it

is

Chap. 4. of Natural Religion. is above the Condition of others who yet live plentifully.

289

Now the First of these is the only proper Notion of Riches, because this alone is agreeable to the chief End of Wealth, which is to free us from Want and Neceffity. And the other may be rather stilled, the being Proprietor of great Possessions, the mere having of which cannot denominate one a truly rich Man, for this plain Reafon; because tho' fuch Possessions be in themselves great, yet they may not be sufficient to free the Owner of them from Want and Poverty, whether in respect to his real or imaginary Occasions for more: And that is not Riches, which cannot free a Man from being poor. And want of Necessaries, is as truly Poverty in him that hath much, as in him that hath but a little. He that in any one Condition of Life, hath enough to answer all his Conveniencies, fuch a Man is more truly rich than he whose Revenue is a thousand times greater, if it be not equal either to his Occasions, or to his Mind.

Now when it is faid, that Religion is the Caufe of Riches, the Meaning of this cannot reafonably be underftood of Riches in the fecond Senfe, as if he that were religious fhould be thereby advanced to the greateft Poffeffions that any Man elfe doth enjoy, from the Condition of a Peafant or a Tradefman to that of a Prince : Becaufe this would U no Of the Principles, &c. Lib. II.

no more confift with those feveral Degrees and Subordinations required to the Order of the Universe, than it would for every common Soldier to be a General, or every private Man to be a King. But the Meaning of this Proposition must be, that Religion will be a Means to supply a Man with such a Sufficiency as may denominate him rich ; and to free him from such Nccessities, whether real or imaginary, as others of his Rank and Station are liable unto.

So that by what hath been faid, it may appear, that the true Notion of Riches doth comprehend under it these two Things.

1. A Sufficiency for a Man's Occasions and Conveniencies.

2. An Acquiescence of Mind, in so much as is in itself really sufficient, and which will appear to be so, supposing a Man to judge according to right Reason.

And that this is not a mere Fancy or Notion, but the most proper Sense of the Word *Riches*, wherein all Mankind have agreed, may be made very evident.

Concerning the *first* of these, there can be no Colour or Doubt. All the Scruple will be concerning the *second*; Whether that be neceffary to make a Man rich. And to this the *Philosophers* do generally attest. Ari-*Rhet*. lib. *stotle* in particular doth affirm, that the true 1. cap. 5. Nature of Riches doth consist in the contented Use and Enjoyment of the Things we

have,

290

Chap. 4. of Natural Religion.

have, rather than in the Possession of them. Those that out of Penuriousness can fearce afford themselves the ordinary Conveniences of Life out of their large Possessions, have been always accounted poor; nay, he that cannot use and enjoy the things he doth posfess, may upon this account be faid to be of all others the moss indigent, because such that a one doth truly want the Things he hath, as well as those he hath not.

That Man who is not content with what is in itfelf fufficient for his Condition, neither is rich, nor ever will be fo; becaufe there can be no other *real* Limits to his Defires, but that of *Sufficiency*; whatever is beyond this, being boundlefs and infinite. And though Men may pleafe themfelves with an Imagination, that if they had but fuch an Addition to their Eflates, they fhould then think they had enough; yet that is but a mere Imagination, there being no real Caufe, why they fhould be more fatisfied then, than they are now.

He that is in fuch a Condition as doth place him above Contempt, and below Envy, cannot by any Enlargement of his Fortune be made really more rich or more happy than he is. And he is not a wife Man, if he do not think fo; nor is he in this either wife or worthy, if he be fo far folicitious as to part with his Liberty, though it be but in fome little Servilities, for the increasing of his Estate.

U 2

These

Of the Principles, &c. Lib. II.

These things being premised, it may be made very evident, that the Defign of being truly rich, that is, of having enough, and being contented, will be most effectually promoted by Religion; and That both Morally and Naturally.

1. Morally; upon which Account this is by the Philosophers owned to be one of the Rewards belonging to Virtue; good Men only having a moral Title to Wealth upon account of Fitness and Defert. There are many Affertions and Promifes in Scripture to this Purpose, of being prospered in our Pfal. 34. stores and labours, and all that we set our hands unto; of lacking nothing that is good for us. 'Tis this that must entitle us to the Bleffing of God, and 'tis the bleffing of God that maketh rich. Solomon speaking of Religion under the Name of Wisdom, saith, Prov. 3. that in her left hand are riches, durable c.7.8, 18. riches; that she causes those that love her to -8. 21. inherit substance, and doth fill their treasures. And the Apostle tells us, that Godliness hath the promises of this life.

2. Religion is a natural Cause of Riches, with reference to those two chief Ingredients required to fuch a State; namely, the fupplying of us with a plentiful Sufficiency, as to our Possessions, and a Satisfaction, as to our Minds.

1. A Sufficiency as to our Estates and Possefions. There are but these two Ways that

IO.

Chap. 4. of Natural Religion.

293

that can contribute to the improving of Men's Possessions, namely, the Art of getting and of keeping. Now Religion is an Advantage to Men in both these Respects. Nothing can be more evident than that there are many Virtues, which upon these accounts have a natural Tendency to the increasing of Men's Estates, as Diligence in our Callings, The diligent hand maketh rich; Heedfulnefs to improve all fitting Opportunities of providing for our felves and Families, being provident in our Expences, keeping within the Bounds of our Income, not running out into needless Debts: In brief, all the lawful Arts of Gain and good Husbandry, as to the Exercife of them, are founded in the Virtues which Religion teaches.

On the contrary it is plain, that there are many kind of Sins which have a direct natural Efficacy for the impoverishing of Men: As all kind of Senfuality, and Voluptuoufnefs, Idlenefs, Prodigality, Pride, Envy, Revenge, &c. of all which may be faid what Solomon fays of one of them, that they bring a man to a morsel of bread, and cloath him with rags.

2. And as for the second Requisite toRiches, Satisfaction of Mind with our Conditions, and a free Use of the Things we enjoy; this is the Property of Religion, that it can enable a Man to be content with his Estate, and to live comfortably without fuch things as o-U₃ thers

Pfal. 37.

16.

Of the Principles, &c. Lib. II.

thers know not how to want. And the Ability of being content with a little, may be much more truly called Riches, than the having of much, without being fatisfied therewith. 'Tis better to be in Health with a moderate Appetite, than to be continually cating and drinking under the Difeafe of a voracious Appetite or a Dropfy: And in this fenfe, *A little that the righteous hath, is* better than great riches of the ungodly.

But this may appear likewife from experience. Let any Man impartially confider, what kind of Perfons those are amongst the Generality of Men, who in their feveral Degrees and Orders are counted most able, and most wealthy, and it will appear that they are such as are most serious in the matter of Religion, most diligent in their Callings, most just and honest in their Dealings, most regular and fober in their Conversations, most liberal towards any good Work ; upon which account it is, that fuch Places, where Men have the Opportunity of being inftructed in, and excited to the Duties of Religion, do thereupon thrive and flourish most; it being one Property of Religion to civilize Men, and make them more inquisitive in Learning, and more diligent in practifing their feveral Professions.

And as for Contentment of Mind, this being in itself a Virtue as well as a Privilege, it is not to be attained but upon the account

of

Chap. 4. of Natural Religion. of Religion; nor are there any that enjoy it, but fuch as are truly virtuous.

295

There are feveral Objections that may be made against what I have been proving, but all of them capable of a plain and fatisfactory Solution.

1. There are fome kind of Virtues that feem to have a contrary Tendency; as Charity to those that want, Bounty and Liberality to any good Work, which in *Aristotle's* Ethic lib. Judgment is fearce confistent with growing^{4. c. 1.} rich.

By that Saying of Aristotle, may be meant Riches in the second Sense, as it denotes large Possefions, which this Virtue of Liberality doth not naturally promote; but it may very well confift with Riches in the first and most proper Notion of it, as it denotes Sufficiency for our Occasions; and the Ability of contributing in some proportion towards any worthy and charitable Work, is in the Efteem of every good Man, one of those Occasions and Conveniencies required to fuch a Sufficiency, and cannot any more be a Prejudice to it, than it would be for a Man to lay up fome part of his Wealth in the safest Place, to lend it out upon the best Interest, to part with '. for the Purchase of the fame Favour and Assistance from others in the like Exigencies; to lay it out upon his Pleafure, with respect to that inward Comfort and Satisfaction, which doth accompany U 4 the

Of the Principles, &c. Lib. II.

the Conficience of doing worthy Things. And befides all this, Experience will affure us, that there is a fecret Bleffing which doth for the most part accompany such Actions; fo that Men grow the richer, and not the poorer for them: And they that in this kind fow bountifully, do very often, even in this World, reap bountifully.

2. There are fome kind of Vices that feem to have a Tendency to the enriching of Men, as *Fraud*, *Extortion*, *Sordidnefs*, all kind of unlawful Ways of getting and keeping an Estate. But to this it may be faid,

1. These Vices may tend to the increasing of Mens Posses but not to the making of them truly rich : And 'tis a plain Argument that such Persons do not think themfelves to have a Sufficiency, who can apply themselves to sufficiency who can apply themselves to fuch wretched Courses for the getting of more.

2. 'Tis commonly feen upon Experience, that there is a fecret Curfe attends fuch Practices, a Canker that eats into fuch Gain, a Hole in the bottom of the Bag, by which it

Jer. 17.11. inschsibly dreins out and wastes away. As the

partridge fitteth upon eggs, and hatcheth them not; so he that getteth riches, and not by right, shall leave them in the midst of his days, and at the end shall be a fool. As that filly Bird doth fometimes take much needless Care and Pains, in sitting upon and cherishing subventancous Eggs, such as can never Chap. 4. of Natural Religion.

297

never be fruitful, which (as Naturalists observe) that Creature is very subject unto, or as the foecund Eggs of that Bird being laid upon the Ground, are many times trod upon by Passengers or wild Beasts, after it hath bestow'd much Pains for the hatching of them: So are the wicked Defigns of Gain often disappointed in the Embryo; and the Contrivers of them, instead of approving themselves to be more wise and subtile Men than others, do appear at last to be Fools. He that will carefully observe the usual Course of things in the World, may from his own Experience find Inftances enough, to confirm those Sayings of the wife Man; There is that scattereth, and yet increaseth; Prov. 11. and there is that withholdeth more than is 24. meet, but it tendeth to poverty. Wealth got-cap. 13. ten by vanity shall be diminished. The 11, 22. wealth of the sinner is laid up for the just. He that oppresseth the poor to increase his cap.22.16. riches, shall surely come to want. He that cap. 28.8, by unjust gain increaseth his substance, shall gather it for him that will pity the poor.

3. There are some good Men that are poor. And 'tis said that God hath chosen the Jam. 2.5. poor of this world, to receive the Gospel, and to be rich in faith. To this it may be said,

1. The Providence of God may so order it sometimes, as to reduce good Men to great Exigencies, to wander up and down in speepskins skins and goat-skins, being destitute, afflicted, tormented. But then these are such particular exempt Cases, as are not suitable to the most usual and general Course of Things. And besides, such as are good Men, may sometimes be desective in several of those Duties which Religion doth oblige them to, Diligence, Caution, &c. And the Poverty of such may justly be ascribed to their Desect in Religion.

298

2. As for that Scripture, that God hath chosen the poor in this world; it is not to be understood in the more absolute Sense, for such as want Necessaries; because 'tis plain from other Texts, that though fome of the Primitive Believers were, by reason of the Persecution of those Times reduced to great Exigencies, yet the Generality of the reft were very liberal in their Contributions towards them. But it must be understood in the relative Senfe, concerning fuch as might be stiled comparatively Poor; (i. e.) such as are of a lower Rank, and meaner Condition than others, and confequently had lefs Temptation to corrupt and feduce them, than those that did more abound in these earthly Things.

CHAP,

Chap. 5. of Natural Religion.

CHAP. V.

299

How Religion conduces to the Happinefs of the Outward Man in respect of Pleasure; or the chearful Enjoyment of outward Bless.

Fourthly, Religion is the most proper Means to promote the Interest of Pleasure.

In the handling of this, I shall first endeavour to state the true Nature of Pleafure, and to shew what is the most proper Notion of it. Now Pleasure doth consist in that Satisfaction which we receive in the Use and Enjoyment of the Things we posfefs. It is founded in a Suitablenefs and Congruity betwixt the Faculty and the Object. Those are called pleasant Tastes and Smells, which are apt to excite fuch a gentle Motion, as is agreeable to the Nerves appointed for those Functions. Now, it cannot be denied, but that Beasts and Insects may be faid to be capable of Pleasure proper to their Kind, as well as Men. Only this must withal be granted, that the more noble and the more capacious the Faculties and the Objects are, the greater will the Delights be that

Of the Principles, &c. Lib. II.

that flow from the Union of them. Upon which account, all intellectual Delights do far exceed those that are sensual; and, amongst Persons that are capable of intellectual Pleasures, their Enjoyments must be greatest, whose Faculties are most enlarged, and most vigorous. 'Tis true indeed, Men of vitiated and depraved Faculties, though they are thereby difabled for paffing a true Judgment upon the Nature of Things, being apt to mistake sour for sweet; yet will it not thence follow, that they are incapable of Pleasure: They may have such peculiar kinds of Gusts, as will be able to find a Satisfaction and Sweetness in such things as appear nauseous and loathfome to others. And 'tis the Congruity of things, that is the Foundation of Pleafure. But then fuch Perfons are beholden to their Ignorance and their Delusion, to the Distemper of their Faculties, for their Relish of these things : None but those that are foolish and deceived, and Tit. 3. 3. under the Servitude of divers lusts, devote themselves to such kind of things for Plea-

themfelves to fuch kind of things for Pleafures. Supposing a Man to have found healthy Faculties, fuch an one will not be able to find any true Satisfaction and Complacence, but only in those things which have in them a natural Goodness and Rectitude. They must be regular Objects, that have in them a Suitableness to regular Faculties.

This

This being premised by way of Explication, I shall proceed to prove, that Religion is the most proper means for the promoting of this Interest; and this it doth

{Morally. Naturally.

1. Morally; as it is one of the Rewards belonging to Virtue, which alone upon its own account doth deferve all fuch Advantages, as may render its Condition pleafant and comfortable in this World.

Befides the feveral Affertions and Promifes in Scripture to this purpofe, *Prov.* 3. 17. fpeaking of Religion under the Name of Wifdom, it is faid, that her ways are ways of pleafantnefs. The yoke of it is easy, $\chi_{pn505}^{Mat. 11}$. gracious and sweet, and the burden light.^{30.} The commandments of it not grievous. The 1 Joh. 5. fruits of it are love, and joy, and peace.^{33.} Gal. 5. 22. The Duties of Religion are in feveral Places of Scripture compared to Musick and to Feasting; and are faid to be *fweeter than the* honey and the honey-comb. I delight to do thy will, O my God, Pfal. 40. 8.

2. Religion is the Natural Caufe of Pleafure. Which I fhall endeavour to make out by Reafon and Experience.

1. By Reafon: Religion hath a natural Efficacy in promoting the Interest of Pleasure, teaching a Man a chearful liberal Use of

of the things he enjoys, how to make his foul enjoy good in his labour; how to fweeten and allay all the Difficulties and Troubles of this Life. Nor doth it restrain Men from any fuch sensible Pleasures, as are agreeable to Reason, or our true Interests. It only prohibits Mistakes and Excesses about them, teaches us so to regulate our selves in the use of them, that they may truly dcferve the Name of Pleasure: how to provide against that natural Emptiness and Vanity, which there is in all fuch Things, whereby they are apt quickly to fatiate and weary us; and upon this account it may be faid to promote rather than hinder the Interest of Pleasure.

As for the Pleasures of the Appetite, these abide no longer than till the Necessities and Conveniencies of Nature are fatisfied; and fo far Religion doth allow of them. When our Hunger and Thirst is well appealed, all that follows after is but a faint kind of Pleasure, if it be not rather to be stilled Satiety and a Burden.

As for those kind of Things, which we call by the Name of Sports and Diversions, Religion doth likewife admit of a moderate Use of these; and what is beyond such a moderate Use, doth rather tire Men, than recreate them: It being as much the Property of such Things, to weary a Man when he is once sufficiently refreshed by them, as

302

Chap. 5. of Natural Religion. 303 it is to refresh him when he is wearied by other Things.

We read indeed of the pleasures of sin: but besides that they are of a baser and groffer kind, 'tis faid also, that they are but for Job 20.5. a feason, but for a moment, and the end of them is heavines. The Ways of Sin may feem broad and pleasant, but they lead down Prov. 5. to death, and take hold of hell. There are fome Vices that seem sweet to the Palate, but do after fill the mouth with gravel. -20. 17. There are several Sins which have very specious and tempting Appearances, which yet upon trial do bite like a serpent, and sting-23. 32. like an adder.

By what has been faid, it appears, that Religion is a natural Caufe of promoting thefe fenfible Pleafures; befides, that it affords Delights incomparably beyond all thefe corporeal Things, fuch as thofe who are Strangers to Religion cannot understand, and do not intermeddle with.

2. But befides the Reafons to this purpofe, it may appear likewife from Experience, that the great Pleafure of Men's Lives is from the Goodnefs of them; fuch only being capable of a free and liberal Enjoyment of what they poffefs, who know how to regulate themfelves in the Fruition of them, to avoid Extremitics on either hand, to prevent those Mixtures of Guilt and Fear, which will imbitter all their Enjoyments.

joyments. Such Persons only who have good Consciences, being capable of having a continual Feast.

The great Objection against this will be, from the Difficulty of the Duties of Mortification, Repentance, Self-denial, taking up the Cross, &c. All which do imply in them a Repugnancy to our Natures, and consequently an Inconsistency with Pleafure.

For answer to this, it must be observed, That Difficulty doth properly arise from a Disproportion betwixt the Power and the Work; as when a Person of little Strength is put to carry a great Burden, when one of a mean Capacity is put to answer an hard Queftion in Learning. Now, fuppofing Men to retain their vicious Habits, it must be granted, to be as difficult for such to perform the Duties of Religion, or to forbear the Acts of Sin, as for a lame and impotent Man to run, or for a Man under a violent Fever to be restrained from drinking. But suppose these Men cured of these Maladies, and their Faculties to be rectified, then all this Disproportion and Unfuitableness will vanish; and those Things will become easy and delightful, which were before very difficult and unpleafant. Now, it is the Property of Religion, that it changes the Natures of Men, making them new Creatures. It puts off the old man, which

304

which is corrupt according to deceitful lusts, and puts on the new man, which after God. is created in righteousness and true holiness. It removes our vicious Habits, and endows the Mind with other kind of Inclinations and Abilities. And though there should be some Difficulties in the very Passage from one State to another, yet this ought not to be objected as a Prejudice against Religion; because there are far greater Difficulties and Pains to be undergone in the Service and Drudgery of impetuous Lusts. The Trouble of being cured, is not so great as that of being fick; nor is the Trouble of being fober, comparable to that of being debauched and intemperate. That godly Sorrow which is required as one of the first Acts in the Change of our Condition, is always accompanied with fecret Pleafure: And as it is said of wicked men, that in the midst of laughter their heart is forrowful; so may it be said of good men, that in the midst of their sorrow their heart is joyful. And when the Conditions of Men are once changed, when they are passed over to another State, it will then prove as eafy to them to observe the Duties of Religion, as it was before to follow their own finful Inclinations. An evil Tree doth not more naturally bring forth evil Fruit, than a good Tree doth bring forth good Fruit.

X

As

305

As for that Morofenels and Sournels of Carriage which fome Men, who pretend to Religion, are noted for; this is not juftly to be afcribed to their Religion, but to their want of it. Joy and Chearfulnels being not only a Privilege, but a Duty which Religion doth oblige Men to, whereby they are to adorn their Profellion, and win over others to a Love of it.

CHAP. VI.

How Religion conduces to our Honour. and Reputation.

Flfthly, for the Interest of Honour and Reputation. This is one of the greatest Bleflings which this World can afford, much to be preferred before Riches or Pleasures, Prov. 22. or Life it self. A good name is rather to 1. be chosen than great riches, and loving favour rather than filver and gold. One that is a generous virtuous Man will chuse to die, rather than do any thing that may expose him to Infamy. St. Paul was of this 1 Cor. 9. Mind. It were better for me to die, than 15. that any should make my glorying void. And because 'tis a thing of so great Excellency, therefore we do pay it, as the best Service we can do to God, and to his Deputies, Magi-

207

Magistrates and Parents. 'Tis by this that we are render'd useful and acceptable to others. And besides the Advantage we have by it while we live, 'tis one of those Things that will abide after us, when we are gone out of the World; and for that Reason a special Regard is to be had to it. And the more wife and virtuous any Man is, the more care will he take to transmit a grateful Memory of himself to future Times; and fince he must be spoken of after his Departure, to take care that he be well-spoken of, that his Name may be as a precious Ointment, leaving a Perfume behind it, that Men may rife up at the mention of it, and call him bleffed. Nor can any Man despise Honour, but he that doth either despair of it, or resolve against doing any thing that may deferve it.

Now Honour is properly the Efteem and good Opinion which Men have concerning the Perfon or the Actions of another, together with fuch external Expressions of Respects as are fuitable thereunto.

And I fhall make it appear, that this kind of Happiness doth depend upon Religion, both

Morally, Naturally:

t. Morally. Nothing being more genetally agreed upon amongst all the Philoso-X 2 phers, 308

Of the Principles, &c. Lib. II.

phers, than that Honour is the peculiar Reward of Virtue, and doth not properly belong to any thing elfe. And that Shame is the proper Reward of Vice, nor can it belong to any thing elfe.

The Scripture is very copious in Expreffions to this purpose. Such as are Religious, are styled the excellent of the earth, Pfal. 16. 3. and faid to be more excellent than Cap. 12. Deut. 32. their neighbours, Prov. 17. 27. They are God's peculiar treasure, the dearly beloved Exo. 19 5. of his foul. He fets apart the man that is Jer. 12. 7. godly for himfelf. Though such Persons may be but low in their outward Condition, being put to wander up and down in Sheepskins and goat-skins, being destitute, afflicted, tormented, seeking for refuge in defarts and mountains, in dens and caves of the earth; yet are they upon the account of Religion, of fuch an excellent Value, that in the Judgment of the Holy Ghoft, the world is not worthy of them, Heb. 11. 37, 38.

The Wife-man, speaking of Religion, faith Prov. 1.9 that it shall be an ornament of grace to thy Cap. 4. 8, head, and as a chain about thy neck. Exalt 9. her, and she shall promote thee, and bring thee to honour. She shall give to thy head an ornament of grace, and a crown of glory. God hath engaged himself by Promise to Deut. 28. those People that are religious, that he will 3. fet them above other nations; they shall be made

made the head, and not the tail. He will' 1 Sam. 2. honour those that honour him. And cer- 30. Joh. 12. tainly, he who is the King of Kings, must 26. needs be the Fountain of Honour, and be able to dispose of it as he pleases.

And on the other fide, Shame is in Scripture faid to be the proper Reward and Confequent of Sin, especially in the Writings of David and Solomon. Religion is styled by the Name of Wisdom, and Sin by the Name of Folly. And the Wife man having faid, Prov. 3. 35. that the wife shall inherit glory, 'tis added, but shame shall be the promotions of fools: it shall be their promotion; the utmost that fuch Persons shall ever attain to, will be but difgrace; when they are exalted and lifted up, it shall prove to their disparagement, to make their Shame more conspicuous. And Prov. 13. 5. 'tis faid, A wicked man is loath some, and cometh to shame. The Word translated loath some, properly denotes such kind of Persons to be as nauseous and offensive to the Judgments of others, as the most loathfome unfavoury Things are to their Taftes or Smells. They are stilled by the Name of Wolves and Bears, Swine, Dogs, and Vipers, things both hurtful and hateful.

Men that are truly virtuous, have a Reverence paid them by all that know them. And on the other fide, vicious Men are defpised. Not but that wicked Perfons may be inwardly honoured, by fuch as do not know X 3 them

310

them to be wicked; and on the other fide, thofe that are good, may by others be effeemed and ufed, as being the Rubbifh and Offfcouring of all things. But this is to be afcribed chiefly to their Miftake and Ignorance of them, whilft they look upon fuch Perfons as being the moft dangerous pernicious Perfons. But the Generality of Mankind have heretofore, and ftill do pay a Reverence to any Perfon whom they believe to be Innocent and Virtuous.

2. Religion is the *natural* Caufe of Honour and Reputation, fo far as fuch Things are capable of any phyfical Efficacy. This I shall endeavour to prove, both from Reason and Experience.

I. By Reafon. For the better understanding of this, we are to take notice, that *Honour* may be confider'd under a twofold Notion.

1. According to the Defert and Foundation of it, in the Person honoured.

2. According to the Acknowledgement or Attribution of it, in the Perfon bonouring.

Now Religion doth by a natural Caufality influence both these.

1. According to the Foundation of it, in the Perfon honoured, which is true Virtue and Merit. I have fhewed before, that the Effence of Man may be faid to confift in being religious, and confequently this must be the Rule and Measure of a Man's real Worth:

Worth; it must be our excelling in that which makes us Men, that must make us better Men than others. All other things have fome kind of Standard, by which the. natural Goodness of them is to be measur'd ; fo is it with Men likewife. And this is usually from their Suitableness to that chief End they are design'd for. Quæ conditio rerum, eadem & hominum est; navis bona dicitur, non quæ pretiosis coloribus pieta est, &c. (saith Seneca.) " We do not therefore esteem Epist. 76. " a Ship to be good, because it is curiously " painted and gilded, or carved and inlay'd, " but because 'tis fitted for all the Purposes " of Navigation, which is the proper End of " a Ship." Nor do we therefore count a Sword to be good, because it hath a rich Hilt and an embroidered Scabbard, but because it is fit for the proper use of a Sword, which is to cut, &c. In homine quoque nihil ad rem pertinet, quantum aret, quantum fæneret, à quàm multis salutetur, sed quàm bonus sit. It should be so likewise in our Esteem of Men, who are not fo much to be valued by the Grandeur of their Estates or Titles, as by their inward Goodness. The true Stamp of Nobility is upon the Minds of Men, and doth confift in such virtuous Habits, as will enable a Man for worthy Defigns and Actions; when the Image of God, who is the Rule of Excellency and the Fountain of Honour, is in any Measure restored upon it,

X 4

Every

SII

312

Of the Principles, &c. Lib. II.

Every Man is endowed with a natural Principle inclining him to a State of Happinefs, and hath in fome meafure both an Ability to judge of, and a Freedom and Liberty for applying himfelf unto, those Duties, which are the proper Means for the promoting of this End : Nor is he upon any other account to be justly praised or blamed, but according to the right or wrong Use of this natural Liberty. And therefore as fuch a Man doth find either in himfelf or others, a constant and firm Resolution to make a right use of this; so should he proportion his Efteem accordingly, preferring this inward Greatness, this Rectitude of Mind, whereby a Man is refolved in every Condition, to do that which shall appear to be his Duty, before any kind of external Greatness whatfoever.

There is a Refpect and Honour due to all kind of Virtues whatfoever, as rendring Men amiable and lovely. But amongft the reft there are two, which are by general Confent efteemed venerable, and fuch as do greatly advance the Reputation of those who are endow'd with them; namely,

> {Wisdom, Courage;

Because they have a more intrinsick Rise, and do less depend upon external Advantages,

tages, but seem rather to be rooted in the inward Frame and Temper of our Minds; and withal are most beneficial both to our felves and others. The former fignifying a Man to have those intellectual Abilities which are proper to his Kind, whereby the human Nature is to be diftinguished from other Things : The other, because it argues a Rectitude in the Will, and a Power to fubdue the Passion of Fear, which is most natural to our present State of Infirmity; and withal doth support a Man against Difficulties, and enable him for those two great Services, of doing and suffering as he ought. And for this Reason, the Vices that are opposite to these, are amongst all others counted the most shameful; there being no greater Reproach to be cast upon any one, than to be efteemed a Fool or a Coward.

Now a Man that is irreligious cannot justly pretend to either of these Virtues.

1. For Wisdom. This is so effential to Religion, that in the Scripture-phrase they both go under the same name. And there is very good Reason, why it should be so; because there is such an intimate Agreement between the Natures of them. The Philo-Sopher doth define Wisdom to confist in an Ability and Inclination, to make choice of right Means in the Prosecution of our true End. And nothing can enable a Man for this but Religion, both as to the Subordinate End of 314

Of the Principles, &c. Lib. II. of temporal Happiness in this World, and

chiefly with respect to that great and *supreme* End of *eternal* Happiness in the World to come.

2. And then for Courage. 'Tis not poffible for a Man to be truly valiant, unless he be withal truly religious: He may be bold and daring, and able in a fearless manner to rush upon any Danger; but then he must stifle his Reason from confidering what the Confequences of things may be, what shall become of him hereafter if he should mifcarry : There being no Man whatfoever fo totally free from the Apprehensions of a future State, but that when he is ferious and confiderate, he must be startled with Doubts and Fears concerning it : So that there cannot be any rational, sedate, deliberate Courage, but only in fuch as have good Hopes of a better Estate in the other World; and 'tis Religion only that can enable a Man for this.

2. Honour confider'd according to the Acknowledgement or Attribution of it in the Perfons *honouring*; which is the external Form, or as the Body of Honour, being much in the power of others. And this may be diffinguished into these two Kinds,

{Inward, Outward,

1. Inward Honouring is properly an Act of the Understanding, in passing Judgment upon

upon the Nature of Things: When we do, in our Minds, own and acknowlege the real Worth or Virtue of a Thing or Person. And every one who will act rationally, not mifcalling good evil, and evil good, must proportion his Esteem of Things, according to the real value of them. Nor is it in any Man's power, so far to offer Violence to his own Faculties, as to believe any thing against Evidence; to esteem that Man to be either worthy or unworthy, whom he knows to be otherwife. He may call him and use him as he pleases, and he may be willing to entertain Prejudices, either for or against him; and in this sense, Honor est in honorante : But he cannot inwardly think or believe otherwife than according to his Evidence. For Men of no real worth to expect this inward Honour from others, as it is very unequal, requiring brick without straw; and very unlawful, it being as well a Man's Duty to contemn a vile person, as to honour those that fear the Lord: so neither is it possible, becaufe Men must necessarily judge according to the most prevailing Evidence; nor can they effeem such a one to be worthy, whom they know to be otherwife, any more than they can believe that to be white and streight, which they see to be black and crooked.

There are indeed fome other things, that do commonly go under this Name, as the feveral

feveral Degrees of Nobility, Titles, and Places of Dignity which are usually called by this Name of Honour; but these things (as they are abstracted from Magistracy) being wholly extrinsical, have no more due to them, but a mere external Respect. They may challenge from us, that we should give them their due Titles, and demean ourselves towards them with that Observance and Ceremony, which becomes their Quality : But then as for that inward Efteem and Valuation of our Minds belonging to good Men, fuch Persons can challenge no greater Share of this than according as their real Merit and Virtue shall require. The Royal Stamp upon any kind of Metal may be sufficient to give it an extrinsick Value, and to determine the Rate at which it is to pass amongst Coins; but it cannot give an intrinsick Value, or make that which is but Brass to be Gold.

Tis true indeed, there are fome Callings and particular Relations of Men, to which an inward Veneration is due, though the Perfons themfelves fhould not be virtuous; namely, Magistrates, and Ministers, and Parents, and Benefactors; who having fomewhat of a Divine Stamp and Impress, may therefore challenge from us, that we should demean ourfelves towards them, both with such an outward Respect as becomes their Places, and with such an inward Respect too, as

316

as may be fuitable to that Image which they bear; to our Dependence upon them, and Obligations to them. But then we cannot be obliged to think fuch Perfons good Men, unlefs we have fome Evidence to believe them to be fo, or at leaft not to be otherwife; fo that they are beholden to fomething extrinfical to their Perfons, namely to their Callings and Relations, for that Honour which is paid to them.

317

2. Outward Honouring is, when Men do by their Words or Actions teftify that Efteem and Respect which they have for the Worth of others. And this indeed may be truly faid to be in the power of others, because Men have a greater Command over their Words and Actions, than they have over their Belief. Now all Men that are truly Virtuous and Religious, will be ready to give unto every one his due Honour; and fuch are the best Judges of it. Upon which account Tully defines true Honour to be consentiens laus bonorum, the concurrent Tusc. Approbation of good Men; fuch only being fit to give true Praise, who are themselves praise worthy.

As for vicious and irreligious Perfons, 'tis not to be expected that they fhould be forward to commend that which is opposite to them. But then 'tis to be confider'd, that these are no competent Judges of such matters: And for a Man to resent deeply the Con-

Contempt of unworthy Persons, were overmuch to honour them, as if their Esteem could add any thing to his Reputation.

And yet, even these Persons cannot avoid having an inward Veneration for Goodnefs and Religion, which is the Reafon why they are so forward to diffemble it, to disguise themselves under the shew of it. Men do not use to counterfeit common Stones and Metals, but fuch as are precious, Jewels, and Gold; nor would any one take the pains to counterfeit being religious, if he did not think it a matter of some Value, and a means to procure Effeem from others. And when fuch Men do revile and perfecute any one for being religious, yet is there fuch a natural Veneration belonging to the Thing itself, as makes them to difguise it under the Name of Hypocrify, Herefy, Superstition, &c. whereby they may justify themselves in their opposing of it.

II. But this is only general Difcourfe, and in the Notion. The beft Argument to this purpofe would be from *Experience*; by which I mean that practical Knowledge, which every Man may attain by his own Obfervation of the ufual Courfe of Things in the World. And by this it will appear, that no kind of Perfons have been more highly reverenced in the Hearts and Confciences of others, than those that have been most eminent for their Virtue and Religion; which hath been always

318

319

ways true, both with respect to publick Communities, and private Persons.

I. For Nations. If we confult the Hiftories of former Times, we shall find that Saying of Solomon constantly verified, That Righteousness doth exalt a Nation, but Sin Prov. 14. doth prove a reproach to it. And more ef- 34. pecially the Sin of Irreligiousness and Prophaneness: As this doth increase in any Nation, fo must the Honour and Reputation of that Nation decrease. The Roman Empire was then at the highest, as to its Name and Greatness, when it was so as to its Virtue; when they were most punctual in observing the Rites of their Religion, (tho' that were a false way of Worship) most heroical in their Justice, Courage, Fidelity, Gratitude; then it was that they deferved to govern the World, and to be had in greateft honour above all other Nations. And not only · Cicero and Polybius, two Heathen Writers, who, upon that account, might be thought more partial; but St. Auftin alfo and Lactantius, two of the Fathers, do ascribe the flourishing of that Empire, when it was at its height, to the Religion, and Piety, and Virtue of those Times: and as they did afterwards degenerate from this, fo did they decline likewife in their Greatness and Honour.

2. Thus also hath it been with particular Persons; amongst the Heathen, what Elogies

gies do we find in the Honour of Socrates, Aristides, Cato, Epittetus? The last of whom, though but a poor Slave, had yet such a Veneration paid to his Memory, that his Earthen Lamp, by which he was wont to study, was, after his Death, sold for three thousand Drachms.

Nor was it otherwise amongst the Chriftians: The Apostles were but poor Fishermen, illiterate Mechanicks: Many of the Martyrs were but of mean Condition, much opposed and perfecuted in the World; and yet these Men, during the time of their Lives, were highly reverenced amongst those that knew them; and fince their Deaths, what can be more glorious than that Renown which they have amongst Men, when the greatest Kings and Princes will not mention their Names without Reverence; when whole Nations are willing to set apart, and to obferve solutions and Festivals in honour of their Memories?

And as it hath always been thus formerly, fo I appeal to every Man's Breaft, whether it be not fo now. Let them but examine what their Inclinations are towards fuch Perfons whom they believe to be truly virtuous; not only to fuch among them, as are their particular Acquaintance and Friends, but likewife to Strangers, nay, to very Enemies, whether they do not effeem and love them, and will-well to them.

320

It

It cannot be denied, but that there are too many in the World; who propose to themfelves fuch Ways and Courfes for the promoting of their Honour and Reputation, as are quite opposite to that which I have now been discoursing of; namely, Prophaneness and Contempt of Religion, despising that which other Men fland in Awe of; by which they think to get the Reputation of Wit and Courage: of Wit; by pretending to penetrate more deeply into the Nature of Things, and to understand them better than others do; not to be fo eafily imposed upon, as other credulous People are: Of Courage, by not being so easily scared at the Apprehension of Danger at a Distance.

But the plain Truth is, fuch Perfons do hereby prove themfelves to be both Fools and Cowards.

Fools, In mistaking their great Interest, in making choice of such Means, as can never promote the End they design. There being no kind of Men that are more exposed (whatsoever they themselves may think of it) than those the source they themselves may think of it) than those they the the the they the the those they the the they the the those the they the the they the the those the the they the the they the the those the they the the they the the they the those the the they the the they the the the the those the the they the the the they the they the the the the they the the the the the

Y

Cowards :

321

Cowards; In being more afraid of little Dangers, because they are present, than of greater, because they are future, and at a Diftance. As that Soldier who doth more dread the present Danger of fighting, when he is obliged to it, than the future Danger of suffering by Martial Law for running away, may justly be effected a notorious Coward; fo may that Man, who is more afraid of a present Inconvenience, by incurring the Prejudice and Displeasure of his loofe Companions, to whom he would be acceptable, than of a future Mischief from the Judgment of God. No Man will efteem another to be truly Valiant, because he is not afraid to do fuch vile unworthy things as will expose him to the Displeasure and Punishment of the Civil Magistrate; much less should he be fo accounted, for daring to do fuch Things, as will in the Isfue expose him to the Divine Vengeance.

322

CHAP.

CHAP. VII.

How Religion conduceth to the Happiness of the Inward Man, as it tends to the regulating of our Faculties, and to the Peace and Tranquility of our Minds.

A S for the Internal Welfare of our Minds, this (as I observed before) doth depend upon these two Things.

1. The perfecting and regulating of our Faculties, inabling them for their proper Functions, and the keeping of them in due Subordination to one another.

2. In the Peace, Quiet, Contentment, consequent thereupon.

And both these do likewise depend upon Religion.

1. For the perfecting and regulating of our Faculties, and inabling them for their proper Functions. These things do depend upon Religion, both

> Morally, Naturally.

1. Morally; As these things are Bleffings and Privileges, so do they belong to Religion X 2 as

as the proper Reward of it. Those Menonly being fit to have free and large Minds,, and refin'd Faculties, who are willing to improve them to the best Use and Advantage. To this Purpose there are several Expressions in Scripture: A good understanding have all they that do his Commandments. Thou thro' thy Commandments hast made me wiser than mine Enemies. He that doth the Will of God shall know it.

2. Naturally; Asthese Things are Duties, fo are they the proper Effects of Virtue.

The Generality of the Heathen Philofophers have agreed in this, that Sin is the natural Caufe of debasing the Soul, immerfing it into a State of Senfuality and Darknefs, deriving fuch an Impotence and Deformity upon the Mind, as the most loathfome Difeases do upon the Body. And therefore: it must be Religion and Virtue, on the other fide, that must enlighten and enlarge the: Mind, and reftore it from the Degeneracy of its lapsed Estate, renewing upon us the: Image of our Maker, adorning us with those: Beauties of Holiness, which belong to the hidden man of the heart. 'Tis the proper Work of Religion, to frame the Mind to the nearest Conformity unto the Nature of God; upon which account it is faid in Scripture to 2 Pet. 1. confist in a participation of the divine nature. Other Things may be faid to have fome remote Resemblance to the Deity; but Man

only

324

only amongst the visible Creatures, is capable of those more immediate Communications from him, by Religion; and all kind of Perfection is to be measured by its Nearness or Remoteness to the first and chief Pattern of all Perfection.

As all kind of Vice doth go under the Name of Impotence, so Religion is describ'd to be the spirit of Power, and of a sound Mind; because it doth establish in a Man a just Empire over himself, over all those blind Powers and Paffions, which of themfelves are apt to raife Tumults and Commotions against the Dominion of Reason. That which Health is to the Body, whereby the outward Senfes are inabled to make a true Judgment of Things; That is Virtue to the Mind, whereby the inward Faculties must be fitted and disposed to discern betwixt Things that differ, which those who are under the Power of vicious Habits are not able to do.

But to speak more particularly, Religion doth,

1. Enlarge the Understanding, enabling it to fee beyond the narrow Bounds of Sense and Time, to behold Things that are invifible; God being in the intellectual World, as the Sun is in the fensible World; and as natural Blindness doth disable Men from seeing the one, so will spiritual Blindness for the other.

2. It

2. It doth exalt and regulate the Will to a Defire after, and Acquiefcence in luch things as will promote the Perfection of our Natures, and confequently will beget in the Mind, the trueft Liberty, Ingenuity, Generofity, which are altogether inconfiftent with the Servitude of Lufts and Paffions.

326

3. It doth reduce the Paffions unto a due Subordination to the fuperior Faculties; reftraining the Violence and Impetuoufnefs of them, from whence the greateft Part of the Trouble and Difquiet of Men's Lives doth proceed. As he that is of a healthy Conflitution, can endure Heat and Cold, and Labour, with little or no Prejudice to himfelf; fo can one of a virtuous Mind undergo various Conditions without receiving any Hurt from them. Such an one is not lifted up by Profperity, not dejected by Adverfity: He is not a Servant to Anger, Fear, Envy, Malice, which are the great Occafions of diffurbing our inward Peace and Quet.

2. The fecond Thing wherein the Welfare of our Minds doth confift, is Peace, Tranquility, Joy, Confidence, in opposition to inward Disquict, Anxiety, Grief, Fear, Diffidence. And these do depend upon Religion likewise, both

> S Morally, Naturally.

> > I. Morally;

1. Morally; As these things may be confidered under the Notion of Blessings and Privileges, so they belong to the Rewards of Religion: All *Philosophers* having agreed in this, that inward Serenity and Composednets of Mind is the proper Reward of moral Virtue.

To which the Scripture doth atteft, in those Expressions, where 'tis said, that a good Prov. 14. man is satisfied from himself; in the fear ^{14.} ver. 26. of the Lord is strong confidence. The righ-c. 28. 1. teous is bold as a lion. Thou wilt keep him ^{16.} 26. 3. in perfect peace whose mind is stayed on thee. That the fruits of righteousness, shall be peace, and the effect of righteousness, quietness and alsurance for ever. That tribula-Rom. 2.9, tion and anguish shall be upon every soul ^{10.} that doth evil; but to him that doth good, glory, and honour, and peace, Serenity and Composedness of Mind, peace that passeth Gal. 5. 22. all understanding, joy that is unspeakable and full of glory.

2. Naturally; As these things are consider'd under the Notion of Duties, so they are the most genuine Fruits and Effects of Religion; which doth oblige us to them, and enable us for them.

1. Religion doth oblige Men to Joy and Peace and Confidence. The very *Heathens* have acknowledged these to be such Things, as all good Men are bound to upon the account of Duty. And the Scripture doth X 4 abound abound in Precepts to this purpose. Rejoice in the Lord always, and again I say rejoice. Commit thy ways unto the Lord, and he shall bring it to pass. Be careful for nothing. Cast thy burden upon him, as knowing that he takes care for thee.

These kind of Duties do formally and in the very Effence of them, contain in them the Nature of Happiness.

And on the contrary, the oppofite Vices do contain in them the true Nature of Punifhment, and render Men formally miferable. Such a Man muft needs be unhappy, who lives under the Power of continual Anxieties, Sorrow, Fears, Diffidence, Self-will, Malice, Envy, &c. of feveral of which, that may be faid which the Poet speaks concerning one of them.

Invidià Siculi non invenêre Tyranni Tormențum majus.

The Sicilian Tyrants who were of old famous for inventing Engines of Torture, as that of *Phalaris* his Bull, were not able to find out any kind of Torment for the Body, equal to that which fome of thefe Vices do occasion to the Mind.

2. And as Religion doth oblige us to, fo likewife doth it enable us for this kind of Happiness, and that upon a twofold Account.

I. From

1. From the general Nature of Religion and Virtue confider'd in itself.

2. From the most natural Effects and Consequences of it,

1. From the general Nature of Religion confider'd in it self. All kind of Virtues containing in their very Effence thefe kind of inward Felicities, either formally or virtually: The very Foundation of Happiness and Mifery, Reward and Punishment, being laid in the very Nature of these Things themfelves. That natural Appetite, whereby Men are carried out after a State of Happiness, is for the Nature of it fo universal and radical, fo closely fixed to our first Principles; and for the Degree of it, fo ardent and impetuous, that 'tis not possible for Men to be difappointed in it, without a very quick Senfation, and some proportionable Trouble for it. The more eager Men are in their Defires, the more fenfible must they be of Gain or Lofs. Now all fuch Courfes as have a natural Tendency to the fatisfying of this Appetite, are upon that Account, Parts of our Happiness. And on the other fide, those which are cross to it, must needs make us miserable. And if it be so (as I have already proved) that our Happiness must confist in fuch a Similitude and Refemblance to the Supreme Good, as we are capable of; it must hence

330

Of the Principles, &c. Lib. II.

hence follow, that Religion is formally Happinefs. He that lives under the power of Godlike Dispositions in his Mind, and doth accordingly exercise them in the Course of his Life, may be faid, eo nomine, to be a happy Man: Holiness and Happiness being but two distinct Names for the same thing. I fhewed before, that the true Nature of Pleafure was founded in a Suitableness betwixt the Faculty and the Object: From whence it will follow, that reasonable Actions have in them a Suitableness to reasonable Minds: And the more virtuous and religious any Man is, the more Delight must fuch a Man take in such kind of Actions. That Man who hath a just Sense of his own impotent dependent Condition, and how much it is for the Interest of the World, and the good of all human Affairs, that there is a Supreme Governour who is infinitely Wife, and Powerful and Gracious, and how reasonable it is that Men should demean themselves towards him fuitably to this Belief: He that is convinced how neceffary it is for the promoting his own private, as well as the publick Welfare, that Men be forward to do all good Offices of Justice and Friendship towards one another; I fay, he that is under this Conviction, must needs find much Satisfaction and Pleafure in fuch kind of Actions. As for first-Table Duties, which confist in Acquaintance with God, Communion with him,

him, in meditating upon his Wisdom, Goodness, Power; in Affiance, Love, Reverence; if these were not Acts of the highest Pleasure, they would never have been appointed for the Happiness of our future State in Heaven. And as for second-Table Duties, What greater Pleasure and Satisfaction can there be to a generous Mind, than to do worthy Things; to be employed about Acts of Justice, and Charity, and Beneficence; to promote publick Peace and Good-will amongst Men? Eating and Drinking is not a more proper Satisfaction to those natural Appetites of Hunger and Thirst, than the doing of good is to the rational Inclinations of a good Man. As all Light, and Love, and Joy are from above, from the Father of Lights; fo all Darknefs, Sorrow, Fear, Disquiet, must be from below, from the Prince of Darkness. Wicked Men are well compared to the troubled Sea, which cannot reft, but by reason Isa. 57. of its being toffed to and fro by contrary Winds, is still casting up Mire and Dirt. He that lives under the Servitude of Lufts and Passions, must always be in an unquiet restless Condition; because such Masters can never be fatisfied in any one Service they employ us about; befides the Interfering and Contrariety of those Employments which they will exact from us. Vice is multiform, scelera dissident, and therefore must they needs be inconfistent with Rest and Quiet. One

332

Of the Principles, &c. Lib. II.

One principal Requifite to a State of Serenity of Mind, doth confift in an uniform Agreement about that chief End which we are to purfue, together with the Means conducing to it; whereas they that have many and contrary Things in Defign, muft needs be diftracted about them. The Soul that cannot fix it felf upon the Enjoyment of God, who is the only All-fufficient Good, and confequently the only Center of Reft, muft be like those disconsolate Spirits, which Mat. 12: our Saviour speaks of, who being cast out of their Habitations, were put to wander up

and down through Defart Places, feeking Reft but finding none.

2. From the most natural Effects and Confequences of Religion, in respect of that inward Confidence, Peace, Joy, which must follow the Confcience of Well-doing; infomuch, that there is not any kind of Tree which doth more naturally produce its proper Fruits, than the Habits of Virtue do bring forth Joy and Serenity in the Mind. When a Man shall sit down and take a ferious Review of what he hath done, and finds it to be most agreeable both to his Duty and Intereft, from hence there must needs arise an inward Satisfaction of Mind. And on the other fide, a Fountain doth not more naturally fend out Waters, than Vice doth Punishment and Misery. Nor is this any mere Notion or Fancy, which fome fevere melan-

melancholy Divines would impose upon the World; but it is most agreeable to those natural Sentiments, which the very Heathen have had, and do frequently mention: Seneca in particular; Res severa est verum gaudium; unde sit, interrogas? dicam, ex bona conscientia, ex honestis consiliis, ex restis actionibus. All solid Comfort must arise from a good Conscience, and honest Actions.

I appeal to the Experience of all confidering Men, whether this doth not appear to them, that the Generality of those who live most pleafantly in the World, are the most religious and virtuous Part of Mankind; fuch as know how to regulate themfelves in the Fruition of what they have, how to avoid the Extremities on either hand, to prevent those Mixtures of Guilt and Fear, which are apt to four and imbitter all our Enjoyments ? Whether lawful Pleafures, which a Man may reflect upon without any Sense of Guilt, be not much to be preferred before others? Whether those intellectual Delights, that flow from the confcience of well-doing, be not much better than any finful sensual Pleasure? Whether the doing of any worthy Action, fuch as all good Men must think well of, and commend, doth not afford a more folid lafting Pleasure, than can be had from any sensible Enjoyments? Whether any thing can be more fuitable, and consequently, delightful to a generous Mind, than an Opportunity of being 334

Of the Principles, &c. Lib. II.

ing grateful to those by whom a Man hath been obliged; the making of an ample Return for the Favours he hath received? Whether that noble way of conquest, overcoming evil with good, surprising an Enemy by Kindnels, when we have it in our Power to be severe towards him; be not a far greater Pleasure than that, which is by some counted the sweetest of all other things, Revenge?

Religion doth likewife advance the Soul to an holy Confidence, concerning the Divine Favour and Good-will towards us. If our hearts condemn us not, we have confidence towards God. A good Conscience will set us above all those Fears, and Doubts, and Cares, whereby the Lives of Men arc render'd uncomfortable. When in Decrepit Age a Man cannot find Comfort in other Things, when the grinders shall be few, and appetite cease, then will this be a continual feast. The most rational, solid, sublime, compleat, durable Delights, of all others, do flow from the Confcience of Well-doing. 'Tis a chief part this, of that Heaven which we enjoy upon Earth, and 'tis likewise a principal Part of that Happiness which we hope to enjoy in Heaven. Next to the Beatifical Vision and Fruition of God, is the Happiness of a good Conscience, and next to that, the Society of Saints and Angels.

Whereas on the other fide, he that lives under the Sense of Guilt, and a Consciousness

nefs of his Obligation to Punifhment, muft needs be deflitute of all inward Peace and Comfort: Such an one can have nothing to fupport him, with Patience, under a State of Affliction in this World, nor can he have any rational Grounds to expect a better Condition hereafter; and therefore muft needs have very dreadful Apprehensions of Dying, and be all his life-time subject to bondage through the fear of death. And that Man must needs be very miserable, who can neither have true Joy in Life, nor any Hope in Death.

This the Heathen Philosophers have acknowledged, that there is always a fecret Dread, which doth accompany Guilt. So Seneca in particular, speaking of wicked Men, he faith, tantum metuunt quantum nocent, that such Men muss have Fears proportionable to their Guilt. And a little after, dat panas quisquis expectat, quisquis autem meruit, expectet; those Men do really suffer Punishment, who live under the Expectation of it, and whoever doth any thing to deferve it. muss needs expect it. 'Tis not easy to expresente Torment which those Men undergo,

-quos diri conscia facti Menshabet attonitos, & surdo verbere cædit. Occultum quatiente animo tortore flagellum. -Mens sibi conscia facti Præmetuens, adhibet stimulos, terrétque flagellis. 336

26.

28.

19.

Of the Principles, &c. Lib. II.

'Tis the Unfupportableness of this, that many times doth caufe Men in the Bitterness of their Souls, to chuse Strangling and Death rather than Life. The Heathens do set forth fuch a Man's Condition, by the Fiction of Furies continually haunting and scourging him: But Zophar doth better describe it, Job 2. 25, where he faith; Terrors are upon him; all darkness is hid in his secret places; a fire not blown shall consume him.

Though fome Men are fo hardened against the Sense of Guilt, as to go on in their finful Courfes, without feeling any of this Remorse for them; yet is their Peace so far from being a Privilege, that it doth render their Condition more desperate, because it Rom. 1. fupposes them to have a reprobate Mind, and Eph.4.18, such a Stupidity upon their Consciences, as makes them past feeling, being seared, as it Tim.4.2. were, with an hot iron. Which though it may preferve them from those present Lashes which others are tormented with; yet doth it argue their Conditions to be more remediless and desperate. All the Difference is, the one is fick of a Calenture, or burning Fever; the other of a Lethargy, or Apoplexy; the former more painful for the present, but both of them very dangerous, only the latter less capable of Remedy than the former.

CHAP.

CHAP. VIII.

337

How Religion conduces to our Happiness in the next World.

A S Religion is the true Cause of our present Happines in this World, whether

SExternal Internal.

So likewife is it the Caufe of that Happinefs, which we expect in our *future States*: Which must depend upon fuch Courses, as can give us the most rational Assurance of Bleffedness and Glory hereafter.

I fhall speak but briefly to this Subject; because 'tis scarce possible for any Man to be so ftrangely infatuated, so wholly lost to common Reason, as to believe, that vicious Courses, despising of Religion, walking contrary to God, can be the Means to entitle him to this future Happines, any more than Contempt and Hatred of any one, is a proper Means to procure his Favour.

What kind of Happinels this is, which belongs to our future State, and wherein the Glory of it doth confilt, is, a pinlow th, a Thing unspeakable, altogether above the Z Exprese

Of the Principles, &c. Lib. II.

Expressions of human Orators, and passeth all Knowledge, the Heart of Man being not able to conceive it: Nor can it be expected that we should be able, in this State of Flesh and Mortality, to comprehend what kind of Irradiations glotified Souls are capable of. Only in the general, 'tis faid, we shall be like God, and see him as he is.

This State of future Happinels, as it is above all other Things of greatest Moment; fo ought it to be proportionably laboured after, with the greatest Care and Diligence.

There are feveral Varieties of Metaphorical Names or Expressions, whereby this State is described in Scripture; but all of them do imply something of more than ordinary Care and Industry to the qualifying Lib.5.c.9. of Men for it, as Bellarmine hath observed in his Tract De Eternâ felicitate Sanctorum.

'Tis stiled,

The City of God, the Heavenly Jerufalem. And it requires fome Care and Diligence for one that is a Citizen of this World,

- Ephef. 2. to be a *Fellow-citizen with the Saints*; it being no eafy thing for one that lives in this World, not to be of it.
- Matth. 7. The house of God, where there are many mansions; but strait is the gate, and narrow is the way to it.
- Matth. 13. An hid treasure, a precious pearl. Not to be obtained without putting such a Value:

338

lue upon it, as will make a Man ready to part with all that he hath, for the Purchase of it.

A Penny. The Wages of our daily Scr-Mat. 20. vice; not to be given but to fuch as *labour* in the vineyard, and hold out to the End.

Feast, or rich Supper; which they are Luk. 14. altogether unworthy of, and unfit for, who do wholly devote themselves to the Affairs of this World.

The Joy of our Lord and Master; which Matth. 25. they only are admitted to, who are careful to improve the *Talents* they are intrusted withal.

The Solemnity of a royal Wedding; from Matth. 254 which all lazy, flothful People, who have not oyl in their lamps, and do not watch for the coming of the Bridegroom, fhall be flut out, and excluded into outer Darknefs.

'Tis a Prize; which they only obtain 1 Cor. 9. who accomplish their Race, and run to the Goal.

'Tis a Crown; which is due only to fuch i Cor. 9. as fight valiantly and overcome.

'Tis an Inheritance; and therefore belongs only to Sons. 'Tis an Inheritance of the Saints; and therefore unfanctified Perfons can have nothing to do with it. 'Tis an inheritance of the Saints in light; and therefore cannot belong to fuch as still remain under the Powers of Darkness.

7 20

Heaven

340

Of the Principles, &c. Lib. II.

Heaven may be confidered under a twofold Notion, either as a

> {State, Place.

r. In the first Sense, 'tis the same with Holiness, confisting in such God-like Difpositions, as may make us Partakers of the Divine Nature.

2. In the fecond Senfe, it denotes that other World, where we hope to enjoy the Beatifical Vision, in the bleffed Society of Saints and Angels. Which Religion only and Holiness can qualify us for, by working in our Natures such a Suitableness and Congruity, as must make such things to be Felicities.

In brief; That Salvation and Glory, which the Chriftian Religion doth fo clearly propofe to us, is, as to the Nature and Effence of it, but the very fame thing with Religion; confifting in fuch a Conformity of our Minds to the Nature of God, whereby we are made capable of the Fruition of him in Heaven. So that in this refpect alfo, Religion is the Whole of Man, that is, the whole Happinefs and Well-being of Man doth depend upon it.

I have now difpatch'd what I intended in this Difcourfe, namely, to prove the Reafonableness and Credibility of the Principles

of

of Natural Religion ; which I have made appear to be in themselves of fo great Evidence, that every one, who will not do violence to his own Faculties, must believe and affent unto them. I have likewife made it plain, that 'tis every Man's greateft Intereft, to provide for his prefent and future Happinefs, by applying himfelf to the Duties of Religion, which upon all accounts will advance the Perfection of his Nature, and promote his true Welfare, both in this World and the other. Infomuch, that if we were to chuse the Laws we would submit unto, it were not possible for us to contrive any Rules more advantageous to our own Interest, than those which Religion doth propose, and require us to observe, upon pain of everlasting Damnation, and in hope of eternal life, which God that cannot lye hath promised, to all those who by patient continuance in well-doing feek for glory, and bonour, and immortality.

Z 3

CHAP.

34I

Of the Principles, &c. Lib. II.

CHAP. IX.

The Conclusion of the Whole, shewing the Excellency of the Christian Religion, and the Advantages of it, both as to the Knowledge and Praclice of our Duty, above the mere Light of Nature.

Have now at large confidered the Credibility of the Principles of Natural Religion, and our Obligation to the feveral Duties refulting from those Principles. The Purpose of all which, is to fhew how firm and deep a Foundation Religion hath in the Nature and Reason of Mankind: But not in the least to derogate from the Necessity and Ulefulness of Divine Revelation, or to extenuate the great Bleffing and Benefit of the Christian Religion; but rather to prepare and make way for the Entertainment of that Do-Etrine which is fo agreeable to the clearest Dictates of Natural Light. For notwithstanding all that hath been said of Natural Religion, it cannot be denied, but that in this dark and degenerate State into which Mankind is funk, there is great Want of a clearer Light to discover our Duty to us With

343

with greater Certainty, and to put it beyond all Doubt and Dispute what is the good and acceptable Will of God; and of a more powerful Encouragement to the Practice of our Duty, by the Promise of a supernatural Assistance, and by the Assurance of a great and eternal Reward. And all these Defects are fully supplied, by that clear and perfect Revelation which God hath made to the World by our Bleffed Saviour. And although, before God was pleased to make this Revelation of his Will to Mankind, Men were obliged to the Practice of moral Duties by the Law of Nature, and as the Apostle speaks, having Rom. 2. not the law, were a law to them felves, shew-14, 15. ing the effect of the law written upon their Hearts; yet now that God hath in so much Mercy revealed his Will fo plainly to Mankind, it is not enough for us who enjoy this Revelation, to perform those moral Duties which are of natural Obligation, unlefs we also do them in Obedience to Christ as our Lord and Lawgiver. As we are Christians, Col. 3. 17. whatever we do in word or deed, we must do all in the name of the Lord Jesus ; and by him alone expect to find Acceptance with God.

How far the moral Virtues of mere Hease thens, who walk answerable to the Light they have, may be approved of God, I shall not now dispute. Only thus much seems clear in the general, that the Law of Na-Z 4 ture 344

Of the Principles, &c. Lib. II.

ture being implanted in the Hearts of Men by God himfelf, must therefore be esteemed to be as much his Law, as any politive Inflitution whatfoever : and confequently, Conformity to it must in its kind, in genere morum, be acceptable to him. God loves the Societies of Mankind, and because of the Necessity of Justice, and Virtue, and Probity to the Prefervation of Human Society, therefore he doth generally give a Bleffing and Success to honeft and good Enterprizes, and blafts the contrary with fignal Judgments and Marks of his Displeasure. But we cannot from these outward Dispensations infer any thing certainly concerning fuch Men's eternal Conditions.

Some of the Fathers, indeed, as Justin Martyr, and Clemens Alexandrinus, and Chryfoftom, have delivered their Judgments for the Salvation of such Heathens as live according to the Light of Nature; but the general Stream of the reft is for the contrary Opinion. I shall not now enquire into the particular Grounds and Reafons of this Différence. It may suffice to fay in general, that the goodness and mercy of God, as well as his judgment, are a great Deep; that he will have mercy on whom he will have mercy; and that when God hath not thought fit to tell us how he will be pleafed to deal with such Persons, it is not fit for us to tell Him how he ought to deal with them. Only of

of this we are fufficiently affured, that in all Ages and Places of the World, all that are faved, are faved by the Mercy of God, and by the Merits of Jesus Christ, who is the Lamb flain from the Foundation of the World; the Scripture having expresly told us, That there is no falvation in any other: for there is none other name under Heaven given among men whereby we must be faved. To be fure, there is no Reason for any Man, who lives under the Dispensation of the Gofpel, to expect that he shall escape, if he neglect so great salvation. This is the Tenor of that Doctrine of the Gospel, which Christ immediately upon his Refurrection doth commissionate his Disciples to preach, Mark 16. 16. He that believeth shall be saved, but he that believeth not shall be damned. And Joh. 3. 18. He that believeth not, is condemned already. And prefently it follows, This is the condemnation, &c. And again, Joh. 7. This is life eternal, to know Thee the only true God, and him whom thou hast Sent, Jesus Christ.

Now that to us, to whom the Christian Doctrine is revealed and proposed, the Belief and Practice of it is the only Way wherein we can hope to be accepted, I shall endeavour to make out by these two Arguments.

1. From the Evidence we have of its Divine Authority.

2. From

Of the Principles, &c. Lib. II.

2. From the Excellency of the Things contained in it; which are the two chief Grounds of our Obligation to it.

346

1. From that Evidence which we have for the Divine Authority of this Doctrine, above any other. It seems to be a Principle of Nature, to which all Nations have confented, that God himfelf fhould prefcribe the way of his own Worship. All kind of Inventions whatsoever, that have been any way useful to human Life, especially such kind of Laws as concern Civil or Ecclefiastical Associations of Men, have upon the first Discovery of them been still ascribed to the Deity: As if the Authors of them must needs have been first illuminated with fome Ray of Divinity. Nor is it probable, that ever any Nation should, with any Degree of Zeal, embrace the respective Ceremonics of their Religion, unless they had first effeemed them to have proceeded from Divine Revelation.

Upon this account was it that Lycurgus, and Numa Pompilius, and Mahomet, and the reft of those kind of Founders of Nations and Religions, when they would obtain a Reverence and Devotion to the Things they were to establish, they were fain to pretend at least to divine Revelation. Which Proceeding of theirs, though it did really abuse the People with gross Delusions, yet was it founded upon this common Principle, that none

347

none can think aright of God, much lefs ferve him in an acceptable manner, unlefs they are first instructed by him in the true way of doing it.

Now, that the Doctrine of Christianity is thus derived to us by divine Institution, we have as clear and convincing Evidence, as things of that Nature are capable of.

As for the Old Testament; That hath, by the general Confent of learned Men, all the Marks of purest Antiquity; there being nothing in the World which, in this respect, is equal to it, or which may pretend to be compared with it : all other the most ancient Monuments of Antiquity coming fhort of it by many Ages. It was written in the first and most ancient Language; from which the very Alphabets and Letters of all other Languages (in the Opinion of the most learned Heathens, Plutarch, Pliny, Tacitus, Lucan, &c.) were derived. The very Number and Order of Letters most generally used in all kind of Alphabets, being very improper and unnatural; which it is not likely Men of feveral Nations would have all agreed upon, were it not barely upon this Reason, that they were taken up by Imitation, and fo did retain the Errors and Imperfections of that first Original, from whence they were derived.

This Book contains as the most ancient, fo the most exact Story of the World. The PropaOf the Principles, &c. Lib. II, Propagation of Men, and the difperfing of Families into the feveral Parts of the Earth; as I fhewed before.

And though this Book were written in feveral Ages and Places, by feveral Perfons; yet doth the Doctrine of it accord together, with a most excellent Harmony, without any Dissonance or Inconsistency.

And for the Manner of delivering the Things contained in it, 'tis fo folemn, reverend, and majeftick, fo exactly fuited to the Nature of Things, as may juftly provoke our Wonder and Acknowledgment of its Divine Original: Infomuch, that Longinus, a great Mafter of Eloquence amongst the Heathens, hath observed the Decorum and Majesty which Moses useth in defcribing the Creation, in those Words, God said, let there be light, and there was light.

And as for the New Testament; those various Correspondencies, which it bears to the chief Things of the Old Testament, may sufficiently evidence that mutual Relation, Dependance, and Affinity, which there is betwixt them. That in such an Age there was such a Man as Christ, who preached such a Doctrine, wrought many Miracles, suffered an ignominious Death, and was afterwards worshipped as God, having Abundance of Disciples and Followers, at first chiefly amongst the Vulgar, but a while after, amongst several of the most wise and learned

. 348

learned Men; who, in a fhort Space of Time, did propagate their Belief and Doctrine into the most remote Parts of the World: I fay, all this is for the Truth of the Matter of Fact, not fo much as doubted or called into question, by *Julian*, or *Celfus*, or the *Jews* themselves, or any other of the most avowed Enemies of Christianity. But we have it by as good Certainty, as any rational Man can wish or hope for, that is, by universal Testimony, as well of Enemies as Friends.

And if these things were so, as to the Matter of Fact, the common Principles of Nature will assure us, that 'tis not confistent with the Nature of the Deity, his Truth, Wisdom, or Justice, to work such Miracles in Confirmation of a Lye or Imposture.

Nor can it be reafonably objected, that thefe Miracles are now ceafed; and we have not any fuch extraordinary Way to confirm the Truth of our Religion: "Tis fufficient that they were upon the first Plantation of it, when Men were to be inflituted and confirmed in that new Doctrine. And there may be as much of the Wisdom of Providence in the forbearing them now, as in working them then; it being not reasonable to think, that the universal Laws of Nature, by which Things are to be regularly guided in their natural Course, should frequently, or upon every little Occasion be violated or difordered.

To

349

Of the Principles, &c. Lib. II.

To which may be added *that* wonderful way whereby this Religion hath been propagated in the World, with much Simplicity and Infirmity in the firft Publifhers of it; without Arms, or Faction, or Favour of great Men; or the Perfuafions of *Philofophers* or *Orators*; only by a naked Propofal of plain evident Truth, with a firm Refolution of fuffering and dying for it, by which it hath fubdued all kind of Perfecutions and Oppofitions, and furmounted whatever Difcouragement or Refiftance could be laid in its way, or made againft it.

2. From the Excellency of the Things contained in it, both in respect of the

SEnd proposed, Means for the attaining of it.

1. From the *End* it proposes, the chief Reward which it sets before us, namely, the eternal Vision and Fruition of God. Which is so excellent in itself, and so suitable to a rational Being, as no other Religion or Profession whatsoever hath thought of, or so expressly infisted upon.

Some of the learned *Heathen* have placed the Happiness of Man in the external senfual Delights of this World; I mean the *Epicureans*, who though in other respects they were Persons of many excellent and sublime Speculations, yet because of their gross

groß Error in this kind, they have been in all Ages looked upon with a kind of Execration and Abhorrency, not only amongft the Vulgar, but likewife amongft the learneder fort of *Philofophers*. 'Tis an Opinion this, fo very groß and ignoble, as cannot be fufficiently defpifed. It doth debafe the Understanding of Man, and all the Principles in him, that are fublime and generous, extinguishing the very Seeds of Honour, and Piety, and Virtue, affording no room for Actions or Endeavours, that are truly great and noble; being altogether unworthy of the Nature of Man, and doth reduce us to the Condition of Beafts.

Others of the wifer *Heathens*, have fpoken fometimes doubtfully concerning a future State, and therefore have placed the Reward of Virtue, in the doing of virtuous Things: *Virtus est fibi præmium*. Wherein though there may be much of Truth, yet it doth not afford Encouragement enough, for the vast Defires of a rational Soul.

Others who have owned a State after this Life, have placed the Happiness of it in gross and sensual Pleasures, Feasts, and Gardens, and Company, and other such low and gross Enjoyments.

Whereas the Doctrine of Christianity doth fix it upon Things, that are much more spiritual and sublime, the Beatifical Vision, a clear unerring Understanding, a perfect Tranquillity 352

Of the Principles, &c. Lib. II.

quillity of Mind, a Conformity to God, a perpetual admiring and praifing of him : than which the Mind of Man cannot fancy any thing that is more excellent or defirable.

2. As to the *Means* it directs to, for the attaining of this End, they are fuitable both to the Goodness and Greatness of the *End* itself.

1. For the Duties that are enjoined in reference to *Divine Worfbip*. They are fo full of Sanctity and Spiritual Devotion, as may fhame all the pompous Solemnities of other Religions, in their coftly Sacrifices, their dark wild Mysteries, and external Obfervances. Whereas this refers chiefly to the Holiness of the Mind, Resignation to God, Love of him, Dependance upon him, Submission to his Will, endeavouring to be like him.

2. And as for the Duties of the fecond Table, which concern our mutual Converfation towards one another; it allows nothing that is hurtful or obnoxious, either to our felves, or others : forbids all kind of Injury or Revenge, commands to overcome Evil with Good, to pray for Enemies and Perfecutors; doth not admit of any mental, much lefs any corporal Uncleannefs; doth not tolerate any immodeft or uncomely Word or Gefture; forbids us to wrong others in their Goods and Poffeffions, or to mifpend Our

.

our own; requires us to be very tender both of our own and other Mens Reputations. In brief, it enjoins nothing but what is helpful, and useful, and good for Munkind. Whatever any Philosophers have prescrib'd concerning their moral Virtues of Temperance, and Prudence, and Patience, and the Duties of several Relations, is here enjoined in a far more eminent, fublime, and comprehenfive Manner : Befide fuch Examples and Incitations to Piety, as are not to be parallel'd elsewhere. The whole System of its Doetrine being transcendently excellent, and fo exactly conformable to the higheft, pureft Reason, that in those very things wherein it goes beyond the Rules of Moral Philosophy; we cannot in our best Judgment but consent and fubmit to it:

In brief, it doth in every respect to fully answer the chief Scope and Design of Religion, in giving all imaginable Honour and Submission to the Deity, promoting the good of Mankind, satisfying and supporting the Mind of Man with the highest kind of Enjoyments, that a rational Soul can wish or hope for, as no other Religion or Profession whatsoever can pretend unto.

What hath briefly been faid upon this Argument, may fuffice to fhew the exceeding Folly and Unreafonablenefs of those Men, who are sceptical and indifferent as to any A a kind 354

Of the Principles, &c. Lib. II.

kind of Religion. 'Tis a Vice this, that if it may not be stiled direct Atheism, yet certainly it is the very next Degree to it. And there is too much reason to suspect, that it doth in this Generation very much abound, not only amongst the Vulgar, but such also as would be thought the greateft Wits, and most knowing Men. It hath been occasion'd by that Heat and Zeal of Men, in those various contrary Opinions, which have of late abounded, together with those great Scandals that have been given by the Professors of Religion on feveral hands: from whence Men of corrupt Minds have taken occasion to doubt of all kind of Religion; and to look upon it only as a political Invention, which doth no farther oblige, than as the Laws of feveral Countries do provide for it. These common Scandals have been the Occasion; but the true Ground at the bottom, of fuch Men's Prejudice and Diffatisfaction, is the Strictnefs and Purity of this Religion, which they find puts too great a Reftraint and Check upon their exorbitant Lufts and Paffions.

I know they will pretend for their Hefitation and Indifferency in this kind, the want of clear and infallible Evidence for the Truth of Chriftianity; than which nothing can be more abfurd and unworthy of a rational Man: For let it be but impartially confidered; what is it that fuch Men would have? Do they expect Mathematical Proof and

355

and Certainty in Moral Things? Why, they may as well expect to fee with their Ears, and hear with their Eyes. Such kind of things (as I fhew'd at large, in the beginning of this Treatife) being altogether as disproportioned to fuch kind of Proofs, as the Objects of the feveral Senses are to one another. The Arguments or Proof to be used in several Matters, are of various and different Kinds, according to the Nature of the Things to be proved. And it will become every rational Man to yield to fuch Proofs, as the Nature of the Thing which he enquires about is capable of: And that Man is to be look'd upon as froward and contentious, who will not rest satisfied in fuch kind of Evidence, as is counted fufficient, either by all others, or by most, or by the wifest Men.

If we suppose God to have made any Revelation of his Will to Mankind, can any Man propole or fancy any better Way for conveying down to Posterity the Certainty of it, than that clear and universal Tradition which we have for the Hiftory of the Gospel? And must not that Man be very unreasonable, who will not be content with as much Evidence for an ancient Book, or Matter of Fact, as any thing of that Nature is capable of? If it be only infallible and mathematia cal Certainty that can fettle his Mind, why fhould he believe that he was born of fuch Parents, and belongs to fuch a Family ? 'Tis Aa a poffible

356

Of the Principles, &c. Lib. II.

poffible Men might have combined together to delude him with fuch a Tradition. Why may he not as well think, that he was born a Prince, and not a Subject, and confequently deny all Duties of Subjection and Obedience to those above him? There is nothing fo wild and extravagant, to which Men may not expose themselves by such a kind of nice and forupulous Incredulity.

Whereas, if to the Enquiries about Religion a Man would but bring with him the fame Candour and Ingenuity, the fame Readinefs to be inftructed, which he doth to the Study of human Arts and Sciences; that is, a Mind free from violent Prejudices, and a Defire of Contention; it can hardly be imagined, but that he must be convinced and fubdued by those clear Evidences, which offer themselves to every inquisitive Mind, concerning the Truth of the Principles of Religion in general, and concerning the Divine Authority of the Holy Scriptures, and of the Christian Religion.

FINIS.

SERMON Preach'd at the FUNERAL OFTHE Right Reverend Father in God, JOHN WILKINS, D.D.

A


Late Lord Bishop of Chester, At the Guildhall Chapel, LONDON, On Thursday the 12th of December, 1672.

By WILLIAM LLOYD, D. D.

Then Dean of BANGOR, Late Lord Bishop of WORCESTER.

LONDON:

Printed in the Year M.DCC.XXXIV.



Нев. хій. 7.

 (\mathbf{I})

Remember them which have the Rule over you, who have Spoken to you the Word of God; whose Faith follow, considering the End of their Conversation.

N handling this Text of holy Scripture, that we may mingle nothing of Human Affections, that our Paffion may give no Interruption to you in Hearing, or to me in Speaking; I should defire to suppress them quite, if it were possible. And possible it is, where they are flightly raifed, as upon common and ordinary Occasions : But where they are grounded and ftrong, where they dare argue, and seem to have Reason on their side, as there is too much in fight for our's; there I think it is in vain to endeavour it : The only way in this Cafe, is to give them fome kind of Vent, to discharge them in part, and to govern what remains of the Affections.

You

You will, I hope, the rather bear with my Infirmity, that I cannot contain from deploring the Lofs, the irreparable Lofs, that we suffer, I think all suffer, in the Death of this eminent Person. He was the Man in whom his Friends had Experience of much Good, and had hopes of much more; not to much for his Greatness or Power, as abstracting from these, for what they found in himfelf, which was a great and manifold Bleffing to all that lived within his Conversation. He was a Father, a Counfellor, a Comforter, a Helper, a sure Friend : He was all they could with in every Relation, and, by the Course of Nature, might have been for many Years. But for our Sins, (tho' for his unspeakable Advantage) the Great and Wife God was not pleafed to continue that Bleffing; he took him out of this World, when, for ought we could judge, there was most need of such Men to live in it; and when we had much reafon to expect more Good than ever, by his living in it.'

Oh the unfearchable Ways and Counfels of God! Oh the Blindnefs of human Hopes and Expectations! While we pleafe ourfelves with the Good we have in hand, while we reach out for more, as if there would never be an End, within a few Days all withers, all vanisheth to this: We have nothing left, but what it grieves us to fee; We

2

we have nothing remains, but what we are willing to be rid of, a poor Shell of Earth, that we make hafte to bury out of our fight.

Yes; of wife and good Men, which is their Privilege above others, there remains after Death, a Memory, an Example, which they leave behind them, as a facred Depositum for us to keep and use until we see them again. Are these things nothing in our fight? They are above all Price in the fight of God; who, that they may be fo to us, both telleth us the Worth, and recommends them to our Efteem, and requires the Fruit of them in many Places of Scripture: but in none with more Application to our present Occasion, than in my Text. I shall sufficiently justify my Choice of it, if I can but make it be understood : I shall shew the full Import of it, in those Duties which it contains: I shall endeavour to stir you up to practife them with respect to this present Occasion.

First, For the Understanding of my Text, we are to look for no help from what goes next before it, or after it: For the whole Business of it is contain'd within it felf: It lies in the heap among other Directions, which, without any certain Connexion between them, were given by the Writer of this Epistle to the Hebrews; that is, to those Jews who were converted to be Christians. 3

For

4

For the Time when it was written, we are certain of this, that it was while Timothy lived; for he is mentioned as living, in the 24th Verse of this Chapter. And he being there faid to have fuffer'd Imprisonment for the Gospel, this brings us a little nearer to the Knowledge of the Time: For then it must be after both St. Paul's Epistles to Timothy. In the last of those Epistles, which was some Years after the other, St. Paul fpeaks much of his own Imprisonment for the Gospel: He warns Timothy oft, that he must suffer for the Gospel: He instructs him what to do when God fhall call him to fuffer. Not a Word of any thing that he had fuffer'd already: nay, he counfels him as a young Man, that had never been tried. He invites him to Rome, which was the great Place of Trial; in which Place, as it appears in the Close of this Chapter, Timothy did suffer that Imprisonment for the Gospel, from which he was deliver'd, when this Epiftle was written. It appears, that after the Epistle to Timothy, how long after we know not, he did go to Rome, as Paul will'd him. How long he staid there we know not, e'er he did fuffer Imprisonment. How long he was in Prifon, we know not, e'er he was fet at liberty. Only we know, it was a confiderable Time, we have Reafon to think it might be fome Years; it might be many Years that this Epifile was written after the second Epistle to Timothy. And

And if so, then it was written, not only as Theodoret says, long after the Death of James the Brother of John: But account it how you will, this Epistle was written after the Death of James the Brother of our Lord : Which James being the first Bishop of Jerusalem, and the other James an Apostle, that is, a Bishop at large, and both these being put to death at Jerusalem; not to search into Church-Hiftory for those others of their Order, who died before this time in other Places, nor to guess how many others were dead, that are not recorded in Church-Hiftory: If we think of no more but these two eminent Servants of Chrift, we cannot be to seek for the understanding of this Text, nor for the Application to our particular Purpose : I say not, but it may have a more general Extent. There is a Memory due, not only to the Apostles of Christ, and to the Bishops their Successors, but to all other good Ministers of Christ, yea, to all other exemplary Christians. But if the Apostle had meant this only of Bishops, I cannot guess that he would have it express'd otherwise, than he hath done in my Text.

To prove this, I must have recourse to the Original, and not wholly depend upon our English Translation. For that he meant this of Bishops, it appears not sufficiently, and

6

and of them being dead, not at all, in our Tranflation. And yet from the Original, I fee no reason to doubt, that our Apostle in this Text, meant no other but Bishops, and those departed this Life.

For the Order of Bishops, it is described by those Acts of Ruling and Teaching, in the Words of our Translation; but it is much more expressly by the Word hysperoe in the Original. For the meaning of which Word, to whom fhould we refort, but either to the Greeks, in whofe Language; or to the Jews, for whole immediate Ule this was written? Among the Greeks houver is a general Word, it signifies Rulers Ecclefiaffical or Civil. In this Verse they take it for Ecclefiastical Rulers : So Chry fostom on my Text : and Oecumenius, aei Eriononov, the Apostle speaks of Bishops in this Verse. If the Jews would fay fo too, what could we have more? They do fay it, as much as we have reason to expect. In their Traditional Language, they call one of our Bishops which in Effect is the Word in my Text. So then we have the Confent both of Greeks and of Hebrews, that is, of them who had most reason to know the Meaning of the Word, that Bishops are meant by the Word ny suevoi in my Text.

That

That the Apostle here speaks not of living, but of dead Bishops; of them that had the Rule before that Time; though 'tis render'd, that have, in our Translation; it appeareth by other Words in my Text. Remember them, fays the Apostle : What, those that are present? They are not the Objects of Memory, but of Sense. Remember 25 hJepérov, the good Bishops you have had : outwes enannoav, them that have Spoken to you, that have spoken their last, and shall speak no more in this World: avaleupsvies, considering, looking back, or looking up to The Exbasis & avageophs, the end of their Conversation. 'Arageogn fignifies the whole Course of this Life; ex6aois is the End or Period of it. Look back, fays the Apostle, to your Bishops deceased, consider their End, or Exit, or going out of this World.

To confirm this, if any doubt, I fhall defire him to compare this Verse with the 17th of this Chapter. In both Verses the Apostle speaks of the hydreson, that is, of Bishops, as I have interpreted and proved. In the 17th, he shews our Duty to the living, Obey them, says the Apostle, and submit yourselves, for they watch for your Souls. In this Verse he shews our Duty to Bishops deceased; Remember them, and follow

follow their Faith, confidering the End of their Conversation.

I think more needs not be faid, to fhew the Scope of my Text, and how applicable it is to our prefent Occasion. It being clear, that the Apostle speaks here of Bishops, and of them being departed this Life.

I now proceed to the Duties required at our Hands; unnuovoliere, and unugode, Remember and Imitate.

First, Remember. 'Tis a natural Desire that Men have, to be remembered when they are dead. We do not find it is fo in any other Creature; they defire to live as long as they can; but, for ought we can judge, by any Indication, they have no regard to what shall come after. The Reason is plain, for their Being determines with their Life. But for Man, among many other Tokens of Immortality, he hath, by secret Instinct, a natural Desire to be thought of, and spoken of in After-Times. We see this, not only in them that are inflamed with the Hope of a future Life; but even in those, that, for ought appears to us, know or think little of any more but the present.

What else made the Egyptian Kings lay out their Wealth on Pyramids, and the like stupendous Buildings? What moved the Old Greeks and the Romans, with so much Care

8

Care and Expence to leave Statues and other Monuments, with Inscriptions of their Names? What meant those in the unlettered Nations, by the much harder Shifts they have made to convey any thing of themselves to Posterity? I need not seek for Inftances of this in remote Times and Countries, when we see 'tis so frequent in our Age, and perhaps no where more than in this City; for Men of Defign, that think long before-hand, above all other things, do provide for this kind of Immortality. Some venture their Lives, others wear out themselves, they do and suffer any thing to get Fartes; not for themfelves, that might be nappier without them; nor fo much for their known Heirs, whom they load with Entails, as for Men whom they know not, but only hope they will be in After-times. For their inward thought is, that their houses shall continue for ever, and their dwelling-place to all generations: they call their lands by their own names. This their way is their folly, and those that fee it are fuch fools to take after them, fays David, P fal. 49. 11.

But if this Defign take, it must be in spite of God, who hath declared it shall not do. He will thwart wicked Men. They that provide not for the true Immortality, shall lose their Defign in this Shadow

Shadow of it. Either their Name shall be forgotten; God hath threatned he will cut it off, he will blot it out, their memory shall perish with them: Or if it survive, it shall be to their Shame, their name shall rot, Prov. 10. 7. What they build for Fame, shall be like Absalom's Pillar, which remains to this Day; but the Passers-by throw Stones at it, in detestation of his Memory. Such is generally, though not always, the Curse of God that pursues wicked Men.

Whereas; contrariwife, it is the Promife of God to the Just, that they shall always be had in remembrance; Psal. 112. 6. And that their memory shall be bleffed as far as known, Prov. 10. 7. Promises, which, as all other temporal Things, are to be understood with Refervation to the divine Occonomy, to that Wifdom of God, which orders all Things in the Government of the World. It becometh not the Majesty of him that governs all Things, to break his Courfe, and to work Miracles upon every particular Occasion. 'Tis enough that he generally provideth, that the fame thing may be done otherwise, and declares it to those by whom it ought to be done. If they do it not, if there be a Failure in them, his Promise is not void, his Word is not broken, fince it was given with that Condition: Which being not performed

formed by them that were to have done it; he can make Reparation to those that suffer by it; yea, he hath done it already in this, that he hath given them that which this typifies. And what if they fall short of the Shadow, when they have the Subftance, in a better and true Immortality?

The mean while, we fee what is required on our Parts. As the Servants of God, out of that Store which he hath given us, we are to pay what he hath promifed good Men. 'Tis that which all naturally defire, but wicked Men shall not attain; only to the Just, God hath promised that we shall remember them, and he commands that we should do it; especially for good Bishops departed this Life.

Our Remembrance of them doth not differ in kind, but in degree, from what we owe to the Memory of others. 'Tis a Duty we are to pay them above others, in our Thoughts, in our Affections, in our Words, and in our Actions and Lives.

First, in our Thoughts: 'Tis not a fimple Remembrance that God requires; for that being an Act of the fensitive Soul, as I conceive, doth not directly fall under Precept. For it is not in our power to remember or forget, either what or when we please. But it is in our power, to do those Acts which conduce to the B b exciting

exciting, or to the helping of our Memory. This is that which God requires at our hands, that we fhould endeavour to turn our Minds towards fuch Objects, and contemplate in them the Gifts and Graces of God; that as often as we think of them, we fhould acknowledge that Good which was in them, and which we have received by their Means: That we fhould pay them that honourable Effeem which we owe to our fpiritual Parents and Benefactors.

If we think upon them heartily in this manner, it will work fomething upon our Affections. We cannot but be sensible of the Want of fuch Men, and therefore grieved for our Lofs, when they are taken from us; as the Asian Bishops were at those Words of St. Paul, when he faid, they should see his face no more. Though God intend it for their Gain, whom he takes to himfelf, and he takes them in that time, which fuits best with their Circumstances: yet, even then we have cause to grieve for ourselves, and for the Church, who are deprived of the Prefence and Use of such Men. How much more, when, for ought we know, they are taken away for our Sins? When, for ought we know, it was because the Age was not worthy of them? For ought we know, tis

12

'tis in order to fome Judgment of God, which will come the fooner when they are gone, when we have filled up the Measure of our Iniquities?

When Elijah was taken away in a very evil Age, Elishah cryed out, O my Father, my Father, the Chariots and Horsemen of Israel! What will become of Israel, now thou art gone? We dare not think fo highly of any one Man. We have no such Cause to despond of our Nation. When it is bad, we are to do our Parts to make it better, to pray that God would fend more Labourers into his Harvest, that he would double his Gifts and Blessings on those that are left.

And for those we have lost, we must refign them to God; both acknowledging his Bounty in giving them to us, and fubmitting to his Will, in taking them to himfelf. So St. Bernard, on the Death of his Brother Gerard, Lord, fays he, thou hast given, and thou hast taken away; tho' we grieve that thou hast taken away, yet we cannot forget that thou didst give him. Yea, we owe not only Submission to God, but Thankfulness too for their Sakes, who are delivered, by this Means, from fo great and fuch manifold Evils, as continually hover about us in this Life; from Sicknefs and Pain, from Labour and Danger, from Bb 2 Sorrow,

Sorrow, and Fear, and Care, and what not? Being delivered from Sin, which is the Caufe, and from that Flefh, which is the Center of all this.

They are pait all Evils elfe, that have overcome Death: They leave Sorrow to us, who call ourfelves the Living: Their Life, the only true Life, is immutable Joy, eternal Reft, Peace, and Felicity.

Which, if we ferioufly believe, if we defire to be with them, we cannot forrow for our Lofs, without Joy for their Gain, and Thankfgiving on their behalf, to that good God, who hath given them the Victory through our Lord Jefus Christ.

But thus much we owe upon the Death of every true Christian, though of never so mean a Rank and Condition. We are to be thankful to God for his Mercies, and to profess it, as we are taught in the Offices of our Church; which have the fame Words of Burial for the meanest of our Communion, as for those that are highest in their Graces and Gifts.

But there is a Remembrance in Words that is due to thefe, and not to the other; namely, the due Praife of those their excellent Graces and Gifts, which, though they have not of themselves, but through the Bounty and Liberality of God, who is therefore to be chiefly respected and glorified,

14

fied, in all the Praife that we give to his Creatures: Yet fince he is pleafed to do them this Honour above others, and to make choice of them whom he fo dignifies; we are bound to allow it them, we are to follow God's Choice, to give them Praife, whom he hath fo qualified for it: only with this Care, that we do it truly, not to flatter the Dead; and profitably, for the Example and Imitation of the Living.

We have fo much Reafon to do this, that they who had only Reason to guide them, the Gentiles, upon the Death of any eminent Person, had Orations made publickly in their Praise. The Jews, without any particular Law for it, had Honour done to the Memory of worthy Perfons at their Funerals, 2 Chron. 32. ult. The Rites of it are partly described, 2 Chron. 16. 14. They laid their Dead in a Bed full of the richeft Perfumes, which also were publickly burnt at the Interment. To which I conceive the Preacher alludes, Eccles.7.1. where he fays, A good name is better than precious ointment, and the day of one's death than the day of one's birth.

When one cometh into the World, none knows how he may prove; if he do well in it, he goes out with this publick Teftimony. After which, the *Jews* never men-Bb 3 tioned tioned fuch Perfons, without a Bleffing on their Memory.

But, above all others, the Primitive Christians were very observant this way. They faw it was the Will of their Lord and Master, that the good Work which was done upon him by Mary should be kept in perpetual Memory, and is therefore recorded in the Gospel. They faw how the Works of Dorcas were thewn at her Death, the Coats and Garments which fhe made for the Poor. They faw what need there was of great Incentives in those Days, when Christianity was a most dangerous Profession. It is of no small Force to make Men love a Religion, when they fee it infuses excellent Principles, that it excites so suitable Practices, that it is Proof against Suffering and Death. And the Experience of that Power it hath in fome, provokes and animates others to the fame.

Upon these and the like Confiderations, and perhaps with Allusion to that Text, where St. Jobn is faid to have seen the Souls of the Martyrs under the Altar; they had their Memorias Martyrum, their Places of Worship, where they placed the Altars over the Bodies of their Martyrs. What, with any Intention to worship the Martyrs? It was so suggested by the Adversaries,

かい きまいちま

verfaries, and as vehemently denied by the Christians of those Times. By those of Smyrna, in the undoubted Acts of Polycarpus: We cannot (fay they) worship any other than Christ; We love the Martyrs as being Followers of Christ: We celebrate the Days of their Passions with Joy; We do it both in remembrance of those Champions of God, and to train up and prepare others for the like Conflicts.

Befides this, which was peculiar to the Martyrs, they had a lower Degree of Remembrance for Bifhops and Confeffors, and all other eminent Perfons departed this Life, whom they not only praifed in Orations at their Funerals, but writ their Names in their Dypticks, or two-leaved Records, which contain'd, in one Page, all the Names of the Living; in the other, the Dead that were of note in the Church.

All thefe were recited in the Communion Service: Where, as the Living for themfelves; fo for the Dead, came their Friends, and gave Oblations and Alms; which, before they were diffributed among the Poor, were first offered up to God, in a Prayer like that which we use for the Church Militant here on Earth. These Doles were their only Sacrifices for the Dead; only Alms to the Poor, with which Sacrifices God is well pleased. And their Bb 4 Prayers

Prayers were not for any Deliverance from Pains; unlefs the Patriarchs, and Prophets, and the Apoftles, and Virgin Mother of Chrift, were in the fame Pains too, and needed the fame Deliverance : For they were all mentioned alike, and together, as it is to be feen in the ancienteft Liturgies.

Among all these innocent Offices and Rites of the Primitive Chrissians, was there any thing of Prayer for Souls in Purgatory? Was there any thing of Prayer to Saints departed this Life? Was there any foundation for those superstitious Observances, of adoring their Reliques, of Prostration to their Images, of Pilgrimage to their Shrines, of making Vows, of faying Maffes, of Offering to them, and the like? The Papifts fay there was; they plead the Practice of the Church for it; they wreft Places of Scripture to their purpose. Nay, the Rhemists and others, alledge this very Text, without which I fhould not have mentioned them at this time. But as the learnedest Men among themselves have been so just not to charge this upon my Text, and fome of them confess they have no ground for these things, in any one Text of Canonical Scripture : so they would do us but right to acknowledge, that none of these things were practis'd for some hundreds of Years after Christianity came into the World.

In

In those Primitive Times, all their Offices for the Dead were either to give Teffimony of that Faith in which they died, and that Death had not diffolv'd their Communion with the Living: Or they were to blefs God for their holy Life, and happy Death : Or to pray to him, not for their Deliverance from Purgatory, of which there was no Faith in those Times; but for the Increase of that Good which they believ'd them to be poffess'd of already, or for the Attainment of that farther Good, which they thought they were fure of; namely, for their speedy and happy Refurrection, for their perfect Discharge at the Day of Judgment, for the Confummation of their Blifs, with their own, in the Kingdom of Glory.

Not to fay how the Fathers differ among themfelves, in thefe Particulars; or, how many of thefe Particulars are omitted in the *Roman* Church, as well as ours; it is enough that here is nothing makes for them, but much against those their Errors and Corruptions. All that is agreed on all hands, or that we find in the Practice of the first Ages, being sufficiently contain'd in those Offices of our Chu.ch; in the Prayer for the Church Militant, in the Collect on *All-Saints* Day, and in the Office for the Burial of the Dead; where We

we pray, That it would please God, of his gracious goodness, shortly to accomplish the number of his Elect, and to hasten his Kingdom; that we, with all those that are departed in the true Faith of his holy Name, may have our perfect consummation and bliss, both in body and soul, in his everlasting Glory.

Lastly, Remembrance in Action is the other Duty enjoin'd in myText, Minade The Tique, Imitate their Faith, that is, their Christian Profession and Practice, their whole Life and Conversation, according to their own Belief of that Word which they have spoken.

The Reafon of this Duty is plain; for it is our Bufinefs in this World to recover the Image of God in which he created us; to be like him here in Righteoufnefs and Holinefs, that we may be like him hereafter in Glory and Happinefs.

To this end, God has given us those Lineaments of himself, which are written sufficiently in our Nature, but more fully and distinctly in Scripture. In which Scripture, he so oft and so vehemently requires us, Be ye holy, as I am holy; be ye just, as I am just; be ye merciful, as I am merciful; be ye pure, as I am pure; be ye perfect, as your heavenly Father is perfect.

This

This good Word of God, which was given by the Prophets and Apostles, is still inculcated on us by them that speak to us the Word of God: Which Office being primarily of Bishops, as appears in my Text, they are first, and above all others, to conform themselves to it, to shew others how possible and how practicable it is.

Our Apostle supposed this in those Primitive Bishops in my Text. God requires it of all that succeed them in the Church. So of *Timothy*, tho' he were young in Age, yet being in that Place, Be thou an Example to Believers in word, in conversation, in spirit, in faith, in truth, 1 Tim. 4. 12. And in the last Verse, Take heed to thy self, and to thy Dostrine: Do this constantly, and continually, and so thou shalt save both thy self and them that hear thee.

Whether they do this or no, they are our *Teachers* and *Rulers*; therefore in the 17th Verfe of this Chapter, while they live, we must *obey* their Word, and *fubmit* to their Government. When they are dead, both for what they are, and were, we may do well to fay no ill of them; and fince we can fay no good, e'en forget them, and leave them to God.

But if they are fuch as they ought, which the Apostle supposes in my Text, if they live as Men, that believe themselves what they

they fay; 'tis our Duty, not only to fubmit and obey them, while they live, but alfo to remember them when they are dead : Remember them in our Thoughts, with that Honour they deferve; in our Affections, with a due Sense of our Loss, and their Gain: Remember them in Words, with the just Praise of their Actions and Lives: In our Prayers to God, with due Thankfulness for their Graces and Gifts in this Life, and for the Glory they receive after Death. Laftly, remember to follow them in that holy Way, which leads to fo happy an End: In our Apostle's Words, follow their Faith, confidering the Event, the bleffed End of their good Converfation.

What my Text fays in general of Bifhops deceafed, 'tis most easy to apply. I know it hath been done all this while, by them that knew the virtuous and great Mind that lately dwelt in this Body. They know the Truth of all I shall fay, and much more that might be faid in his just Commendation. But the little I can bring within the Time I have left, being faid from many Years Experience, will, at least, stir up those that knew him not, to enquire; and if they find these Things true, they know their Duty of Remembranee and Imitation.

I

I fhall be minute in drawing all I fay under these Heads: For I speak to them that can diffinguish and fort Things, as they belong to the one, or to the other.

To begin with the natural Endowments of his Mind; I cannot think of him without just Reflection upon that Paradox, of the Equality of Souls. He was furely a great Inflance to the contrary; having that Largeness of Soul in every respect, which was much above the Rate of ordinary Men. He had an Understanding that extended to all Parts of useful Learning and Knowledge; a Will always disposed to great, and publick, and generous Things. He had a natural Aversion from all idle Speculations, and from the eager Pursuit of small and frivolous Defigns. In great Matters, he judged fo well, that he was not ufually furpriz'd with Events. He pursued his Intentions with fuch Equalnels of Mind, that he was never carried beyond the Calmness of his natural Temper, except thro' his Zeal for Publick Good, or where his Friend was concerned.

What he was in his Studies, I have reafon to know, that have often been tired with fludying with him. He was Indefatigable, and would have worn himfelf out, if he had not been relieved with Multiplicity of Bufinefs. However, he impair'd by

by it, a Body which feemed to have been built for a long Age, and contracted those Infirmities that hasten'd his Death.

The Effect of his Studies, in his Preaching and Writings, are fufficiently known, and would have been much more, if God had given him Time.

As for his Preaching, it was fometimes famous near this Place; tho' he fought rather the Profit, than the Praise of his Hearers. He spoke solid Truth, with as little Shew of Art as was possible. He express'd all Things in their true and natural Colours; with that Aptness and Plainness of Speech, that grave natural Way of Elocution, that shewed he had no Design upon his Hearers. His Plainness was best for the Instruction of the Simple; and for the better Sort, who were in truth an intelligent Auditory, it was enough that they might fee he had no mind to deceive them. He applied himfelf rather to their Understanding than Affections. He faw fo much of the Beauty of Goodness himself, that he thought the bare fhewing of it was enough to make all wife Men, as it did him, to be in love with it.

In his Writings he was judicious and plain, like one that valued not the Circumstances fo much as the Substance. And he shewed it in whatsoever Argument he undertook; fome-

fometimes beating out new untravelled Ways, fometimes repairing those that had been beaten already: No Subject he handled, but I dare say is the better for him; and will be the easier for them that come after him.

If in these he went sometime besides his Profession, it was in following the Design of it, to make Men wiser and better, which I think is the Business of Universal Knowledge. And this he promoted with much Zeal and Sincerity, in hope of the great Benefit that may accrue to Mankind.

It was his Aim, as in all things, fo efpecially in that, which I conceive is much more cenfured than underftood; I mean, in the Defign of the Royal Society. He joined himfelf to it with no other End, but to promote modern Knowledge, without any Contempt or leffening of those great Men in former Times. With due honour to whom, he thought it lawful for others to do that which, we have no reason to doubt, they themselves would have done if they were living.

I would not feem to excufe that which deferveth Commendation and Encouragement; or to commend other things for want of Subject in him. Therefore leaving this Theme in better hands, I proceed next to speak of his Virtues and Graces; and

26

and these the rather, as being both to be remember'd and follow'd.

And in fpeaking of thefe, where fhall I begin? Nay, when fhall I end, if I fay all that may be fpoken? I think it not worth while to fpeak of thofe that are Vulgar, tho' he had them alfo in no common Degree: Nor would I feem to make any Virtue a Propriety. But there are thofe which are not common to many, and were generally acknowledged to be in him; tho' they appear'd not fo to fome other Men, as they did to thofe that intimately knew him.

His Prudence was great, I think it feldom failed in any thing to which he applied himfelf. And yet he wanted that Part, which fome hold to be effential; he fo wanted Diffimulation, that he had rather too much Ópennefs of Heart. It was Sincerity indeed that was natural to him; he fo abhorred a Lye, that he was not at all for Shew; he could not put on any thing that look'd like it. And prefuming the fame of other Men, thro' Excefs of Benignity, he would be fometimes deceived, in believing they were what they feem'd to be, and what he knew they ought to have been.

His Greatness of Mind, was known to all that knew any thing of him. He neither eagerly sought any Dignity, nor declined any Capacity of doing Good. He look'd

look'd down upon Wealth, as much as others admire it : He knew the use of an Estate, but did not covet it. What he yearly received of the Church, he bestow'd in its Service. As for his temporal Estate, being secured against Want, he sought no farther, he set up his Rest; I have heard him say often, *I will be no richer*, and I think he was as good as his Word.

As for Revenge, how could it enter into the Breaft of him that hated nothing but that which makes us hateful to God? I fay not but he had a Senfe of Perfonal Injuries; and efpecially of those that reflected upon his Name, when they proceeded from those that had good Names of their own. What others faid, he despised; but by those he would often wish he had been better underftood: That he was not, he bore as his Missfortune; he would not requite them with the like, but mention'd them with all due Respect, and was always ready to oblige them, and to do them good.

Yct it was not so defirable, (I fay not to be his Enemy, for he did not account them so, but) to be at those Terms with him as to be his Acquaintance or Friend. They that were never so little familiar with him, could not but find, as well Benefit as Delight in his Conversation. His Discourse was commonly of useful Things; it never caused C c Trouble

Trouble or Wearinefs to the Hearer. Yet he would venture to difpleafe one for his good; and indeed he was the only Man that ever I knew, for that moft needful and leaft practifed Point of Friendfhip. He would not fpare to give feafonable Reproof, and wholefome Advice, when he faw Occafion. I never knew any that would do it fo freely, and that knew how to manage that Freedom of Speech fo inoffenfively.

It was his way of Friendfhip, not fo much to oblige Men, as to do them good. He did this not flightly and fuperficially, but like one that made it his Bufinefs. He durft do for his Friend, any thing that was hoheft, and no more. He would undertake nothing but what well became him, and then he was unwearied till he had effected it.

As he concerned himfelf for his Friend, in all other Refpects, fo effectially in that which went neareft to him of all earthly Concernments. He would not fuffer any Blot to be thrown, and to lie upon his Friend's good Name, or his Memory. And that Office 1 am obliged to requite, in giving fome Account of that which has been ipoken by fome to his Difadvantage.

I shall neglect, for he did so, any frivolous Reports; but that which seems to have any Weight in it, as far as I have observed, is, that he had not that Zeal for the Church, that

that they would feem to have that object this. He feemed to look upon the Diffenters with too much Favour to their Perfons and Ways.

As to the Perfons; no doubt that Goodnefs of Nature, that true Chriftian Principle, which made him willing to think well of all Men, and to do Good, or at leaft no Hurt to any, might and ought to extend itfelf to them, among others. But befides, he was inclined to it by his Education under his Grandfather Mr. Dod, a truly Pious and Learned Man; who yet was a Diffenter himfelf in fome Things.

Not that he had any Delight in Contradiction, or could find in his Heart to disturb the Peace of the Church for those Matters: He was fo far from it, that as I have frequently heard from this his Grandchild and others, when some thought their Diffents ground enough for a War, he declared himfelf against it, and confirmed others in their Allegiance : He profest, to the last, a just Hatred of that horrid Rebellion. Now his Relation to this Man, and Conversation with those of his Principles, might incline him to, hope the like of others of that Way. And when he found them farther off from the Unity of the Church, he might poffibly over-do, thro' the Vehemence of his Defire, to bring them off of their Prejudices, and to Cc 2 reduce

reduce them to the Unity of the Church; in which his Grandfather lived and died: Why might he not hope the fame of other Differences?

As for himfelf, he was fo far from approving their Ways, that in the worft of Times, when one here prefent bewailed to him the Calamities of the Church, and declared his Obedience even then to the Laws of it: He encouraged him in it, he defired his Friendfhip, and protected both him and many others, by an Intereft that he had gained, and made use of chiefly for fuch Purposes.

How he demeaned himself then, is known in both Universities; where he govern'd with Praise, and left a very grateful Remembrance behind him. How in the next Times fince, I cannot speak in a better Place. And when I have named this City, and the two Universities, I think he could not be placed in a better Light in this Nation. There were enough that could judge, and he did not ufe to difguife himfelf; I appeal to you that converfed with him in those Days, what Zeal he hath express for the Faith, and for the Unity of the Church: How he flood up in Defence of the Order and Government. How he hath afferted the Liturgy, and the Rites of it : He conformed himfelf to every thing that was commanded. Beyond which, for any Man to be vehement in little and unneceffary

ceffary things, whether for or against them, he could not but dislike; and as his free manner was, he hath oft been heard to call it Fanaticalness. How this might be reprefented, I know not, or how his Design of Comprehension might be understood.

Sure I am, that fince he came into the Government of the Church, to which he was called in his Absence; he so well became the Order, that it out-did the Expectation of all that did not very well know him. He filled his Place with a Goodnefs answerable to the rest of his Life; and with a Prudence above it, confidering the two Extremes, which were no where fo much as in his Diocese. Tho' he was as before very tender to those that differ'd from him; yet he was as before, exactly conformable himfelf, and brought others to Conformity, some eminent Men in his Diocese. He endeavoured to bring in all that came within his Reach, and might have had great Succefs, if God had pleafed to continue him.

But having given full Proof of his Intentions and Defires, it pleafed God to referve the Fruit for other Hands, from which we have great Caufe to expect much Good to the Church.

He was in perfect Health in all other Respects; when a known Infirmity, from an unknown Cause, that had been easier to 3I

to cure, than it was to discover, stole upon him, and soon became incurable.

He was for many Days in a Prospect of Death, which he faw as it approached, and felt it come on by Degrees. Some Days before he died, he found within himfelf as he often faid, a Sentence of Death. In all this time, first of Pain, then of dreadful Apprehenfions, at last in the Presence of Death; Who ever saw him dismay'd? Who ever found him furprized? or heard a Word from him, unbecoming a wife Man, and a true Christian? It was my Infelicity to be fo engaged, that I could not duly attend him; and fo deceived with vain Hopes, that I believ'd him not dying, till he was dead. But at the times I was with him, I faw great Caufe to admire his Faith towards God, his Zeal for his Church, his Conftancy of Mind, his Contempt of the World, and his chearful Hopes of Eternity. I have heard much more upon these Heads from those that were with him. Some of you may have heard other things from other Men. It hath been the way of our Adversaries to entitle themselves to dying Men, even those whose whole Life was a Testimony against them. Thus after the Death of our famous Jewel, the Papifts were pleas'd to fay, he died of their Religion. Militiere hath ventured to infinuate the fame of our late King, of Bleffed and Glorious Memory. Men's Tongues

Tongues and Pens are their own. But left they fhould abufe them and you, and the Memory of this worthy Prelate, as they have abus'd others, (tho' nothing needs to be faid to fuch groundlefs Calumnics) I declare, and that upon most certain Grounds, that he died in the Faith of our Lord Jefus Chrift, and in the Communion of the Church of *England*, as it is by Law established.

He died only too foon for the Church, and for his Friends, but for himfelf he had lived long enough. He has lived long enough that dies well: For whatfoever he wants of that which we call Time, it is added, tho' it adds nothing to Eternity.

As for us that are now to try how we can bear the Want of those many Blessings we enjoy'd in him, What shall we fay? We must submit to the Will of God. Our Comfort is, that we shall follow, and come together again in due time. Till when, Farewel, Pious and Virtuous Soul; Farewel, Great and excellent Man; Farewel, worthy Prelate, faithful Friend! we have thy Memory and Example, thou has our Praises and our Tears. While thy Memory lives in our Breass, may thy Example be fruitful in our Lives: That our Meering again may be in Joy unspeakable, when God shall have wiped away all Tears from our Eyes.

FINIS.

Lately Published,

WELLS'S Antient and Present Geography, 800. Set of Maps of Antient and Present Geography.

- Of Wildom. Three Books. Written originally in French, by the Sieur de Charron. With an Account of the Author. Made English by George Stanhope, D.D. late Dean of Canterbury. 3 Vols. 8vo.
- The whole Critical Works of Monsieur Rapin. In 2 Vols. 800.

Bishop PATRICK's Devout Christian.

Chriftian Sacrifice.

- PUFFENDORF'S Law of Nature and Nations, with Monsieur Barbeirack's Notes, fol.
- TALENT'S Chronological Table, fol.

Archbishop Wake's Sermons, 3 Vols.

Bishop Sprat's Sermons.

143

A plain Method of Christian Devotion; laid down in Difcourfes, Meditations, and Prayers, fitted to the various Occasions of a Religious Life. Published by

Dr. FLEET WOOD, late Lord Bishop of Ely.

- Dean SHERLOCK's practical Discourse concerning Death.
- ------concerning a future Judgment.

----- concerning the Divine Providence.

----'s Sermons, 2 Vol.

-----'s Difcourse of a Future State.

Dr. WALL'S Hiftory of Infant Baptism, 2 Vol.

——-'s Defence thereof against Mr. Gale, and others. DREXELIUS'S Considerations on Eternity.

A New Edition of the late Archbishop of CAMBRAY'S Telemachus. Translated by Mr. Littlebury, adorned with Cuts.









